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Abstract

Biological research has the capacity to inform ethical discussions. There are
numerous questions about the nature of sexual orientation, intelligence, gender identity,
etc., and many of these questions are commonly approached with the benefit of implicit
or explicit biological commitments. The answers to these sorts of questions can have a
powerful impact on social, ethical, and political positions. In this project I examine the
prospect of naturalizing ethics under the umbrella of developmental systems theory
(DST). If one is committed to DST, then those ideas involved in DST that steer biological
research will also have implications for ethics. There has been much debate over whether
certain human traits or attributes are the consequence of nature or nurture. This kind of
question tends to be articulated in dichotomous terms where the focal point of the
discussion is over which opposing causal mechanism asserts the most power over the
development of these attributes. The debate places particular importance on such
distinctions as that between gene and environment, and biology and culture. DST seeks to
dismiss such dichotomous accounts. In this sense, DST is an attempt to do biology
without these dichotomies. In the process, DST articulates a reconceptualized notion of
“the natural.” I am interested in how DST’s reconceptualization of the natural can inform
a naturalistic approach to ethics. Thus, the aim of this project is to examine the
ramifications of taking DST as a guiding principle in the naturalization of ethics.

iii

Introduction

In a general sense, naturalism is “a view of the world, and of man’s relation to it,
in which only the operation of natural (as opposed to supernatural or spiritual) laws and
forces is admitted or assumed.” 1 One of the main goals of naturalism for philosophers is
to show that the subject matter of philosophy, or phenomena about which philosophers
theorize, is compatible with science. Ethical naturalism, then, can be seen as an attempt to
demonstrate that ethics is compatible with science—specifically to show that ethical facts
are natural facts. However, such attempts come with serious difficulties.
One of the main problems encountered when attempting to ally science and ethics
is figuring out how the human capacity to reason can be explained in accordance with
natural law. Our experience of using reason can sometimes suggest that it is somehow
free from the constraints of natural law. In other words, when we use reason to motivate
an action, our experience is that we are freely choosing to perform whatever action our
mind recommends. The problem consists in the idea that if nature is exhaustively
governed by natural law, and the space of reasons is seen as operating freely in its own
sphere, then the space of reasons may be seen as residing outside nature. 2 But, if we are
to understand ethics as compatible with scientific explanation, then this intuition must be
1

Flanagan, Sarkissian, Wong (1984, 1995, 1996, 2002, 2006) “Naturalizing Ethics.” Found in SinnottArmstrong, Walter (2008). Moral Psychology. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. p.1
2
Gubeljic, Mischa., Link, Simone., Müller, Patrick, and Osburg, Gunther. (1999) “Nature and Second
Nature in McDowell’s Mind and World.” Found in John McDowell: Reason and Nature a Lecture and
Colloquium in Münster. p.44
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wrong because ethics involves the use of reason or seems to be a part of the space of
reasons. Further, if the laws of science tell us that there is no empirical evidence to
support the intuition that we make free choices, and responsibility is tied to the capacity
to make free choices, then science seems to leave no room for attributing responsibility.
If science leaves no room for responsibility, then naturalizing ethics jeopardizes a major
component of ethical inquiry.
A further difficulty that arises in attempts to naturalize ethics is how we are to
reconcile the apparent divide between culture and biology, genetic and non-genetic
factors, and nature and nurture. There has been much debate over the question of whether
or not certain traits or attributes are the consequence of nature or nurture. This kind of
question tends to be articulated in dichotomous terms where the focal point of the
discussion is over which opposing causal mechanisms assert the most power over the
development of these attributes. The debate places particular importance on such
distinctions as that between gene and environment, and biology and culture. It assumes
that we have the capacity to isolate these concepts in a manner that will allow for claims
to be made about the causal power of each. It is here that my project has something to
add.
In this project I examine and outline some of the changes in how we see ethics
when viewed through the filter of developmental systems theory (DST). DST seeks to
dismiss dichotomous accounts of development. 3 In this sense, DST is an attempt to do
biology without these dichotomies. 4 I am interested in how DST’s reconceptualization of
the natural can inform a naturalistic approach to ethics. The aim of this project is to
3
4

See Griffiths, P.E. and R.D. Gray (1994); Godfrey-Smith (2000); Oyama (1985,2000,2001)
Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray (2001). Cycles of Contingency: Developmental Systems and Evolution, p.1

2

examine the ramifications of taking DST as a guiding principle in the naturalization of
ethics.
I begin with an examination of naturalism broadly construed, and then turn to an
exposition of ethical naturalism. I open with a discussion of the two main branches of
naturalism, methodological naturalism (MDN) and metaphysical naturalism (MPN). I
argue that of these two main branches, MDN is the most viable option of the two.
Next I offer an overview of specifically ethical naturalism, and examine some of
the problems associated with attempts to naturalize ethics. After discussing various
objections and responses to naturalized ethics I conclude that the debate is still open, and
that further work in this area is warranted.
I then introduce Developmental Systems Theory. I begin with a synopsis of DST
and examine the implications of accepting a DST perspective. I pay particular attention to
DST’s reconceptualization of what it means to be “natural.” I argue that this
reconceptualization allows for a naturalized ethics that avoids some of the most
problematic features of a naturalized ethics. Specifically it avoids the problem of seeing
different developmental factors as dichotomous, thus allowing culture and other nongenetic factors to be seen as part of the natural.
Another notion that plays a key role in how we go about forming ethical
conclusions is the notion of autonomy. Many argue that autonomy is requisite for
attributing moral responsibility to an organism. Thus, it seems necessary to examine the
implications on autonomy that result from accepting MDN under the umbrella of DST,
and attempt to reconcile DST with a naturalized account of autonomy. I posit the
necessary conditions for autonomy on a naturalized account, and offer an interpretation

3

of a naturalized account of autonomy within a DST framework. Proponents of DST
maintain that there is “no single, centralized control of the processes of development.” 5
So, if DST is used as a guiding principle in establishing an account of autonomy, then it
follows that it is not necessary to posit volition, inclination, environmental factors, or any
other factor as the primary determinant of the action—all these causal influences are best
seen as part of a system in which the relationship between these factors all play a role in
determining what actions are available to the organism in question.
I develop a notion of autonomy that sees autonomy as admitting of degrees rather
than as an absolute. Thus, it is possible to be more or less autonomous. I base this claim
on the number of available alternatives present to an organism. These available
alternatives are the result of three factors: Available alternative paths, available
alternative faculties, and the relationship between these faculties and paths. I call this
view autonomy-as-available-alternatives. Next I examine how moral responsibility for
our actions is to be construed under a naturalized account of autonomy within a DST
framework. I ultimately argue that only those organisms who have reason as an available
faculty, and who have the proper relationship between this faculty and an available path
are to be held morally responsible for their actions.
Although I argue that reason can play a role in autonomy, I do not claim that it
necessarily plays the primary role in determining whether an organism is autonomous.
Reason is just one of many possible interactants involved in the development of
autonomy. This leads to a question about what other sources motivate action. One other
possible motivating source of action is inclination. This raises a couple interesting
5

Oyama (2006) “Speaking Nature” in How Does Nature Speak? Dynamics of the Human Ecological
Condition. (pp. 49-65). Chuck Dyke and Yrjö Haila (Eds.), series on Ecologies for the Twenty-First
Century. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. p.12
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questions. 1) What is the source of inclination? 2) How is it that inclination can be seen
as agential? In light of these questions, I investigate the notion of inclination, and how it
might look if approached from the standpoint of DST. I discuss an argument by Tamar
Schapiro in which she breaks down three views on the source of inclination. I examine
these three views, and investigate the capacity for these accounts to work within the
naturalistic framework I endorse in the first three chapters. I discuss the three positions as
she sees them, offer criticism of the extreme rationalist (ER), and extreme anti-rationalist
(EAR) positions, then show how Schapiro’s account lends itself to the naturalistic
framework I endorse, one that assumes DST.
Finally, I investigate two contemporary versions of ethical naturalism in order to
illustrate the differences between these accounts and the account that emerges when we
look at ethics as understood from the theoretical/empirical perspective of DST. I examine
what some have termed Duke Naturalism and Pittsburgh Naturalism. 6 In discussing Duke
Naturalism I focus on the claims of Owen Flanagan, and in discussing Pittsburgh
Naturalism I focus on the claims of John McDowell. I argue that the concept of nature
used in these versions differs from the notion of nature found in naturalistic frameworks
that assume DST. I show how their accounts differ from mine, and offer criticism of their
accounts from a DST perspective. I then investigate the affect of DST’s
reconceptualization of nature on attempts to naturalize ethics. I argue that the use of
Susan Oyama’s reconceptualization of “the natural” in formulating an account of a
naturalized ethics changes the very foundation on which these accounts rest.

6

Flanagan, Sarkissian, Wong, and Ruse use this terminology in their respective chapters found in SinnottArmstrong, Walter. (2008). Moral Psychology. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press
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I want to make clear that I do not argue that DST is the best theoretical framework
for integrative biology. That is up to the biological sciences and their practitioners to
decide. I am interested in examining what a naturalized account of ethics and autonomy
would look like under the assumption of DST, but there is very little defense for DST
offered in this project. I do offer a brief account of why DST is at least a reasonable
position, and explain what it entails; however, the goal of this project is not to offer
argument for why one ought accept DST.
In addition, this project is not in the business of applied ethics, and does not
directly engage in moral theory. I do not address any specific moral problems, nor
attempt to offer solutions to any pressing ethical matters. I have not attempted to show
how one would go about addressing a moral problem by application of some guiding
principle or rule. Rather, my project may be best seen as having a meta-ethical character.
I am interested in how we might see ethics if understood from the theoretical/empirical
perspective of DST. I am not solely concerned with approaching ethics from a naturalistic
position, but from the viewpoint of DST specifically. I argue that ethics needs to be
compatible with science, and if DST ends up being widely recognized as the most
accurate account of development from a biological perspective, then my hope is that this
project will have done some valuable work.

6

1
Naturalism

In this chapter I offer a brief discussion of the concepts associated with “naturalism,” and
provide an explanation of how I use the term. I then offer an overview of ethical
naturalism. In a later chapter I discuss in detail some contemporary versions of
naturalized ethics, and attempt to show how the very foundation from which these
accounts blossom is called into question when DST enters into the conversation.

1.1 Naturalism Considered

In the broadest sense, naturalism is “a view of the world, and of man’s relation to
it, in which only the operation of natural (as opposed to supernatural or spiritual) laws
and forces is admitted or assumed.” 7 So, in one way or another, all naturalists are at least
committed to not using the supernatural to explain, understand, or account for what
happens in this world. 8 In doing this, one of the main goals of naturalism for philosophers
is to “ally philosophy more closely with science.” 9 Now, although naturalists share this
common commitment, there are different nuances found in particular accounts. The first
thing to note is that there are two primary camps, metaphysical naturalism (sometimes

7

Flanagan, Sarkissian, Wong (1984, 1995, 1996, 2002, 2006) “Naturalizing Ethics.” Found in SinnottArmstrong, Walter (2008). Moral Psychology. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. p.1
8
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter (2008) p.2
9
Papineau, David (2007) “Naturalism,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (February 22, 2007),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism/.
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called ontological naturalism), and methodological naturalism. In his book, Copernican
Questions: A Concise Invitation to the Philosophy of Science, Keith Parsons offers a
fairly uncontroversial textbook presentation of the differences between these two camps
upon which I will draw. 10 Parsons claims that “metaphysical naturalism is a doctrine
about the nature of reality. […] it assumes that all natural things have only natural causes
and therefore rejects out of hand any hypotheses postulating supernatural causes.” 11
Further, metaphysical naturalism (MPN) can be split into two main lines. Let’s call one
the strong line, and the other the weak line. The strong line not only discounts the
supernatural as an explanation, but outright denies that supernatural things exist. The
weak line does not deny the existence of supernatural things, but claims that even if
supernatural things did exist, they could not causally interact with the natural world. 12
Thus, whether one is committed to the strong line or the weak line, MPN maintains that
anything we see going on in the natural world cannot possibly be the result of the
supernatural. Although different in the strength of their commitments, both the strong line
and the weak line of metaphysical naturalism are in the business of making claims about
the nature of reality.
In contrast, “methodological naturalism does not offer opinions about the nature
of ultimate reality; it merely requires that as a matter of good scientific practice we
consider only naturalistic hypotheses.” 13 The methodological naturalist (MDN) makes no

10

Although Parsons does not offer any original analysis, he does offer a good vanilla exposition of these
two camps, and this should suffice for my purposes.
11
Parsons, Keith (2006) Copernican Questions: An Concise Invitation to the Philosophy of Science. New
York, NY: McGraw-Hill. p.91
12
Ibid., p.91
13
Ibid., p.97
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claims about the actual constituents of reality, but does make claims about the best way to
explain the phenomena we encounter in this world.
One difference to note between the MDN and MPN is that the MDN places
emphasis on the pragmatic aspect of naturalism, whereas the MPN sees naturalism as a
description of the world, i.e. as an ontological or metaphysical thesis. To clarify, the
MDN is concerned with what works, and therefore, claims that the best way to discover
things about the world is to eliminate the use of supernatural explanation. Since we lack
epistemic access to the supernatural, supernatural explanations do nothing to aid in the
actual understanding of the phenomena they are intended to explain—they simply
become placeholders for information that we lack. So, the MDN simply claims that we
ought avoid positing such explanations because they are of no use in inquiry or scientific
investigation. On the other hand, the MPN does not appear to be driven by a commitment
to the most pragmatic approach, but rather by claims about the nature of this world. The
strong line MPN offers claims about what the world consists of, and how it functions, and
although the weak line refrains from offering strong claims about what the world
consists, it does still constrain claims about how this world functions. Both strands of
MPN, rather than seeing naturalism as just a tool for the advancement of our knowledge,
see naturalism as a thesis about the nature of the world. In this sense, MDN has an
instrumentalist aspect to it, and MPN has aspects of realism.
To clarify, the MDN’s can be either scientific realists or anti-realists without
taking a stance on whether or not we possess the capacity to discover truth. They simply
claim that the best way to do so is to eliminate the use of supernatural explanations. The
MDN is concerned with what methods we are most likely to discover the truth, but makes

9

no claims about whether or not there is a truth out there that we can or will discover.
Accordingly, the MDN sees naturalism as a pragmatic tool that aids empirical research.
In contrast, the MPN seems committed to a realist position. By making claims about the
constitution of the world, and how the world functions, the MPN displays a dedication to
the notion that there actually is some ultimate nature to reality that we can discover, and
make claims about.
The strong line MPN claims that the supernatural does not exist. However, in
order to offer empirical evidence of something’s existence, we must be able to either
observe the event or object itself, have the capacity to perform experiments that offer
evidence for the existence of the event or object in question by positing this object or
event as the best possible explanation, or at the very least, observe evidence of some
residual effect that is best explained by positing the existence of this object or event. By
definition, something that is supernatural is something that does not obey natural laws. If
something does not obey natural laws, then we have no way of explaining it in natural
terms. To clarify, when we offer an explanation of some event, the explanation, if it is to
be articulated in natural terms, must conform to previously established laws, or to some
posited new law. If we posit a new law, then this new law itself must remain consistent
with other established laws. So, if an explanation for a supernatural event is given, such
as a so-called miracle, then there must be some established meaning for the terms used to
articulate the event. But, if the terms used to articulate the event have no established
meaning themselves, then nothing has been explained. In order to offer an explanation of
an event, we must have an understanding of the terms used to explain the event, and this

10

explanation must conform to at least some accepted rule, law, or principle. As Hume
notes,
Nothing is esteemed a miracle, if it ever happen in the common course of nature. It is no miracle
that a man, seemingly in good health, should die on a sudden; because such a kind of death,
though more unusual than any other, has been frequently observed to happen. But it is a miracle,
that a dead man should come to life; because that has never been observed in any age or country.
There must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the
event would not merit that appellation. 14

In other words, miracles are whatever is unexplainable through experience, observation,
or established natural laws. Thus, I read this passage as supporting the notion that if
something is supernatural, as a miracle certainly is, then it does not conform to
experience, observation, or accepted natural laws. Thus, we have no capacity to offer an
empirical explanation for a supernatural event. In this sense, the term supernatural is
reserved for those things for which we have no explanation. It is simply a placeholder for
an as yet unformulated explanation. If we are able to explain something, then it is not
supernatural. After all, if one is able to explain an object or event that has been called
supernatural, it must be the case that it has been articulated in natural terms. So, as soon
as some event or object that was previously unable to be explained, and thus called
supernatural, is able to be explained, our understanding of it automatically assimilates it
into our broader view of natural events, and thus it ceases to be supernatural. In this
sense, it seems right to deny that we can have knowledge of the existence of the
supernatural, but this does not warrant the strong claim of the MPN, that the supernatural
just does not exist. It is possible that some things exist that we do not know exist, in fact,
this is almost undoubtedly the case. However, in order for us to have knowledge of the
existence of some thing, we need to have the capacity to offer an epistemic account of

14

Hume, David., 2007 [1748] An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. New York: Cambridge
University Press., p.101
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this thing. But, as stated previously, as soon as we offer such an account it ceases to be
supernatural. Anything that we have the capacity to explain as existing is implicitly
natural. Hence, in order for the strong line MPN to support the claim that the supernatural
does not exist, by their own standards, they need to offer an explanation in natural terms
and facts. Because this is impossible to do for the supernatural, the strong line MPN has
no empirically rich manner in which to support their main claim. Thus, it seems that the
weak line MPN is the most epistemologically sound of the two main lines of MPN.
However, the weak line has problems as well.
The weak line MPN claims that even if supernatural things do exist, they cannot
causally interact with the natural world. 15 So, the weak line MPN avoids the problem of
making claims about the existence or non-existence of supernatural entities; however, it
does constrain claims about how these supernatural entities function if they do exist. By
stipulating that supernatural entities cannot causally interact with the natural world, the
weak line MPN constrains the sorts of claims that may be true of it. But, if it is
impossible to explain, understand, or claim knowledge of the supernatural, then it is a
mistake to posit constraints on how the supernatural does or does not function. In positing
constraints on how the supernatural functions the MPN implies that there is some
understanding of how supernatural entities function if they do exist. However, as noted
earlier, if there is an understanding of how the supernatural functions, then it ceases to be
supernatural. Thus, even though the weak line MPN allows for the existence of the
supernatural, and makes no claims about whether the supernatural exists or not, and
therefore avoids the specific problem of the strong line MPN, it does still place
constraints on the claims that may be true of the supernatural, and thus, makes a similar
15

Parsons (2006) p.91
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mistake as the strong line MPN. In this sense, it seems that the weak line MPN simply
collapses into the strong line MPN. In order to avoid this problem the weak line MPN
might argue that theses constraints ought not be mistaken for metaphysical claims, but
rather seen as methodological suggestions; however, this ultimately leads to the weak line
MPN collapsing into MDN. Since the weak line MPN either collapse into the strong line
MPN or MDN, and the strong line MPN has been shown to be unable to support their
main claim, this leaves MDN as the only viable naturalistic position.
MDN “does not offer opinions about the nature of ultimate reality; but requires
that as a matter of good scientific practice, we consider only naturalistic hypotheses.” 16 In
other words, according to MDN we should only consider those hypotheses that remain
consistent with other established laws, and can be articulated in natural terms. After all, if
the supernatural is posited in place of an explanation, then to go about positing
supernatural hypotheses which by definition do not follow the same rules that govern the
natural world, and thus are not consistent with other established laws, is of no help in
advancing the understanding of the world. Thus, it makes sense that one ought avoid
using the supernatural in our attempts to explain the world. Now, unlike the MPN, the
MDN position does not commit one to making claims about the nature of the
supernatural. The only claim about the supernatural that the MDN is committed to
making, is that the supernatural defies explanation. Which by definition, must be the
case. If the MDN does not commit to this notion, then it no longer follows that the
supernatural ought not be admitted into consideration as an explanation for phenomena in
the world. After all, if the supernatural does not defy explanation, then there is no reason
not to use it if it offers the best explanation of some event, object, or phenomenon. So,
16

Ibid., p.97
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implicit in the MDN’s commitment to not use supernatural hypotheses is the notion that
the supernatural just is a placeholder for currently unexplainable phenomenon. In light of
the aforementioned criterion for MDN, I maintain that the MDN escapes the difficulties
associated with the MPN. Thus, I ultimately argue that some version of MDN is the best
route to take.

1.2 My Naturalistic Commitments

I intend to promote naturalism as the best method for attaining meaningful
information about our world. Thus, I am committed to some form of MDN. I maintain
that the most reliable manner to attain information about our world is to use empirical
evidence. 17 Thus, I argue that the best empirical theories about human beings and society,
such as evolutionary theory, are the best options we have for gaining an understanding of
our world. In short, my particular version of naturalism commits me to at least the
following:
1. I maintain that even if supernatural things exists, we should not posit them as explanations
about how our world works because supernatural explanations are not really explanations. Thus,
I disallow the use of supernatural explanations.
2. I maintain that the best option we have for gaining an understanding of our world is to use our
best and most relevant empirical theories.
3. I maintain that the difference between the human animal and the rest of the animal kingdom is
one of degree.
4. I maintain that we are never free in the metaphysical sense.

I see the first two of these commitments as the core of any methodological naturalistic
approach, and I see the third and fourth commitments following as a direct result of the
second commitment. I now turn to a defense of these claims. I take it to be the case that

17

I use a broad notion of empirical, which in addition to the hard sciences, includes but is not limited to
anthropological and historical information.
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commitment one has been supported by arguments earlier in this chapter, thus I will
forgo any further argument for this claim, and will move on to a defense of the three
remaining commitments.

1.3 The best option we have for gaining an understanding of our world is to use our best
and most relevant empirical theories.

As a guide to our understanding of the world the merits of scientific inquiry
cannot be denied. Science as a guide has been remarkably successful in its capacity for
prediction, and problem solving. However, there has been much criticism over the merits
of scientific inquiry in regards to the likelihood of it being in error. But, as J.J.C. Smart
articulates, we need not see our current scientific understandings as infallible. 18 He notes,
“even when a theory is overturned it can usually be seen as an approximation to the
truth.” 19 There has been much talk over what it means to be approximately true, Parsons
notes that one way to grasp this concept is to think about the way in which one might
describe the earth. To say that the earth is a sphere is technically wrong. It is not really a
sphere (it bulges at the center and is flat at the poles). To say that the earth is a cube is
also wrong, 20 but as Parsons’ articulates, “clearly we have a very strong intuitive sense
that the statement, ‘the world is a sphere,’ while false strictly speaking, is more ‘truth
like’ than the statement ‘the world is a cube.’ ” 21 So, although we must recognize that our
science is both incomplete, and vulnerable to falsification, it does not warrant, we might
say, throwing out the baby with the bath water. The fact is, science has shown time and
18

Lenman, J., (2006) “Moral Naturalism,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, p.2
Smart, J.J.C. and Haldane J.J. (1996) Atheism and Theism. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. p.6
20
Parsons (2006) p.123
21
Ibid., p.123
19
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time again, that it has the capacity to increase our understanding of the world; however,
such an account is not without objection.
Larry Laudan argues for what is often called “The pessimistic meta-induction”
(hereafter PMI), which states that “[T]he fact that so many theories have been shown
wrong, though they enjoyed great success and nearly universal acceptance in their day,
should lead us to conclude that the majority of our present theories are likely false.” 22 In
response, Parsons notes that
“[E]ven if we concede that the majority of successful theories of the past are totally false, the
PMI is still not warranted because the quality and quantity of the empirical tests theories must
pass has greatly increased over the history of science. […] New methods and techniques are
frequently found that allow for ever more stringent tests of theories. […] Judged by the kinds of
empirical tests and analytic tools we have today, many past theories were not very well tested,
and so were not really very successful compared to current theories.” 23

Thus, the fact that our testing capabilities have become more rigorous over the years
should lead us to accept that our current theories, while still vulnerable to falsification,
are not likely to find themselves being rejected in totality as has been the fate of many
earlier theories. This should give us reason to think that there is something valuable about
our current theories even if these current theories are eventually shown to be false. So,
even if we think our current empirical accounts will be shown false, we have good reason
to think that they are at least closer approximations to the truth than previous accounts.
Currently, the best account we have about how the world works is found in our scientific
understanding. So, it follows that we at least have reason to think that the use of our best
and most relevant empirical theories to gain an understanding of our world is warranted.
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1.4 Why naturalism commits one to the notion that the differences between the human
animal and the rest of the animal kingdom is one of degree not kind

Before proceeding with argument for why I am committed to the notion that the
differences between the human animal and the rest of the animal kingdom is one of
degree, it will be helpful to explain just what I mean by the phrases “differences in degree
and differences in kind.”
One way to make this distinction clear is to draw attention to the difference
between a category mistake and a contingent falsehood. 24 To say that Robert Bowlby is
the starting nose tackle for the Tennessee Vols is a contingent falsehood. As it turns out,
Bowlby is not the starting nose tackle for the Vols, but it is not in-principle something
that Bowlby could not be. Bowlby, even if 70 years old, 4’3” tall, and 80 pounds (and
thereby not likely to make a great nose tackle) is the type of thing that can be a nose
tackle for the Vols, it just happens to be the case that he is not. In other words, the
starting nose tackle for the Vols is the same kind of thing as Bowlby. Although it is false
to claim that Bowlby is the starting nose tackle for the Vols, the falsity of this claim is
contingent on the fact that Bowlby just happens to not be the starting nose tackle for the
Vols, it is not because Bowlby is the kind of thing that necessarily cannot be the starting
nose tackle for the Vols. In contrast, to claim that the color orange is the starting nose
tackle for the Vols is a category mistake. It is in-principle impossible for the color orange
to be the starting nose tackle for the Vols. In other words, the color orange is not the same
type of thing as those things that can be starting nose tackles for the Vols. Unlike
24
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Bowlby, the color orange necessarily cannot be the Vols’ nose tackle. So, the color
orange and those things that can be the starting nose tackle for the Vols are different in
kind, whereas Bowlby and the starting nose tackle for the Vols are only different in
degree. Having clarified how I intend to use these phrases, I now turn to a defense of why
I think naturalism commits one to the notion that the differences between the human
animal and the rest of the animal kingdom are of degree not kind.
Committing to the claim that the differences between the human animal and the
rest of the animal kingdom are of degree, follows as a result of committing to the use of
our best empirical theories to advance our understanding of the world. Currently
evolution by natural selection is the most widely accepted explanation for the
development of the organisms in this world. Following this explanation, there is little
reason to believe that there are differences in kind between the human animal and the rest
of the animal kingdom. Darwin himself opens The Descent of Man with a chapter titled
“The Evidence of the descent of man from some lower form.” He then spends the better
part of the book making the case that humans, much like every other species, descended
from an ancestor shared with other allied species. Thus, in a genealogical sense, every
organism on the planet shares some commonality. So, in this case, differences in degree
might be thought of as the sharing of a genealogical continuum. Darwin sees the origin of
species as the result of the extinction of intermediate forms. The extinction of
intermediate forms results in gaps between one species and another; however, if all these
intermediate forms existed today, we would see no clean break between species. In the
case of organisms, it is not in-principle impossible to close this gap. However, the current
gap seen between organisms leads to the notion that there are apparent differences in
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kind between species, but these apparent differences are only visible due to the extinction
of the connecting forms. For example, if we were to locate “the missing link,” then we
would replace the current gap between humans and apes, and thus the differences
between the two would no longer be so clear. If one accepts evolutionary theory, then one
also accepts the idea that at some time a connecting variety between humans and apes did
exist. Thus, what appear to be differences in kind between species, can be written off as
differences in degree if one accepts evolutionary theory.
Further, Darwin was committed to the notion that all organisms are the result of a
gradual evolutionary process, and the human animal is no exception. In doing this, as
James Birx notes, “Darwin positioned the human animal squarely within material nature
without recourse to metaphysical forces or theological beliefs. There was no appeal to
teleology or essentialism. […] Darwin let the scientific facts lead him to their
unmistakable conclusions.” 25 In this sense, Darwin’s method of discovery was
naturalistic. Following suit, I am committed to viewing the human animal as the result of
a material nature, and thus I am dedicated to answering questions about the human
animal in light of this commitment. I maintain that viewing the human animal as the
result of a material nature gives further reason to reject the notion that the human animal
has a distinct nature from that of other animals. In other words, any essentialist claims
about the human animal must be rejected if one is committed to answering questions
about the human animal in reference to the human animal’s position in the material
world. Appealing to the material nature of our world to answer questions about the
human animal results in the use of our best empirical theories to answer such questions.
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Again, my naturalistic commitments commit me to maintaining that the most
advantageous method for attaining information about the human animal must take into
account evolutionary explanations. Following David Hull, I argue that the acceptance of
an evolutionary explanation leads to the rejection of essentialist claims. Hull states
In most cases, any character universally distributed among the organisms belonging to a
particular species is also possessed by organisms belonging to other species, and conversely any
character that happens to be limited to the organisms belonging to a particular species is unlikely
possessed by all of them. […] A character state (or allele) which is rare may become common,
and one that is nearly universal may become entirely eliminated. In short, species evolve, and to
the extent that they evolve through natural selection, both genetic and phenotypic variation are
essential. 26

The constant change of characteristics propagated by evolutionary theory exposes the
difficulty of maintaining essentialist notions of the human animal or any animal, for that
matter. There is no such thing as a static species. In fact, it has been argued that the
delineation of species is no more than an arbitrary delineation made for the pragmatic
benefits gained through a taxonomy of organisms in the world. 27 In other words,
classifying species allows for ease of communication in discussions about particular
organisms. If classifications of species are simply a matter of pragmatic benefit, then it
follows that these classifications offer no real evidence about what characteristics a
particular organism must possess in order to be part of a particular species. The result of
recognizing that such classifications are arbitrary at best, exposes our inability to
demarcate phylogenetic divides. Without a static notion of any supposed species, it is
impossible to isolate any species in virtue of its possessing certain traits. Thus, there
seemingly is no way to draw such distinctions given the empirical evidence at hand. If all
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of these supposed species are in a constant state of change, then there is no one moment
in time that takes precedence over any other moment in time in deciding which organisms
belong to a particular classification. I argue that the capacity to make essentialist claims
about the “nature” of any organism relies on the notion that we are capable of isolating a
particular set of characteristics possessed by all and only members of a supposed species.
Since the acceptance of an evolutionary account supports the idea that this capacity is not
possible, then the acceptance of an evolutionary account leads to the rejection of any
essentialist claims regarding the nature of the human animal. Consequently, I maintain
that our best empirical theories lead to the conclusion that the differences between the
rest of the animal kingdom and the human animal must not be differences of kind, but
rather of degree. In fact, as we will see later, the incorporation of DST into the
conversation may give reason to think that there are differences of degree between each
individual organism.

1.5 Naturalism and Freedom

In applying empirical evidence toward an understanding of the world, we are
necessarily committed to the use of causal explanations to account for events. Even if
science eventually confirms that the universe is not a deterministic system—where cause
and effect is viewed as probabilistic rather than deterministic as quantum mechanics
suggests, there is still no room for metaphysical freedom. In order to have metaphysical
freedom we must have the capacity to choose what we wish, but if things are
probabilistic, then we would have no more control over our choices or the outcomes of
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our choices than we have under a deterministic system. I argue that there is simply no
way to maintain my naturalistic position, and at the same time defend the notion that
organisms possess metaphysical freedom.
There are no “unmoved movers” in this world. Thus, any notion of “freedom”
used in the context of my naturalism must be qualified. According to Thomas Nagel
almost everything that we do is subject to causal influences beyond our control. 28 By
beyond our control he means those factors that in Kantian terms are not the product of
our will. In similar fashion to Nagel, I argue that there are a set of conditions that all
organisms in this world are subject to, and that these conditions interfere with the
capacity for freedom in the broadest sense. To clarify, I see these conditions as the bare
minimum of necessary conditions involved in the existence of any organism, call them
the bare necessities (BN) inherent in any organism’s life. In other words, all organisms
are subject to these conditions. Thus, to be free, is to not to be free from the BN, but
rather to be free from things that interfere with the organism that are in addition to BN.
So, the starting point for talk about how free some organism is under the naturalism I
endorse begins with the acceptance of the BN. The BN are comprised of the following:
1. An organism’s temperament, inclinations, capacities, etc.
2. The kind of situations an organism faces.
3. How an organism is determined by antecedent circumstances: upbringing, education, social
influences, etc.
4. The way an organism’s actions and projects turn out: the results of some actions may or may
not be what the organism expected. 29

Assuming that these four things are in play at all times, it follows that metaphysical
freedom is not an option. Since metaphysical freedom is not an option, I accept a
compatibilist account of freedom. So, in order to make meaningful claims about the
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freedom of an organism, it is necessary to admit these conditions in as the necessary
components involved in any organism’s life, and to take them as the starting point for
which notions of freedom are plausible. The BN are simply part of the organism’s base
set of circumstances. In this sense, the freest an organism can be, is to have no constraints
other than the BN. If this be the case, then metaphysical freedom is just something that
organisms in this world cannot ever fully possess.
In addition, on my naturalistic approach I maintain that freedom is something that
can only be evaluated a posteriori on the basis of natural facts. I maintain that the BN are
part of a set of unavoidable natural facts, and must be taken into consideration in any
empirically sound evaluation of an organism’s freedom. So, from an empirical
perspective, it makes little sense to think that organisms escape the constraints placed on
them by the BN. If metaphysical freedom requires the capacity for organisms to act
without these constraints, then metaphysical freedom is unattainable.

1.6 Ethical Naturalism: An Overview

In the broadest sense, to be an ethical naturalist is to believe that it is possible to
offer an adequate account of morality in terms that are consistent with natural law. 30 In
his oft cited article “Why Naturalism,” David Copp asserts that as a species of naturalism,
ethical naturalism holds that there are moral properties, […] and that these properties are natural.
Accordingly, when a naturalist hears us say that something is right or wrong, […] she takes the
truth of what we say to depend on whether the relevant thing has the relevant property, and she
takes this to depend in turn exclusively on the way things are in the natural world. 31
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He further claims that “naturalism is best understood as the view that the moral properties
are natural in the sense that they are empirical.” 32As argued previously, I maintain that
the best option we have for gaining an understanding of our world is to use our best and
most relevant empirical theories. In regards to our understanding of morality, it is just this
that ethical naturalism seeks to do. James Lenman states that the naturalist claims “the
domain of moral value is to be seen as simply part of the familiar natural world, known
about in just the familiar, broadly empirical ways we know about the natural world.” 33 In
this sense, he thinks that the naturalist seeks to collapse the distinction between the
domain of natural facts and the domain of values, and thus expose value to us as simply
part of the domain of natural facts. 34 Others, such as Simon Blackburn, in describing the
aim of ethical naturalism, assert that
[…] just as we can use […] information to construct theories involving higher-order concepts,
such as those of physics, so we can use it to construct the moral concepts. […] (such a theory)
intends to ask no more from the world then we already know is there—the ordinary features of
things on the basis of which we make decisions about them, like or dislike them, fear them and
avoid them, desire them and seek them out. It asks no more than this: a natural world, and
patterns of reaction to it. 35

So, the recurrent theme we see in all these claims, is that there should be no
methodological gap between the way we come to know about things in the natural world
and the way we come to know about things in the moral world. In other words, under this
account, the moral world just is part of the natural world. Of course, this approach does
not come without its critics or problems. Many have questioned whether we have the
capacity to collapse this distinction. As Copp states, “[T]he chief problem (for ethical
naturalism) […] is to explain what it might mean to claim that moral properties are
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natural properties.” 36 I now turn to a brief discussion of some of the most prominent
charges against this endeavor.
Many skeptics of ethical naturalism insist that it is a mistake to claim that a moral
theory does not necessitate the use of some special set of explanatory information
reserved for just moral questions. This charge is often articulated in terms of a fact/value
distinction. Naturalized accounts of ethics are often charged with making the mistake of
drawing conclusions about what ought be the case from premises that state only what is
the case. One of the earliest and most influential sources in the literature is found in
Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature, where he offers what Max Black termed “Hume’s
Guillotine,” wherein Hume remarks that we cannot derive “ought” from “is.” Hume
writes:
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the
author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a
God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find,
that instead of the usual copulations or propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition
that is not connected with an ought, or ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however
of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or
affirmation, it is necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a
reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a
deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. 37

Now, numerous individuals have written this off as a simple logical constraint on the
grounds that one cannot make logical inferences of value from observations of natural
facts without the inclusion of an additional premise. 38 Still, many argue that the
difference between fact and value statements may not be as obvious as it appears. In any
statement of fact there are underlying assumptions that must either be investigated or
simply accepted. So, we might be warranted to call into question the capacity to draw a
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clean distinction between all fact and value statements. In an article titled, “The Gap
Between “Is” and “Should,” Max Black does just this. Black asserts,
To those who claim the existence of an unbridgeable logical gap between “ought” and “is,” I
offer for consideration the following counterexample:
Fischer wants to mate Botwinnik,
The one and only way to mate Botwinnik is for Fischer to move the Queen.
Therefore, Fischer should move the Queen. 39

Black argues that in this example both premises make statements of fact; however, the
conclusion is a nonfactual “should” or “ought” statement (where the differences between
“should” and “ought” are insignificant in this case). 40 Now, one might question if Black’s
example is valid, perhaps he has managed to smuggle in a logical mistake. One might
think that the conclusion of Black’s argument need be stated in a factual manner if it is to
follow from the premises. James Rachels thinks we can explain why Black’s example
works if we look at the relationship between “ought-judgments, reasons, and
preferences.” 41 He writes:
Any judgment about what should be done requires reasons in its support. If I say you should get
out of the room, you may ask why. If there is no reason, then it isn’t true that you should leave
[…]. Suppose, however, I tell you the room is on fire. That provides a reason; and if you believe
me, you will no doubt leave at once. But whether this is a reason for you will depend on your
attitudes. If you want to avoid being burned, then the fact the room is on fire is a reason for you
to leave. 42

Rachels argues that this example demonstrates a common form of practical reasoning.
There is a “judgment about what should be done and a reason is supplied for why this
should be done. The fact that you have a certain desire […] explains why the reason cited
is a reason for you to do the indicated action” 43 Rachels argues that there is no reason to
think that this pattern of reasoning is invalid. If you do not want to get burned, and the
39
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only way to avoid being burned is to leave the room, then you should leave the room. He
claims that Black’s example makes the same move.
It says that Fischer should move the Queen, a judgment that is true only if there are good reasons
in its support. Then just such a reason is provided (because moving the Queen is the only way to
mate Botwinnik). And finally, the relevance of this reason is secured by asserting that Fischer
has the required attitude (he wants to mate Botwinnik). If Fischer wants to mate Botwinnik,
there is a good reason for him to move the Queen. So it follows that he should move the
Queen. 44

So, Rachels thinks that Hume is wrong to think we can never derive “ought” from “is.”
However, he thinks Hume is wrong for a reason that Hume himself illustrates in his own
inquiry.
If our premises include information about a person’s relevant desires, we may validly draw
conclusions about what he or she should do. This result is not out of keeping with the spirit of
Hume’s view. Indeed, it is probably better to express Hume’s view as the idea that we cannot
derive ought-judgments from facts about how the world is independently of our desires and
other attitudes regarding it. That is the point of Hume’s Guillotine. 45

Indeed, it seems that the premise, “Fischer wants to mate Botwinnik” displays the factual
claim that Fischer has a desire to mate Botwinnik. Thus, if Fischer wants to satisfy his
desire, then he must do what is necessary to satisfy this desire. If what is necessary to
satisfy Fischer’s desire, in this example, is for Fischer to “move his Queen,” then it
follows that Fischer “should” move his Queen. Black notes that “nobody who
understands the premises of the practical argument and knows the rules for the proper use
of ‘should’ can honestly offer any other ‘should’ conclusion.” 46 He writes:
In this respect, the parallel with “theoretical” arguments is strong. Accordingly, no special
“practical” logic is needed in such cases: the relevant principles are the familiar ones employed
throughout deductive reasoning. 47

Thus, according to Black, it is possible to derive nonfactual conclusions from factual
premises. It is worth pointing out that Black’s argument seems to suggest that the rules
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for the proper use of “should” imply that people should satisfy their desires, and this
seems like a non-moral rule. 48 Black’s use of “should” may be seen as instrumental. If
one desires to do “X,” and in order to do “X,” one needs to do “Y,” then one “should” do
“Y,” in an instrumental sense, but not necessarily in a moral sense. It might be
instrumentally necessary that Anne kills Manuel if he stands in the way of her satisfying
a desire, and thus in an instrumental sense, she “should” kill Manuel. But, we might
wonder if she really “should” kill Manuel. So, Black appears to have a weakness in his
argument. Nonetheless, although Black’s example has its problems, and may even seem
trivial to many, it does seem to at least weaken the blow of “Hume’s Guillotine.”
In addition to the accounts offered earlier, some maintain that ethical naturalism is
in the business of defining the good as that which satisfies our interests. Rachels takes
this stance as he claims that the most plausible form of ethical naturalism “begins by
identifying goodness with satisfying our interests, while ‘interests’ are explained in turn
as the objects of preferences. Protecting our eyesight […] is in our interests because we
have desires that would be frustrated if we could not see; and that is why unimpaired
eyesight is a good thing.” 49 Again, this view has been met with heavy objections, most
notably in the writings of G.E. Moore. According to Rachels, “Moore believed that no
such view can be correct, [...] if we focus our attention on what we mean by ‘good’ and
what we mean by ‘satisfies our interests’ we will see that they are not the same. We need
only think clearly about the two notions to realize they are different.” 50 In defending this
view, Moore levees a criticism against ethical naturalism that is known as “The Open
Question Argument.” In Principia Ethica, Moore calls into question our ability to offer a
48
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final or ultimate answer to the question ‘What is good?’ By this he does not mean what
things are good, but “how ‘good’ is to be defined.” 51 He states, “‘good’ is a simple
notion; that, just as you cannot, by any manner of means, explain to anyone who does not
already know it, what yellow is, so you cannot explain what good is.” 52 Moore argues
that it is only possible to define the “real nature” of complex things. If the object in
question is “simple,” then the best we can do is offer examples of things we think exude
this quality. He explains:
You can give a definition of a horse, because a horse has many different properties and qualities,
all of which you can enumerate. But when you have enumerated them all, when you have
reduced a horse to his simplest terms, then you can no longer define those terms. They are
simply something which you think of or perceive, and to any one who cannot think or perceive
them, you can never, by any definition, make their nature known. 53

Unlike a horse, Moore maintains that yellow and good are not complex, but rather
notions of the simplest kind. He declares that these simple kinds are what we use to
compose definitions of other things, and that they (simple kinds) cannot be furthered
defined, analyzed, or de-composed into constitutive parts.
Following this, Rachels sees Moore’s argument as implying that if one claims
“goodness and self interest-satisfaction are the same thing, then this would be like asking
‘Do the things that satisfy our interests satisfy our interests?’” 54 If this is the case, then it
seems a similar argument can be given in regards to “any other natural property with
which goodness is identified, and this seems to show that goodness cannot be identical
with anything other than itself […].” 55 Rachels concedes that if we take naturalism to be
a thesis about the meaning of words, which for example might lead to the conclusion that
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the word “good” just means “satisfies our interests,” then Moore’s argument seems
plausible. 56 However, Rachels thinks that we need not conceive of ethical naturalism as
doing this. He claims that “ethical naturalism can also be understood […] as an idea
about what goodness is—that it is, for example, the same thing as the property of
satisfying our interests.” 57 So, Rachels thinks that if Moore’s argument is sound, then it
would show that things like the morning star and evening star or H2O and water cannot
be identical. He argues:
If we focus our attention on what we mean by those terms, we will see that they are not the
same—the first is a star seen in the morning, while the second is a star seen in the evening. And
the question “Is the Morning Star the Evening Star?” was an open question the answer to which
was unknown for many centuries. But in fact the two are identical. So, Moore’s arguments cast
no doubt whatever on ethical naturalism, understood as a thesis about the nature of things. 58

If Moore’s argument was sound, then it should show that the morning star can only be
identical with itself. But, as Rachels has shown, this will only seem the case if it is the
meaning of the term “Morning Star” we are looking at, rather than the referent of the
Morning Star. So, if Rachels is right to think that ethical naturalism is a thesis about the
nature of things, rather than about the meanings of terms, then it seems he has dulled the
blow that Moore’s “Open Question Argument” deals to ethical naturalism.
A further criticism is found in discussions of internalism. The internalist expresses
concerns in regards to naturalism’s capacity to deal with the connection between moral
judgments and motivation. As Lenman notes, internalism claims “that you can’t make a
moral judgment and not be motivated to act in accordance with it.” 59 What this means
depends on what “branch” of internalism one endorses. In David Brink’s book, Moral
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Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, he draws a distinction between what he calls
strong internalism and weak internalism. He writes:
Weak internalism about motives claims it is a conceptual truth that moral considerations provide
some motivation, while strong internalism about motives claims it is a conceptual truth that
moral considerations provide sufficient motive for action. Weak internalism about reasons claims
it is a conceptual truth that moral considerations provide a reason for action, while strong
internalism about reasons claims it is a conceptual truth that moral considerations provide the
agent with conclusive, overriding, or sufficient reason for action. 60

So, in the case of strong internalism, to be motivated means one will act when a
motivation is present; however, in the case of weak internalism, motivation does not
necessarily result in the performance of an action. Rather, as Lenman notes, “[W]eak
internalists allow that the motivation is defeasible.” 61 By defeasible he means that
although one is motivated to some extent to perform a particular action, one may fail to
actually perform the action because one is more motivated to perform another action, or
perhaps more likely, fail to perform the action out of weakness. 62 Although some do
support strong internalism, both Brink and Lenman believe that the position cannot
sufficiently deal with cases of weakness of will, “where we all too frequently fail to act as
we believe we morally ought.” 63 So, we will not investigate strong internalism any
further, but rather focus on the claims of the weak internalist.
It should be no surprise that ethical naturalism rejects the claims of the weak
internalist. As Lenman remarks, if for the ethical naturalist “ […] a moral judgment is
just a belief to the effect that some natural fact obtains, I might at least conceivably hold
that belief and simply not give a damn.” 64 So, in this case, the ethical naturalist offers
reason to believe that it is possible to be an amoralist. In other words, it is possible to
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make moral judgments, and at the same time not care about these judgments. If the
ethical naturalist is right to hold this position, then it seems the notion of motivation
offered by the weak internalist is called into question. Brink claims that internalism
makes the amoralist conceptually impossible. He writes,
Although indifference to what is regarded as moral considerations may be fairly rare, it does
seem to exist. Some people (e.g., certain sociopaths) do not care about what they regard as moral
considerations. Moreover, the internalist cannot rest content with the extensional claim that
everyone is, in fact, motivated by moral considerations. […] The internalist about motives
claims it is a conceptual truth about morality that moral judgment or belief motivates. According
to the internalist, then, it must be conceptually impossible for someone to recognize a moral
consideration or assert a moral judgment and remain unmoved. 65

So, in order for the claims of the internalist to follow, it must be the case that there is no
such thing as the amoralist. But, it certainly appears as if this type of individual is not
only possible, but actually exists. Thus, in order for the internalist to escape this charge,
they must show that those who appear to be an amoralist, are not actually an amoralist.
This is exactly what the internalist attempts to do.
In R.M. Hare’s book, The Language of Morals, he maintains that individuals who
appear to be amoralist are actually not. He argues that “[…] value-judgments, if they are
action-guiding, must be held to entail imperatives.” 66 In other words, according to Hare,
it is not possible to make moral judgments, and at the same time not care about these
judgments. He believes that in cases where we think we have identified an amoralist, we
have actually mistaken the evaluative use of a term for what he calls the inverted-commas
use of a term. What this means, is that in cases where Uncle Bill says, for example, “I
know I ought not give my three year old niece Charlotte whiskey, but I don’t care ,” the
“ought” sentence is not a genuine value judgment, but rather, as Hare notes, it means that
not giving Charlotte whiskey “[…] falls within a class of actions which is generally held
65
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to be obligatory in the evaluative, imperative-entailing sense,” 67 but which is not held in
this same manner by Uncle Bill. In other words, Uncle Bill is simply making what
Lenman calls an anthropological judgment or social observation. 68 He does not really
make a moral judgment when he utters the words “I know I ought,” rather he is simply
conveying the moral views of others with whom he does not agree. 69 So, according to the
internalist, in apparent cases of amoralism, what we are really dealing with is someone
who is unmoved by considerations that are “only conventionally regarded as moral.” 70 If
these considerations were actually moral considerations, then the subject in question
would be moved to act on these considerations. In response, Brink thinks that the
internalist does not take the amoralist challenge seriously enough. 71 He writes:
Amoralist skepticism is a familiar philosophical and popular form of skepticism. Reflection on
the stringent character of many apparent moral demands can make us wonder whether we do
have good reason to be moral. We may even come to wonder whether we have good reason to
become amoralists. All of this seems to assume that the amoralist is an intelligible figure. […] It
is simply unclear why we should assume that the person who professes indifference to what she
insists are moral requirements is confusedly using moral language in inverted commas or
mistaken about what morality requires. We can imagine someone who regards what we take to
be moral demands as moral demands—and not simply as conventional demands—and yet
remains unmoved. 72

So, in essence, Brinks response is that due to the stringency of moral demands, that
skepticism about the justification or rationality of moral demands is warranted. 73 Thus, it
is reasonable to question whether or not we have good reason to be moral. If we have
reason to question this, then Brink thinks the amoralist is at least an intelligible figure.
Thus, it is at least possible that an amoralist exists, and if this be the case, then we should
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at least offer reason for why this person should care about morality. 74 As Lenman notes,
Brink must hold that “[…] taking any interest in morality is […] rationally optional,” 75
and it seems the passage above expresses just this notion. If morality is rationally
optional, as Brink implies, then it seems warranted to question the merit of being moral,
and so there is reason to think that any rational individual might require reasons for why
they ought care about morality. Further, it seems reasonable that one might fail to be
given what one sees as a “good” reason to be moral, and thus take on the character of an
amoralist. Following this, it certainly appears that there is reason to think that amoralism
is a possibility. Since, as Lenman notes, a moral judgment for the ethical naturalist “ […]
is just a belief to the effect that some natural fact obtains,” 76 and thus one might “at least
conceivably hold that belief and simply not give a damn,” 77 the possibility of amoralism
is consistent with a naturalist ethics. However, it is clearly not consistent with the claims
of the weak internalist. Thus, the possibility of amoralism is a real problem for Brink and
the internalist.
It should be clear at this juncture that ethical naturalism has been met with heavy
objections; however, it should be equally clear that these objections have been met with
numerous responses, and replies. All this shows is that the prospect of a naturalized ethics
has not been put to rest just yet. The argument is not over, and the conclusions not settled.
Having taken at least a cursory look at the general notion of ethical naturalism,
and some of its critics, I want to bracket this discussion for the moment. In Chapter Five,
I reopen this discussion with an examination of some contemporary versions of

74

Ibid., p.48
Lenman (2006) p.14
76
Ibid., p.9
77
Ibid., p.9
75

34

naturalized ethics. These versions of naturalism appear to assume at least some form of
an essentialist notion of nature. This is something that I want to separate from, and I think
the injection of DST into the conversation aids in doing just this. Thus, in Chapter Two, I
discuss the notion of DST, and the reconceptualization of both nurture and nature found
in the DST literature. Later in Chapter Five, I evaluate the result that this
reconceptualization has on a naturalized ethics.
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2

DST and the Implications of its Acceptance

In the last chapter I argued that if one is committed to naturalism, then one ought be
committed to naturalism as a methodological thesis. I then discussed some of the
common literature surrounding the prospects for a naturalized ethics. In closing, I made
mention of the impact that the acceptance of DST has on the concept of “the natural.” In
light of this, I now offer a brief examination of the implications involved in the
acceptance of DST. First, I open with a synopsis of DST. I then discuss DST’s challenge
to essentialism and preformationism. Next, I investigate DST’s Challenge to the
Biology/Culture divide. Finally, I give some attention to Susan Oyama’s
reconceptualization of “the natural,” and some of the general ethical implications that
may follow from an acceptance of DST. In a later chapter I examine in more detail how
this reconceptualization might shape naturalized ethics.

2.1 Synopsis of DST

There has been much debate over the question of whether or not certain traits or
attributes are the consequence of nature or nurture. This kind of question tends to be
articulated in dichotomous terms where the focal point of the discussion is over which
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opposing causal mechanisms assert the most power over the development of these
attributes. The debate places particular importance on such distinctions as that between
gene and environment, and biology and culture. It assumes that we have the capacity to
isolate these concepts in a manner that will allow for claims to be made about the causal
power of each. DST seeks to dismiss such dichotomous accounts. 78 In this sense, DST is
an attempt to do biology without these dichotomies. 79 Susan Oyama articulates DST as
“[…] a general theoretical perspective on development, heredity and evolution, a
framework both for conducting scientific research and for understanding the broader
significance of research findings.” 80 In doing this, Oyama maintains that DST “draws on
insights from researchers in a wide range of areas who have been dissatisfied with crude
dichotomous accounts of development and have attempted to formulate an alternative.” 81
The alternative promoted by DST is one in which the capacity to isolate the causal
responsibility of any particular object is called into question. DST calls for a notion of
development that sees traits as the result of a mutual interaction. Peter Godfrey-Smith
suggests that one helpful way to think about DST “is to think of it as an assertion of a
very strong antipreformationism about development.” 82 DST seeks to refute the notion
that there are pre-formed representations of traits in DNA on the grounds of evidence
against preformationism. 83
Now, it needs to be pointed out that DST does not simply maintain that
development is the result of a combination of nature and nurture, where one might make
78
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the claim that a certain trait is for example, 30 percent nature, and 70 percent nurture. 84
According to Oyama, this simply continues the nature/nurture debate. 85 She claims that
what we need is “a way of thinking about development that does not rely on a distinction
between privileged essential causes and merely supporting or interfering causes.” 86
Further, Oyama expresses the need for a reformulation of other concepts in
contemporary biology, such as inheritance and evolution. 87 She claims that the
“reliability of many aspects of development has encouraged biologists, psychologists, and
social scientists to postulate some central directing agency or ‘master molecule.’” 88 In
addition, such researchers define inheritance and evolution as the passing on and
alteration of such “master molecules.” 89 All other contributions to development are then
grouped together as environment. Oyama maintains that
In contrast, DST views both development and evolution as processes of construction and
reconstruction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably
reassembled for each life cycle. 90

In other words, following Paul Griffiths and Russell Gray, “[T]he full range of
developmental resources represents a complex system that is replicated in
development.” 91 Now, although these resources may play different roles, Griffiths and
Gray note that “[…] there is nothing that divides the different resources into two
fundamental kinds.” 92 In this sense, there is nothing distinctive about one developmental
resource over another. There is no primary determinant of development. Thus, DST does
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not simply rely on a distinction between what might be termed “essential causes” and
“supporting causes.” Avoiding this distinction is, according to Oyama, what is needed if
we wish to do away with the nature/nurture debate. I now turn to a more detailed account
of how DST achieves this.
Oyama offers the following list of the major themes in DST:
1. Joint determination by multiple causes—every trait is produced by the interaction of many
developmental resources. The gene/environment dichotomy is only one of many ways to divide
up these interactants.
2. Context sensitivity and contingency—the significance of any one cause is contingent upon the
state of the rest of the system.
3. Extended inheritance—an organism inherits a wide range of resources that interact to
construct that organism’s life cycle.
4. Development as construction—neither traits nor representations of traits are transmitted to
offspring. Instead, traits are made—reconstructed—in development.
5. Distributed control—no one type of interactant controls development.
6. Evolution as construction—evolution is not a matter of organisms or populations being
molded by their environments, but of organism-environment systems changing over time. 93

2.1.1 Joint determination

The concept of joint determination by multiple causes draws into question the
fruitfulness of accounts that rely upon dichotomies to answer questions about the causal
impetus of particular factors. It promotes the notion that all traits are the product of
mutual interaction amongst various developmental resources. In particular it rejects the
notion that the use of a gene/environment dichotomy is dynamic enough to offer insight
into the causal factors involved in ontogeny and phylogeny. DST maintains that “[T]he
distinction between genes and every other causal factor in development is just one more
grouping.” 94 Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray write:
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Oppositions between genes (or biology) and learning, or between genes (or biology) and culture,
[…] are miserably inadequate for capturing the multitude of causal factors needed for any
reasonable treatment of ontogeny or phylogeny. DST emphasizes crucial but often overlooked
similarities among resources that are usually contrasted. 95

This does not mean that DST maintains that all developmental causes are of equal
importance. 96 It is clear that there is a difference in the significance of the roles played by
these causal factors. Griffiths and Knight suggest that
The real Developmentalist position is that the empirical differences between the role of DNA
and that of cytoplasmic gradients or host-imprinting events do not justify the metaphysical
distinctions currently built upon them. 97

Accordingly, there is no justified reason to construct developmental theories based on the
distinction between DNA and all other causal contributors simply because there is a
difference in the role played by DNA and other host-imprinting events. Oyama notes that
the “parity thesis” discussed by Griffiths and Knight
does not imply that there is no difference between the particulars of the causal roles of genes
and factors such as endosymbionts or imprinting events. It does assert that such differences do
not justify building theories of development and evolution around a distinction made between
what genes do and what every other causal factor does. 98

Thus, although there is a difference in the causal roles of genes and other factors, these
differences do not provide reason to build theories about development or evolution on a
distinction between the roles of the genes and these other factors. Building theories on the
basis of that distinction perpetuates the same problems associated with accounts based on
the nature/nurture distinction.
Further, in denying that theories based on this distinction can adequately account
for ontogeny and phylogeny, DST draws attention to the similarities between resources
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that are typically contrasted. 99 Evidence suggests that these often contrasted resources are
developmentally equivalent in many cases. Oyama cites phenocopying as an example.
Phenocopying […] occurs when genetic mutations, as well as changes in the outside world, can
bring about similar alterations in the organism. There are bithorax mutants in Drosophila, but
the bithorax phenotype can also be induced by ether. Genes and ether shocks turn out to be
developmentally equivalent in this respect. 100

Cases like this show that phenotypes can be the product of more than one type of
resource. Thus, the capacity to draw conclusions about the causal impact of one factor on
the basis of phenotypic displays is problematic. This problem also arises in evolution.
Phenomena that are frequently contrasted can be equivalent in evolution as well. 101
Different developmental influences can be stable within any lineage. These influences
“may follow a lineage equally closely through evolution, even though one is genetic and
the other ‘environmental’” 102 It may be the case that the extracellular resources are as
stable as the intracellular resources in some instances. Resources such as the types of
food available may in some cases maintain stability through a lineage, and thus must also
be seen as having the capacity to determine phenotypes. If this is the case, then it follows
that both intracellular and extracellular resources will play a role in determining the
phenotypic displays of an organism. Again the capacity to draw conclusions about the
causal impetus of one factor on the basis of phenotypic displays is problematic. However,
as mentioned before, the significance of these roles is contingent upon the status of the
other. It is not the case that one leads the way, and the other simply interferes or
promotes. It is the relationship between the intracellular and extracellular resources that is
significant in determining phenotypes. DST is not promoting a dichotomous account
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where intracellular and extracellular resources are posited as contrasting factors in the
developmental process, but rather the interaction of these resources is seen as prompting
traits.

2.1.2 Context sensitivity and contingency

The notion of context sensitivity and contingency in DST draws attention to the
manner in which we draw conclusions about the magnitude of any cause. The impact of
any cause is contingent upon the status of the rest of the system. As Oyama, Griffiths,
and Gray note, “[W]henever a number of causal factors interact to produce an outcome,
we should expect that the effect of changing one factor will depend on what is happening
to the others.” 103 Imagine a scale that has a five pound weight on the left side, and a ten
pound weight on the right side, if one then adds five pounds to the left side, it will even
out the scale. However, the adding of five pounds to the left side only evens out the scale
due to the fact that the right side is holding a ten pound weight. If the weight on the right
side were to be changed, then the effect of adding five pounds to the left side will change
as well. Thus, the amount of influence that adding weight to one side of the scale
produces, is contingent on what is happening on the other side of the scale. DST sees the
causal impact of any factor in a similar light. The significance of any changes made to
one factor will be relative to the status of all other relevant factors. In the example above,
if one ounce of weight was added to the left side when the right side had a thousand
pounds on it, the significance of the added ounce would be nearly null. We cannot gauge
the impact of any one casual factor in isolation from the others. No causal factor exists in
103
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isolation, and thus little information can be gathered from attempts to make claims about
causal factors in isolation.

2.1.3 Extended inheritance

Extended inheritance refers to the idea that organisms inherit a multitude of
resources that mutually interact to construct that organism’s life cycle. 104 This calls into
question accounts that view genes as the only thing inherited. Oyama explains that “DST
insists on a definition of inheritance that explicitly recognizes the wide range of resources
that are ‘passed on’ and thus available to reconstruct the organism’s life cycle.” 105 Thus,
DST does not see the gene as the only heritable resource, nor any other resource as the
only heritable resource. In support of this account Griffiths and Gray note that
In multicellular organisms the parental generation typically contributes extracellular resources.
An ant in a brood cell is exposed to a variety of chemical influences that lead it to develop as a
worker, a queen, or a soldier. A termite inherits a population gut endosymbionts by coprophagy.
In viviparous organisms the environment of the womb provides not only nutrition but also a
range of stimulation essential for the development of the nervous system. This stimulation
continues after birth. 106

The lesson to be learned is that there are numerous resources that are consistently passed
on, and many of these are not genetic. According to Griffiths and Gray, “[T]he concept of
inheritance is used to explain the stability of biological form from one generation to the
next.” 107 If there are reliable resources which are passed on to the following generation,
and these resources are non-genetic, but play a role in why each generation shares such
close similarities to the next, then there is reason to expand the notion of inheritance to
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include these types of resources. DST does just this: “DST applies the concept of
inheritance to any resource that is reliably present in successive generations, and is part
of the explanation of why each generation resembles the last.” 108 By allowing these other
resources into the conversation, DST avoids the problem of overlooking potentially
valuable resources in the evolutionary process.
In addition, DST sees niche construction as playing a significant role in
inheritance. Oyama suggests that one aspect of inheritance that needs to be taken into
consideration is the effect that the participation of an organism has on the construction of
its niche. 109 The local environment is constructed by past generations of the same species,
as well as other species. For example, there has been considerable change in the amount
of undeveloped land since the invention of the automobile. The increased use of the
automobile has led to the need for more highways and parking structures. This in turn has
led to changes in the landscape. This change in landscape has forced many species to
abandon their habitat and relocate. This relocation forces changes on the habitat of the
species who reside in the areas of relocation. This change in habitat then forces changes
on the behavior of the species that reside in these areas of relocation, and in turn this
change in behavior can force more changes to the local environment. The local
environment changes as the behavior of species change, and the behavior of species
change as the local environment changes. Thus, the local environment into which any
organism is born has been shaped by a multitude of factors, and all these factors need to
be considered when attempting to offer explanations for the development of inherited
traits. In short, the local environment is one of many inherited resources, and the
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development of this local environment is in part due to niche construction. DST promotes
an expanded definition of inheritance, and this includes genetic as well as non-genetic
factors. Further, in promoting an expanded definition of inheritance, DST investigates the
various roles played by these diverse resources, but in doing so, does not split them into
two opposing factors. Thus, for DST one set of resources is not seen as “nature,” and the
other as “nurture,” Rather, as Oyama suggests, “we should think of heredity […] as the
ways in which developmental resources or means become available to the next
generation.” 110

2.1.4 Development as construction

According to DST, the life cycle of an organism is developmentally constructed,
not preformed or programmed. 111 Current preformationist accounts posit that “the
information that programs development is preformed in the genes.” 112 All other factors
are seen as simply supporting or interfering aspects of development. The gene leads the
way, and these other factors take a back seat. Under this account traits or representations
of traits are transmitted to offspring rather than being reconstructed in development.
Thus, under such a view, the life cycle of an organism is explained by the effect that the
environment has on the genes. The gene is portrayed as the steady force, and other factors
are thought to be influencing the possible phenotypic outcomes of the gene. However,
these possible phenotypic outcomes are limited by the genes. In other words, the
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information that programs development in the genes dictates the range of possible
outcomes, and all causal factors outside the gene simply aid in directing development
towards one of these preprogrammed outcomes. In this sense, the gene is seen as the
primary determinant of an organism’s life cycle, while other factors are seen as playing
secondary roles in the development of the life cycle. The preformationist account sees the
life cycle of an organism as the result of the passing down of certain immutable traits.
These traits manifest in the following generation in much the same manner as they did in
previous generations. They are not reconstructed in each following life cycle, but simply
passed down. In contrast, DST posits that the life cycle of an organism is engendered
“through interactions between the organism and its surroundings as well as interactions
within the organism.” 113 However, these interactions should not be seen as promoting any
one causal factor to the role of primary determinant. Traits are reconstructed in
development rather than being passed down to offspring. 114 Thus, the stability of each
subsequent life cycle is not simply the result of the transmission of these traits, but the
result of the stability of the organism’s local system.

2.1.5 Distributed control

The notion of distributed control calls into question approaches that identify a
specific resource as the primary determining factor in the process of development. These
approaches pinpoint “one type of resource as controlling and directing the process,
leaving other interactants to function as background conditions, raw materials, or sources

113
114

Ibid., p.4
Ibid., p.2

46

of disturbance.” 115 In contrast, DST does not endorse any one interactant as controlling
development. Instead, it supports the notion that these “other” interactants contribute to
development through more than just interference. Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray note that
“[L]ocating information in a single type of developmental resource obscures the contextdependency of causation by localizing control.” 116 Thus, in order to give an accurate
account of development it is necessary to offer a more complex story, and part of this
story according to a systems perspective involves an account of the ways in which
developmental resources are inherited and evolve, and this includes more than just talk of
genetic blueprints and programs. 117 For example, among other things, DST requires that
we think about the ways developing organisms act as a resource for their own
development. 118 Accordingly, proponents of DST argue that there is at the very least a
heuristic value to the idea that the passing on of developmental information is context
dependent. 119

2.1.6 Evolution as construction

Evolution as construction views the evolution of organism and environment as
interdependent. As Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray assert, “[J]ust as there are no preexisting
representations or instructions that shape organisms from within, there are no preexisting
niches or environmental problems that shape populations from without.” 120 Thus, DST
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promotes the idea that evolutionary change is the result of mutual interaction between a
population and its environment. 121 It is not the case that the evolution of organisms is the
result of adaptation to a static environment. The environment is not static anymore than
the organisms inhabiting that environment. The relationship between an organism and its
environment is dialectical. Each informs the other, and thus the changes that take place to
both the organism and the environment are not in response to each other as isolated
entities, but rather the result of a change in relationship. This change in relationship
results in a change to the developmental system of which each is part. Thus, we might
think of evolution as change in the developmental system. 122 To help clarify, imagine a
couple that is going through a struggle to maintain a relationship. The focal point of the
struggle is not on either individual as an isolated entity, but rather on the relationship
itself. It is not the individual that is at stake, it is the relationship that is at stake. Thus,
changes made by either individual are not in response to the other individual as an
isolated entity, but are instead made in response to the individual as part of the
relationship. In other words, the changes are made in an attempt to sustain the type of
individual needed to maintain the relationship, not to sustain the individual as an isolated
entity. These changes aid in the sustainability of the relationship, but also aid in the
sustainability of the type of individual needed to be in the relationship. So, if P1 and P2
are in relationship type W, and wish to be in relationship type X, and relationship type X
requires that P1 make changes that result in P1 being of type Z, and P2 make changes that
result in P2 being of type R, it is not the case that P1 or P2 need be of type Z or R in order
for P1 or P2 to sustain in the current relationship, but rather that that they must be of type
121
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Z or R in order for P1 and P2 to change to, and sustain in, relationship type X. Further, it is
not the case that P1 changing to type Z, and P2 changing to type R, is the result of one
changing in response to the other, but rather it is the result of the change in relationship
between P1 and P2. Thus, in changing to, and sustaining in, relationship type X, both P1
and P2 change in a manner that makes them the type of individuals needed to change to,
and sustain in, relationship type X. In this sense, the changes made to ensure both the
switch from relationship type W, to relationship type X, and the sustainability of
relationship type X, require that both P1 and P2 sustain the changes that make them type Z
and R. If they cannot sustain such changes, then the capacity to change to, and sustain in,
relationship type X will be lost. Thus, the change to relationship type X will fail, and
because the relationship fails, P1 and P2 will also fail to have changed to type Z and R,
and sustained type Z and R. In other words, relationship type X, P1 type Z, and P2 type R,
are all codependent on each other. If one fails, all fail. If they succeed, then the change
should be viewed as a change in relationship, not simply a change in one of the individual
parts of the relationship in response to the other, but a change in the relationship as a
whole, and this change is the result of mutual interaction. Further, this change in
relationship results in a change to the system of which each is part. Thus, the system
changes as a result of this dynamic interaction. The idea is that in making this change the
different parts of the system coevolve. 123
Now, if we think of evolution as change in the developmental system, then we must
understand it as involving changes to the pattern of development of individuals within
that system. Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray note that
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If evolution is change in developmental systems, then […] it is no longer possible to think of
evolution as the shaping of the organism to fit an environmental niche. Rather, the various
elements of the developmental systems coevolve. Organisms construct their niches both
straightforwardly by physically transforming their surroundings and, equally importantly, by
changing which elements of the external environment are part of the developmental system and
thus able to influence the evolutionary process in that lineage. 124

So, evolution is not the result of organisms adapting to environment, or environment
adapting to organisms, it is the result of change in developmental systems. 125 Thus, for
DST, “evolution is not a matter of organisms being molded by their environments, but
rather the result of organism-environment systems changing over time.” 126 If this is the
case, then it seems advisable to drop notions of evolution that see it as simply the
adaptation of the organism to its environment.

2.1.7 Conclusion

In short, DST claims that the interdependence of the system makes isolation of
any determinant problematic. Developmental systems theorists want to reconceptualize
ontogeny in a manner that displays the difficulty involved in clearly demarcating the
divide between gene and environment, culture and biology, and inherited and learned
traits. Information, whether on the micro level, or on the macro level, is mutually
constructed through the interaction of organism and environment; however, since the
environment includes the organism, even this divide cannot be easily delineated.
Consequently, the nature/nurture dispute itself is called into question due to the inability
to clearly assess the amount of individual involvement either side has in ontogeny. In
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fact, the capacity to even distinguish between the two sides is questioned. Thus, there is
no reason to define any one determinant as the primary determining factor in the
development of anything. So, if we wish to have an explanation of evolution and
development that is dynamic enough to account for the complexities involved in these
processes, then DST seems to offer a viable alternative.

2.2 Some Implications of Accepting DST

Now that we have at least a working understanding of DST, we are prepared to
examine the implications of its acceptance. I begin with an examination of the challenges
that DST produces for essentialism and preformationism, then I investigate Oyama’s
reconceptualization of “the natural,” and how it challenges certain concepts of nature and
nurture. Finally, I offer a cursory account of the general ethical implications involved in
accepting DST. Later in Chapter Five, I examine in greater detail these implications, and
the consequences Oyama’s reconceptualization of “the natural” has on attempts to
naturalize ethics.

2.2.1 DST’s Challenge to Essentialism and Preformationism

Strong essentialist accounts of biology have fallen out of favor for the most part;
however, there are nuanced versions of essentialism still in play in some disciplines.
Oyama notes that “[T]he essentialist idea of a privileged developmental pathway and
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phenotype is very much alive in biology, psychology, and anthropology.” 127 Further,
Griffiths and Knight claim that the preformationist “[…] idea that genes specify traits is
alive and well in evolutionary thought.” 128 In contrast, DST is committed to offering antiessentialist and anti-preformationist accounts of development. Thus, DST challenges any
notion of development that supports privileged developmental pathways and phenotypes,
as well as those accounts that claim that genes specify traits.
Oyama notes that the positing of privileged developmental pathways and
phenotypes is typically “expressed in terms of biological bases or propensities.” 129 To
claim that organisms are inclined in one way or another due to biological underpinnings
is to miss the complete story. This story suffers from some of the same problems that we
see with accounts that posit some kind of static nature to organisms. The basic idea
behind these types of accounts, as Oyama points out, is that species have essences “which
will tend to be expressed as long as there is no interference.” 130 The claim is that there
exist particular pathways or phenotypes which are privileged, and when these privileged
pathways or phenotypes fail to emerge, it is due to “interference.” Exactly how these
accounts make this distinction is called into question by proponents of DST. The socalled “interference” is portrayed by advocates of DST as part of the developmental
story. Rather than seeing these influences as interrupting an individual’s genetic
propensity or biological potential, and thus circumventing the “intended” phenotype,
these supposed extraneous influences are not given a marginalized role in development,
but rather are seen as part of the complete story. In this sense, DST denies that there are
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privileged developmental pathways and phenotypes. Now, this does not mean that
advocates of DST see all developmental influences as equally important, but it does call
into question the merit of drawing metaphysical distinctions based on these
differences, 131 and this is exactly the sort of distinction being made when one asserts
privileged phenotypes or pathways.
Further, talk of privileged or intended phenotypes seems to import a teleological
element into development. In order to posit a phenotype as “intended” or “privileged” it
seems necessary that there be some sort of “plan” or “blueprint” to reference. There
seems no other way for one to know that the intended outcome has been interrupted. But,
who writes up this plan? Without an “author” there seems no way of knowing the
“intended” outcome of this plan. Evolution is not a teleological doctrine, it is not a story
about how things are supposed to be, but rather a explanation of why things are the way
they are. Part of this story involves the regularity in which non-genetic resources are
reproduced. Genetic influences are only part of the story, and although they may exhibit a
certain amount of stability, this stability is in part a reflection of the stable reproduction
of other resources. Thus, it must be recognized that these supposed privileged phenotypes
are not simply the result of some biological propensity, but also the result of other stably
reproduced influences such as the types of energy-producing material available. If the
kinds of food available to a given organism change, then other changes should be
expected, and these changes may eventually be seen at the genetic level. In short, the
stability of genetic influences and outcomes is only as stable as the system in which these
outcomes and influences reside. So, if in an attempt to avoid teleological explanations,
advocates of privileged pathways and phenotypes look to the stability of genetic
131
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resources to make their case, they are only looking at part of the story. DST challenges us
to look at the complete story. It promotes a different heuristic, one that refuses to
marginalize any developmental resource, and forces us to pay attention to the
complexities involved in the emergence of seemingly stable (or non-stable) outcomes.
In addition, from a philosophical perspective, the DST heuristic problematizes
claims that rely on the use of Aristotelian essences. Here I am thinking of claims that
involve, ceteris paribus, the notion of a “proper” function or form. 132 So, borrowing from
Oyama, we might think of these things, as what will be the case if nothing interferes. 133
However, as mentioned previously, from the heuristic of DST, these “interfering”
influences are not portrayed as interference. The capacity to recognize the “proper”
function or form of any phenotype is called into question when the heuristic in use
refuses to distinguish between which developmental resources are interference, and
which are not. If no resources are seen as interference, and the function or form of any
phenotype is constructed out of the interaction of these resources, then the capacity to
distinguish what is the proper function or form of a phenotype from what is not, is
problematized. In other words, the meaning of the statement, “what will be if nothing
interferes,” no longer applies. Ceteris paribus clauses are obviated. Either there is no
“interference” or everything is “interference.” Thus, claims about what is or is not the
“proper” function or form of a phenotype can no longer be supported by this distinction.
Moreover, the use of the term ceteris paribus becomes more complex when
examined from the perspective of DST. From a DST perspective what we are really
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talking about is stability in the reconstruction of a life cycle. The use of the term ceteris
paribus, then, must indicate that the resources involved in the construction of the
phenotype in question, are reliably reconstructed in each life cycle. This would include
both phylogeny and ontogeny. As Oyama notes, according to DST, traits must be
constructed in ontogeny. 134 Thus, the reliability of any trait is contingent on the stability
of the influences present during construction. If these influences lack stability, and
undergo change, then we might say that “all other factors have not remained the same;”
however, if all resources constructed in phylogeny and ontogeny are stable, then from a
DST perspective, it seems okay to claim that “all other factors have remained the same.”
Oyama suggests that “[…] we should think of heredity not as the transmission of traits
between organisms, […] but rather as the ways in which developmental resources or
means become available to the next generation.” 135 From the perspective of DST,
resources becoming available to the next generation in a reliable and stable manner is
what must be meant by the term ceteris paribus. But note, this is a much more complex
story than the one we get if we use Aristotelian-like essences in order to make claims
about the “proper” function and form of phenotypes. Ceteris paribus in these cases will
not take into consideration all of the resources involved in phylogeny and ontogeny, but
rather only those that appear to interfere with the emergence of the so-called “privileged”
pathways or phenotypes.
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2.2.2 DST’s Challenge to the Biology/Culture Divide

A further challenge that DST offers regards the notion that there is a clean
distinction between biological evolution and cultural evolution. Griffiths and Gray assert
that “[T]his distinction rests on a distinction between genetically transmitted and
environmentally acquired traits,” 136 where cultural evolution is seen as the result of traits
being passed on through learning, and thus environmentally acquired, and biological
evolution is seen as the passing on of traits through genetic transmission. In contrast,
DST denies the capacity to divide these traits into these two categories. Griffiths and
Gray argue that:
The means by which traits are reconstructed in the next generation are varied, and do not admit
of any simple twofold division […]. Instead, all traits that are typical of a lineage are subject to a
form of evolutionary explanation that describes how developmental processes replicate and
differentiate into lineages as part of an adaptive-historical process. Many elements of the
developmental systems associated with these processes can be given evolutionary explanations.
Some of these will be elements of the traditional organisms, such as genes. Others will be
elements of culture, such as the social structures that are required for the replication of evolved
psychological traits in humans. 137

Culture is seen as one of the developmental resources involved in the evolution of
traits. 138 As noted earlier, Oyama claims that traits are constructed in ontogeny, and part
of this ontogeny is the result of cultural influences. Griffiths and Gray explain that culture
has been with us well before we were humans, and that culture is one of the
developmental resources at work in the construction of our traits. 139 Thus, the line
between biological evolution and cultural evolution begins to collapse. They further
assert that “[M]any species typical features of human psychology may depend critically
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on stably replicated features of human culture.” 140 Going back to the discussion of ceteris
paribus, I argued that the reliability and stability of phylogeny and ontogeny is what the
advocate of DST must mean when using the term ceteris paribus. Thus, when talking
about species typical features, it follows that these features would depend critically on
stably replicated features of human culture. In other words, in order to even claim that
there are such things as typical features, there needs to be some amount of stability in the
reproduction of one’s developmental resources, and it seems clear that for advocates of
DST, that human culture is one of these developmental resources. Further, if culture is
portrayed as a developmental resource, and human biology is constructed out of these
different resources, then this means there is a social aspect involved in the construction of
human biology. Consequently, as Oyama articulates, “Human biology is then not a matter
of individuals with fixed internal natures, but of changing natures that are a function of
reciprocal relations with environments that always have a social aspect.” 141 The collapse
of the social with the biological, then gives further reason to think that the biology/culture
divide is not justified in a post-essentialist biology or philosophy. Here we really begin to
see the consequences of considering phylogeny and ontogeny as involved in mutually
constructing each other. It becomes increasingly more difficult to see where one ends and
the other begins. Thus, it becomes more and more complicated to make meaningful
claims through the use of this distinction.
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2.2.3 DST’s Challenge to the Concepts of Nature and Nurture: Reconceptualizing the
Natural

In her book, Evolutions Eye, Oyama claims that “[W]e do not need more
conciliatory declarations that nature and nurture are both important, but rather a
reformulation of both.” 142 She reconceptualizes the notions of nature and nurture in a
manner that allows genes and environments to be seen as “parts of a developmental
system that produces phenotypic natures.” 143 She proposes the following
reconceptualization of nature:
Nature is not transmitted but constructed. An organism’s nature — the characteristics that define
it at a given time — is not genotypic (a genetic program or plan causing development) but
phenotypic (a product of development). Because phenotypes change, natures are not static but
transient, and because each genotype has a norm of reaction, it may give rise to multiple natures.
[…] An organism’s nature is simply its form and function. Because nature is phenotypic, it
depends on developmental context as profoundly and intimately as it does on the genome. To
identify nature with that genome, then, is to miss the full developmental story in much the same
way that preformationist explanations have always done. 144

Nature is not seen as some immutable preexisting program that is transmitted to an
organism and functions as the agenda for the development of the organism, but rather it is
seen as the product of development. Under this view natures are seen as phenotypic
rather than genotypic. If natures are viewed as phenotypic, then it follows that natures
cannot be fixed and unchanging, rather as Oyama notes, “[I]nstead of being fixed at
conception, natures are multiple and changing over the life span. […] nature is simply a
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phenotype—an organism-in-transition through a life cycle […].” 145 Thus, an organism’s
nature simply amounts to whatever attributes identify an organism at a particular time,
and these attributes are the result of developmental processes.
Developmental processes are what Oyama calls nurture. Oyama sees nurture as all
developmental interactions and processes that contribute to a life. 146 She claims that
nurture is “[…] as crucial to typical characters as to atypical ones, as formative of
universal characters as of variable ones, as basic to stable characters as to labile ones.” 147
So, the phenotypic outcomes that she calls nature, are the product of the developmental
processes she calls nurture. In short, nature is the result of nurture. So, in contrast to
accounts that see nature as a guiding principle, with limits to the amount of change that
can take place to an organism, and nurture as simply molding nature into whatever form
and function that nature allows, she sees nature as the product of development, and thus
as the product of nurture. However, this does not mean that nurture is the primary
determinant of an organism’s nature, as Oyama notes:
[…] Nature and nurture are […] not alternative sources of form and causal power. Rather, nature
is the product of the processes that are the developmental interactions we call nurture. At the
same time, that phenotypic nature is a developmental resource for subsequent interactions. 148

So nature in turn plays a role in the developmental interactions of nurture. In other words,
both nature and nurture play a role in the mutual construction of each. In this sense,
neither takes on the role of primary determinant. So, although in some sense, nature is the
product of nurture, phenotypic natures are a resource for the subsequent developmental
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processes involved in nurture. 149 Thus, rather than seeing one as the primary determinant
of the other, it is more accurate to see them as involved in a mutual construction. In some
sense, this clouds the very distinction between the two. As Oyama notes:
our natures are nurtured because each of us, like any other being, develops, and we develop as
wholes, not by sprouting acquired bits from a prepackaged innate core. We develop in many
environments, and are constituted by our interactions with these environments. Once nurturing—
that is, development—is accepted as an ineliminable and integral part of “biological” nature, it
can no longer be contrasted with nature. It cannot represent, for instance, an environmental
“outside” to an inherited “inside,” or the psychological as opposed to physical. 150

This account seems to collapse the separation between nurture and nature, thus making it
difficult to base claims about organisms on this division. Such reconceptualization forces
us to offer a more complete and complex story about the form and function of organisms.
It is no longer a case of how much nature or nurture is involved in the production of an
organism and its behavior, but rather, is a story about how these things interact, and what
this interaction produces. In this sense, DST challenges us to offer a more complex
account of organisms and their behavior. Our explanations become more complex;
however, this is what is needed to offer the complete story.

2.2.4 General Ethical Implications Involved in Accepting DST

The goal of this section is to offer a cursory account of the possible implications
that arise when ethics is informed by DST. I address this issue in greater detail later in the
project.
Peter Godfrey-Smith states that
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DST can be regarded as a proposal for a scientific research program. DST contains a set of core
negative and positive ideas about biological systems. These ideas do have the ability to steer
biological research in particular directions, and they have the ability to be confirmed and
disconfirmed through empirical testing. 151

I maintain that not only do these ideas steer biological research, but due to the capacity to
steer biological research, they also affect research in other areas as well. It is clear that
biological research has the capacity to inform ethical discussions. There are numerous
questions about the nature of sexual orientation, intelligence, gender identity, etc., and
many of these questions are examined in light of biological commitments. The answers to
these sorts of questions can have a powerful impact on social, ethical, and political
positions. Thus, it seems reasonable to see these types of things as being part of the realm
of moral discourse. So, if one is committed to DST, then the ideas involved in DST that
steer biological research, will also have implications for ethics. DST’s denial of strict
divides between the various developmental resources leads to different explanations than
those arrived at through accounts that posit strict divides between these resources.
Therefore, it seems clear that the judgments made about these issues will be affected by
the stance one takes on whether or not there is a strict divide between nature and nurture.
If one places a strong emphasis on the nature/nurture divide, then the answers to
questions about things like sexual orientation will be made in light of this commitment.
For example, under such a commitment one may explain sexual orientation as the result
of a biological given. If it is seen as a biological given, then moral judgments about
sexual orientation may be seen as misplaced. 152 Now, if for example, one thinks the best
description of the natural world is one that supports a notion of development as the
product of mutual interaction, then one is most likely committed to the denial of
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biological givens all together. Consequently, the judgments made about something like
sexual orientation will differ depending upon one’s commitments. Thus, if we wish to
offer a thorough analysis of such moral/political questions, then it seems imperative that
we take into consideration diverse accounts on such matters, and that includes DST.
I argued previously that my branch of naturalism commits me to the notion that
we must make use of our best and most relevant empirical theories if we want a better
understanding of the world. Like David Wong, I maintain that we must attempt to
“integrate our understanding of morality with our best and most relevant empirical
theories.” 153 In doing this, I argue that we must take to task the possibilities that result
from the denial of dichotomy laden methods of discovery, and take seriously the
implications that follow from a commitment to DST. We must consider the normative
implications of DST.
As explained previously, DST offers an account of development that sees no
single developmental resource as any more important than another, rather it places an
emphasis on the mutual interaction of these resources. Thus, in assuming DST, any
prescriptions made based on the descriptions given by DST must be made in light of this
mutual interaction. What follows from doing this is a change in the types of claims that
can be supported. Granting DST’s destruction of the nature/nurture divide, any claims
about what traits should or should not result given a particular phylogenetic background
are problematic if not simply impossible. The traits that do emerge are the product of a
mutual interaction, and this mutual interaction includes resources that are typically seen
as background interference. Thus, in making claims about what traits “ought” emerge
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given a particular phylogenetic background, if one assumes DST, then it is necessary to
take into consideration the relationship between all these different resources, and avoid
placing an overwhelming emphasis on either nature or nurture. Godfrey-Smith claims
that if we grant that no trait is more genetic than any other, as Oyama asserts, then there
may not be any reason to hold onto the “standard genetic/environmental distinction
between causal factors, given that we have stopped using it to divide up biological
traits.” 154 Thus, DST may help do away with “the idea that the natural in a biological
sense is normal or acceptable in a moral sense, and the idea that biological traits appear
inevitable.” 155 If phenotypes are contingent upon factors that are themselves contingent,
and there is no means for discerning the degree of phylogeny from the degree of
ontogeny in any given effect, then we might think that there is no such thing as a normal
biological trait. 156 In other words, the contingency of any trait disrupts the capacity for
epistemic access to that which “should” be produced naturally ceteris paribus. Thus, talk
about what trait “should” be produced naturally, seems unwarranted. Furthermore, the
loss of such a distinction makes it increasingly difficult to make normative claims based
on what is “natural.”
A further ethical implication of accepting DST is found in the anti-preformationist
stance taken by proponents of DST. The anti-preformationist stance held by Oyama and
others makes it difficult to posit any claims about what is a normal phenotype. DST
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denies that there is a form of the adult structure that preexists any ontogenetic influence.
Thus, the ultimate outcome of any structure is contingent upon factors that are themselves
contingent upon ontogenetic influences. Granting this assumption, it seems to follow that
we cannot make epistemically sound claims about the normality of phenotypes. In an
attempt to naturalize ethics, if DST is used as a guiding principle, then the types of claims
that can be supported differ dramatically from attempts to naturalize ethics that use
dichotomy laden accounts as a guiding principle. Having given at least a cursory account
of the possible ethical implications involved in the acceptance of DST, I close this issue
for the moment. In Chapter Five, I examine in greater detail exactly how DST can be
used to inform a naturalized ethics.
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3
DST & Naturalized Autonomy

In the first chapter I argued that if one is committed to naturalism, then one ought be
committed to naturalism as a methodological thesis. In the second chapter I examined
DST and some of the philosophical challenges it poses. I gave special attention to Susan
Oyama’s reconceptualization of “the natural,” and later I will show how this
reconceptualization shapes naturalized ethics. A further avenue of investigation that plays
a key role in how we go about forming ethical conclusions concerns the notion of
autonomy. Many argue that autonomy is requisite for attributing moral responsibility to
an organism. Thus, it seems necessary to examine the implications on autonomy that
result from accepting MDN under the umbrella of DST. Following Bruce Waller, I intend
to use the term autonomy to mean the potential for alternative actions. This does not
mean that the agent has unconstrained control over the decision to take an alternative
action, but simply that such routes are in the realm of possibility. The central goal of this
section is to define exactly how I use the term, offer an explanation of the necessary
conditions for a naturalized account of autonomy, and then look at the possibility of
offering such an account under the umbrella of DST. I posit the necessary conditions for
autonomy on a naturalized account, and then offer an interpretation of a naturalized
account of autonomy within a DST framework (hereafter NADST). In conclusion, I argue
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that NADST leads to a non-essentialist account of normativity, and then examine the
prospect of attributing moral responsibility under this account.

3.1 Some Necessary Conditions for a Naturalized Account of Autonomy

Marina Oshana asserts that “claims about autonomy can be established a
posteriori on the basis of natural facts.” 157 If this is so, then we might have the building
blocks for a naturalized account of autonomy. Oshana claims that there are two
conditions that a naturalized conception of autonomy must satisfy: 1) “The properties
which constitute autonomy must be natural properties, knowable through the senses or by
introspection.” 158 2) The properties that constitute autonomy “must not be restricted to
phenomena ‘internal’ to the agent. In addition, certain objective, “external” properties are
required.” 159 By external properties Oshana does not mean that there is a need for an
external perspective in order to investigate personal autonomy, but rather that “there are
certain necessary conditions of autonomy that are themselves external to and independent
of the individuals ‘internal’ character.” 160 For example, she claims that “[…] it is a
natural, empirical fact that persons are socially situated, and that socially situated
individuals are not self-governing unless they are free from interferences that are
‘external’ in nature and origin.” 161 Even if a person removes him or herself from society,
by say running off into the jungle to escape other people, this person is still not free from
external interferences. After all, there must be some environment that this person dwells
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within, and the items in this environment external to the individual will no doubt produce
what some may call interference. So, for Oshana, a fully naturalized account of autonomy
“[…] will treat autonomy as, in part, a function of natural relations that are extrinsic to
the individual.” 162 Consequently, she believes that accounts which posit psychological
characteristics of persons as decisive for autonomy are non-naturalistic in this sense. 163
As stated previously, following Waller, I use the term autonomy to mean “the possibility
for alternative actions.” I maintain that this use of the term allows for the satisfaction of
Oshana’s criterion. I now turn to a defense of this claim.
Waller claims that in order to develop a plausible naturalized account of
autonomy-as-alternatives it needs to be an account “based on the vital importance of
alternative possibilities in the natural world, rather than on mysterious libertarian
agency.” 164 In order to flush out what he means, Waller notes a study on the behavior of
feral white-footed mice conducted by J. Lee Kavanau. In the study, white-footed mice
learn to run through mazes for rewards. Kavanau explains that the mouse even though
educated in the correct path to the reward, will still occasionally stray from the correct
path. In doing so the mouse is investigating alternative paths. Kavanau claims that
although it appears that the mouse is taking the incorrect path, it is only incorrect “from
the point of view of the investigators rigidly prescribed program involved in the
experiment,” 165 not from the perspective of the mouse’s larger interests.
The basis for these responses is that the animal has a certain degree of variability built into many
of its behavior patterns. This variability is adaptive to conditions in the wild, where there are
many relationships that are not strictly prescribed. 166
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The idea is that if the mouse never strayed from the one true path, then it would be
doubtful that it ever discovered the possible benefits of an alternative route. In the wild, if
the primary source for food were ever lost, then the failure to explore other routes could
leave the mouse lacking a food supply. In exploring alternative routes the mouse gains
information about these other routes, and the possible benefits to be found along these
routes. Thus, assuming there are benefits to be found, it is in the best interest of the
mouse to explore alternative routes. This exploration allows for the mouse to “keep its
options open.” 167 Notice that in this description there is no need to posit a form of
libertarian freedom in order to expose the potential for alternatives. The potential for
alternatives in this account is the result of there actually being more than one path
available to the mouse. The discovery of these alternative paths is empirical. It is a claim
made a posteriori on the basis of natural facts, and it is not restricted to phenomena
“internal” to the mouse. Thus, at least in respect to the possibility of alternative paths for
the white-footed mouse, Oshana’s criteria for a naturalized autonomy are met. This says
nothing about the mouse’s capacity for self-direction; however, it does show that any self
direction the mouse might have will be contingent on its relationship with the
environment. So, it is not the case that the possibility for alternatives is restricted to
phenomena solely “internal” to the mouse, but rather that there is a mutual interaction
between the mouse and its environment. Now, as Waller notes, the white-footed mouse is
not the “paradigm of autonomy,” but it does offer some valuable insight into
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autonomy. 168 Let’s look at how the story of the white-footed mouse maps on to human
autonomy.
Much like the white-footed mouse it is in our best interest to explore alternative
routes. Waller asserts that just as the white-footed mouse is occasionally vindicated for
taking what appears to be the “wrong” path, human beings too are sometimes rewarded
for pursuing a path that in the past displayed no benefits, or one which had benefits that
have since perished.
Humans pursue a path because it is particularly successful, but we do not stop exploring new
ones. When the successful behavioral pattern loses its effectiveness we have other alternatives
ready. In like manner, we do not entirely abandon the previously successful pattern, and may
return to it occasionally (though we know it is unlikely to work). If later the old behavioral
pattern again proves beneficial, we are less likely to overlook those benefits. 169

The fact is that our environment is constantly changing. Evolutionary success is at least
partially based on the capacity for plasticity. If we are not malleable, then we risk losing
the ability to cope with the complex and constant flux of our surroundings. By
continually exploring alternative routes we keep options open, and thus are in a position
to capitalize on benefits that would otherwise be overlooked or missed.
Now, it should be clear that such behavior is at least in part directed by the
success of the exploration. After all, if it was the case that nothing beneficial ever came
from the exploration of alternative paths, then there would seem to be no benefit in
pursuing such paths; but, the fact is that we sometimes do continue to pursue paths that
either do not offer benefits, or no longer offer benefits. It is entirely possible that one
continues to pursue a particular path even though it continues to fail. There is nothing that
demands the agent to continue on a fruitful path or abandon a fruitless path, but there
does seem to be some incentive to follow the fruitful path rather than the fruitless one. In
168
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an attempt to flush out the incentive behind such behavior patterns Waller draws a
connection between the types of patterns involved in maintaining alternatives, and the
types of patterns maintained through what he calls “variable interval reinforcement.” He
claims that “the same pattern of maintaining alternatives can be observed in behavior
shaped on a variable interval reinforcement schedule (The schedule that shapes most of
our learned behavior).” 170
Behavior shaped on a variable interval schedule can be maintained with quite limited positive
reinforcement; and when the pattern is almost extinguished, one instance of positive
reinforcement revives it to near full strength. That is not invariably a good thing: it causes my
deleterious gambling behavior—almost ended by a long losing streak—to regain full intensity
following one small payoff. But the overall advantage of having a large range of behavior
readily available for changing environments and new contingencies more than balances the
disadvantages—for white-footed mice as well as humans. 171

According to Waller, the sustainability of behavior shaped by a variable interval
reinforcement schedule (hereafter VIRS) requires very little positive reinforcement. This
does not always lead to advantageous behavior in particular instances. As the gambling
example makes clear, the limited amount of reinforcement needed to maintain actions
through a VIRS sometimes leads to non-beneficial actions; however, it does not render
useless the advantageous nature of these behavior patterns as a whole. The behavior
pattern as a whole allows the agent more possible solutions in the long run. If one were to
limit exploration to only those paths that have shown promise, then the number of
alternatives open to the agent would diminish. The result of diminishing one’s
alternatives leads to a more limited capacity to attain necessary benefits. Even if, for
example, an organism has just a few alternatives, and these alternatives result in a high
degree of success—in other words, the organism is almost certain to get what it needs
from them—there is still the possibility that these alternatives dry up, or that some other
170
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organism prevents this organism from accessing these alternatives, and if this organism
has failed to explore other potential alternatives, then it will be ill prepared to overcome
these challenges. In a changing environment, the more limited one’s capacity for
attaining necessary resources, the more likely it is that one fails to attain such resources.
The failure to attain necessary resources may result in the loss of sustainability. In a
changing environment, the more alternatives present to an agent, the more possible
avenues one has for attaining these necessary resources. Thus, the likelihood of
sustainability increases with the increase of alternatives. Now, it is still possible that all
available alternatives fail to provide just what one needs, or that these alternatives are so
risky that to pursue them would end in certain death, but this does not mean that the
likelihood of sustainability is compromised by having more alternatives. It might be the
case that none of these alternatives do the trick, but having more alternatives seems to at
least raise the likelihood that one of them will do the trick. A further objection might
hinge on the idea that an organism can put so much energy and time into exploring these
alternatives that it begins to detract from sustainability. This is a possibility; however, I
maintain that the benefit of having a variety of alternatives outweighs this worry. I argue
that in order for an organism to reach the point of diminishing returns as this objection
suggests, it would require that in exploring all these alternatives the organism in question
failed to secure the necessary resources. This might suggest that the need to explore so
many alternatives was necessary. After all, if an organism spends this much energy and
time exploring all these alternatives, and does not secure the necessary resources in the
process, then none of the explored alternatives provided just what the organism needed.
In this case, we might think that the organism did not have enough alternatives. Further,
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this does not show that the having of more alternatives is in some way damaging, it only
shows that if one attempts to explore all alternatives, then they run the risk of reaching
the point of diminishing returns, but this seems to only be a real worry if all explored
alternatives fail to provide just what the organism needs. Again, I maintain that having
more alternatives seems to at least raise the likelihood that one of them will do the trick.
So, in the case of the organism that spends so much time and energy exploring
alternatives that it begins to have a negative affect, I think it right to claim that this
organism has simply run out of luck or alternatives. Although it may be the case that
VIRS sometimes leads to deleterious behavior, due to the ever-changing environment, the
benefit of possessing a variety of behavioral alternatives outweighs such
disadvantages. 172
In addition, the shaping of behavior patterns by a VIRS exposes a further reason
to reject the libertarian sense of freedom. If at least some of our behavior patterns are
reinforced by their success or failure, then the discontinuation or continuation of these
behavior patterns is caused by something external to the agent. Namely, the success or
failure of the pattern in question. Thus, in such situations, even if it appears that the
agents decision to stop or continue a particular behavior pattern is uncoerced, as
libertarians claim, the empirical evidence used to motivate this decision is external to the
agent, thus there is at least some portion of the decision making procedure that is
motivated by factors beyond the control of the agent. In other words, it is the product of a
cause, and it seems that there is little difference between being caused and being coerced.
Now, one might argue that the decision to base further expeditions on the success or
failure of behavior patterns is one that is made by the agent internally. Thus, although the
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decision making procedure involves the use of evidence which has been developed
outside the control of the agent, the actual decision is solely within the control of the
agent. In response, I maintain that the decision making procedure cannot be isolated in
this way. Decisions are motivated through the interaction of multiple factors which
include the organisms relationship to its environment. Thus, it would be a mistake to
claim that the internal influences involved in agential decision making have a privileged
position over the external influences, or that the internal influences have less causal
impetus than the external influences. In other words, the actual action decided on by the
agent is developed out of the relationship between the internal and the external, and
neither one should be seen as the primary determinant of the action performed, nor
should either be seen as a non-causal factor. I would like to bracket this claim for the time
being. I address this response in more detail later in my discussion of DST’s contribution
to naturalized autonomy. For now, I maintain that as long as we view autonomy as the
capacity for alternative possibilities, then there is no problem with admitting that at least
some part of our capacity to decide what actions we perform is directed by factors
beyond our control. I want to note that I am not maintaining that all behavior patterns are
dictated by variable interval reinforcement, but I do maintain that our decision making
procedure is made in light of external information that can be established a posteriori on
the basis of natural facts. This is not to say that there is no “internal” part of the decision
making procedure, but rather that both the “internal” and “external” are mutually
constructed. Thus, in a sense, there is a collapse between the two, and talk of them in a
dichotomous manner seems unwarranted. Again, I address exactly how this works later in
the section on NADST.
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Returning to how the white-footed mouse’s autonomy maps on to human beings,
Waller remarks:
[…] autonomy – as – alternatives is grounded in learning strategies that are not the exclusive
province of higher-level rational powers, nor the exclusive property of humans. Autonomy
involves access to genuine alternatives, and in that sense human autonomy parallels white-footed
mouse autonomy. 173

The learning strategies involved in autonomy–as–alternatives are not the sole property of
human beings; these strategies are used across at least some phylogenetic divides. Thus,
the capacity to achieve autonomy in this sense is not strictly a human endeavor.
Waller admits that human intelligence produces important differences between the
autonomy of white-footed mice and humans, but he claims that “even these differences
are best understood in terms of their common roots in the exploration of alternative
paths.” 174 The white-footed mouse relies on a keen sense of smell, sharp eyes, and quick
feet to aid in its exploration of alternative paths, whereas the reflective intelligence of
humans is our best exploratory device. 175 Thus, a human being that lacks such reflective
intelligence would be just as ill equipped to examine possible alternatives as a whitefooted mouse deprived of sight and scent. 176 Waller claims that “reason is essential to full
human autonomy: reason opens a wide range of possibilities and options, and facilitates
careful assessment of those options.” 177 Thus, the main difference between humans and
the white-footed mouse in respect to exploring alternatives is the device used to perform
the exploring; humans use reason and white-footed mice use sight, smell, and nimble feet
as the main devices for such exploration. However, Waller points out, that the reason
used by humans in this sense is not “a Reason that closes off alternatives in favor of a
173
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single true path.” 178 In fact, he maintains that the use of reason in this sense is “precisely
the opposite.” In making his case, he argues that Susan Wolf’s notion of reason found in
her book, Freedom Within Reason, misses this point.
Wolf argues for a notion of reason that appears to close off alternatives in favor
of a single path. 179 She sees reason as something that one would not want to act in
opposition to. She writes:
To want autonomy, then, is not only to want the ability to make choices even when there is no
basis for choice but to want the ability to make choices on no basis even when a basis exists. But
the latter ability would seem to be an ability no one could ever have reason to want to exercise.
Why would one want the ability to pass up the apple when to do so would merely be unpleasant
or arbitrary? 180

Thus, Wolf maintains that reason is the thing we want to use when making choices, and
to desire otherwise is something that one could never want to actually put into
application. So, even though in wanting autonomy one may wish to have the capacity to
act in opposition to reason, one will not actually want to put this capacity to use. Waller
asserts that Wolf’s notion of reason leads to the use of reason as a device to “discover the
single true path,” and that the use of reason as the one true single path is problematic for
the attainment of natural autonomy–as–alternatives. Waller points out that
from the perspective of natural autonomy – as – alternatives, one might want to pass up the
apple—the most desirable and reasonable option, on this particular occasion—in order to
discover new sources of fruit for when the apple harvest is exhausted. 181

Thus, the use of single path reason limits the number of possible alternatives available to
the agent, and as such, may in the long run promote a behavior pattern that is deleterious.
So, although in any one instance following reason in the single path sense may lead to an
immediate reward, to solely follow reason does not promote the most advantageous
178
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behavior pattern as a whole. Thus, at least according to Waller, the use of reason as a
device to limit alternatives is not always in our best long term interest.
It is clear that reason functions in a different manner for Wolf than it does for
Waller. Waller thinks that reason opens options, and Wolf thinks it aids in limiting
options to those things that are most useful. However, in Waller’s critique of Wolf he
attributes a faulty consequence to her notion of reason. Waller claims that Wolf’s notion
of reason will lead to the closing off alternative paths, but closer inspection reveals that
Wolf’s claim does not imply such a consequence. Wolf’s claim only asserts that it seems
no one could ever want to exercise the capacity to choose in opposition to reason. She
does not claim that no one can exercise this capacity, or even that no one ever will
exercise this capacity. Further, her assertion does not commit one to the notion that such
a capacity is removed by the possession of reason. Thus, it seems that Wolf’s notion of
reason does not entirely rule out the possible alternative of choosing in opposition to
reason’s dictates. It only points to the possibility that reason might interfere with one’s
desire to act in opposition to reason’s dictate. But, it is not unusual to witness human
beings acting in opposition to their desires or to reason. In fact, Wolf states later that
“[T]o want autonomy is to want the ability to make a more fundamental choice, the
choice of whether to act in accordance with Reason or not.” 182 Thus, simply because
Wolf’s notion of reason leads to a lack of desire to choose or act in opposition to reason,
does not necessarily mean this avenue is closed.
In response to Wolf’s assertion that no one could ever have reason to want to
exercise the ability to make a choice on no basis, even when a basis is present, 183 I
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maintain, in line with Wolf’s own claims, that even though one may never want to put
such a capacity to use, this does not eliminate the possibility that the capacity to do so
exists. Thus, the capacity to act in opposition to reason may be available as an alternative,
even if one never desires to apply this capacity. However, Wolf’s assertion that “[T]o
want autonomy is to want the ability to make […] the choice of whether to act in
accordance with Reason or not,” 184 seems to place reason in the role of primary
determinant. It establishes a dichotomy between reason and everything else. I argue that
to promote reason as the primary determinant of our actions places a constraint on our
actions that need not be there.
In addition, unlike Waller, I am not claiming that single path reason interferes
with the capacity to expand our options, it only interferes with the desire to act in
opposition to reason. Now, if the lack of desire to act in opposition to reason interferes
with the capacity to expand our options, it would prove problematic for a naturalized
account of autonomy-as-alternatives. However, as I stated previously, it does not interfere
with the capacity to act in opposition to reason, it only effects the desire to put the
capacity into application, and this is not enough to remove the option to apply this
capacity all together. Thus, this option is still available.
In contrast, to assert reason as the primary determinant of our actions and choices
does interfere with the capacity to offer a naturalized account of autonomy-as-alternatives
because it closes off possible alternatives. In fact, the use of reason, or any faculty for
that matter as the primary determinant for what actions we perform interferes with the
capacity to possess natural autonomy-as-alternatives. To clarify, if reason is the primary
faculty human beings use to determine what actions we perform, then it places an
184
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unnecessary constraint on how we establish available alternatives. As Waller states, it
may be the case that reason is a large part of how we determine what actions we will or
will not execute; however, to establish reason as the primary determinant means that in
all cases when we act autonomously we will conform to the demand of reason. But, this
clearly leaves a large array of alternatives out of the equation. Simply because human
beings possess reason, does not mean that we ought not allow other alternatives to inform
or actions in some instances. Now, Waller might claim that reason itself dictates that it is
in our best interest to act in opposition to reason in some instances—as in the case of
Wolf’s apple. Thus, to use another device, such as inclination, to determine what choice
or action we execute is simply the consequence of following reason’s dictate, and thus
reason is still acting as the primary determinant. Reason is the faculty that determined
that we ought follow one of these other possible devices. However, I argue that this does
not mean that reason is promoted to the primary determinant. It only shows that it is one
of many determinants in play at all times, and that sometimes it (reason) will recommend
using one of these other possible determinants. If in contrast, we recall Schiller’s critique
of Kant, 185 on which it is possible that one is simply inclined to use reason as the primary
determinant, then it can be shown that this leads to a similar problem; it leads to the
notion that using reason as the primary determinant is simply the consequence of
following the dictate of an inclination. Thus, in this case, inclination is acting as the
primary determinant; inclination is the faculty that determined that we ought follow
another possible determinant. Similar claims can be made ad infinitum, and thus seem of
little use. I argue that it is best to abandon the view that we possess a primary determinant
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for autonomous actions. 186 The basic idea is that autonomous actions can be
accomplished in more than one manner. For human beings, reason is just one of the
interactants involved in the development of autonomous actions.
In addition, I maintain that autonomy can be identified empirically. If the whitefooted mouse is locked in a room, then there is only one available path; to stay put. All
other available paths are closed off, and thus, the white-footed mouse is lacking possible
alternatives. There is only one path the mouse can explore. The mouse must stay put, it
cannot do otherwise, there are no other available options. Thus, the white-footed mouse
has no autonomy in this case. Notice that in this example the white-footed mouse’s lack
of autonomy is established a posteriori on the basis of natural facts. It is an empirical
statement. Now, if there is a door in the room, and that door leads to one path, then the
white-footed mouse has at least two available options; stay put or follow the path. I argue
the white-footed mouse, in this situation, has the capacity to be autonomous. However, if
the mouse had more alternative paths, or if it had more alternative faculties, then it would
have the capacity to be more autonomous.
One might question whether having too many options might in fact inhibit the
decision making capacity of an organism. Perhaps, having innumerable options might
leave one unable to decide what to do; however, this does not thwart the capacity to be
autonomous in the same manner as having no options. Having no options makes it
impossible to be autonomous, having too many may in some cases make it difficult to be
autonomous, but it does not eliminate the possibility altogether. Having more options at
least offers the possibility for an organism to be more autonomous. To clarify, by more
options I mean either one or both of two things: 1) Having more available paths. 2)
186
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Having more available faculties. So, if there are more available paths present, then the
organism has more possibilities to follow, and thus has at least the possibility to be more
autonomous than if it had fewer available paths, and if the organism has more available
faculties to draw upon, then it has at least the possibility to be more autonomous than if it
had fewer available faculties. Under faculties I include eyesight, reason, inclination, and
instinct. 187 So, an organism that possesses just instinct has fewer available options than
one that possesses reason and instinct, and the organism that possesses more available
options, has the possibility of being more autonomous. Whether the organism actually
becomes more autonomous is another question—a question that appears to be answerable
only on a case by case basis.
So, rather than viewing autonomy as an absolute, where one is either autonomous
or not, the naturalistic framework that I endorse allows for one to be more or less
autonomous. This denial of autonomy as an absolute results in a more dynamic and
complex notion of autonomy. So, although reason plays a role in autonomy, it does not
necessarily play the primary role in determining whether an organism is autonomous. In
contrast, I maintain along with Wolf, that the capacity to abandon reason, if one
possesses reason, is necessary 188 in order to achieve autonomy; however, in contrast to
Wolf, it is not the primary basis for achieving autonomy. I see reason as one of many
possible interactants involved in the development of autonomy, and maintain that no
interactant takes on the primary role in this development. This is a place where DST has
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the capacity to inform our understanding of autonomy. Later in the following section I
address in more detail how DST lends itself to this interpretation.

3.2 A Naturalized Account of Autonomy under DST (NADST)

In offering an account of NADST the idea is to take the standing formulation of
naturalized autonomy sketched in section 3.3, connect it with Developmental Systems
Theory, and evaluate the result of the connection. In doing this, I seek to answer the
question: Does DST contribute anything useful to naturalized autonomy? I claim that the
answer to this question is “yes.” I maintain that a naturalized approach to autonomy
allows for autonomous actions to be viewed as an outcome of a developmental system.
This view would then see autonomous actions as developed from the resources and
interactants within the system.
As noted in the synopsis of DST sketched in chapter two, Griffiths and Gray
maintain that “[…] we might define a developmental system as the sum of the objects
that participate in the developmental process, or alternatively, as the sum of the
developmental resources.” 189 Susan Oyama describes a developmental system as a
shifting complex of heterogeneous elements that includes the organism and all features of
its surroundings. Further, she maintains that there is no category of interactants that is
privileged a priori as the primary local of causal control. 190 The common idea implicit in
these descriptions is that developmental productions cannot be explained by reference to
one dominant causal force, but rather must be explained through the relations of each to
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the other. As Oyama notes, “[…] any factor’s role in the system depends on its relations
with the others.” 191 Further, Oyama claims that the environment is included in the
developmental system, and thus she eliminates the idea that the environment is simply a
location. 192 Thus, any item that is the result of this development, including the
environment, must be seen as a heterogeneous production. In other words, it is the result
of mutual construction. Thus these items are not simply guided or constrained by one
primary determinant.
Waller uses the constantly changing environment to promote the value of
possessing alternative possibilities. Accordingly, he sees the having of these alternatives
as aiding in the sustainability of the organism, and the availability of this alternatives as
the result of the environment in which the organism resides. Thus, the use of these
alternatives by an organism is seen as a response to the environment. So, in this sense, the
organism is seen as separate from the environment. NADST reformulates this claim into
one about the system as a whole. Thus, claims of an isolated environment that determines
the production of these alternatives, claims that see the construction of these alternatives
as products of the environment, or claims about organisms using these alternatives in
response to the environment, are problematized. It is not simply a matter of organism
responding to the environment, alternatives being constructed by the environment, or
alternatives simply aiding in the sustainability of the organism, but a matter of how the
sustainability of the organism informs and is informed by the system of which the
organism is part, thus resulting in the construction of these alternatives. Assuming
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NADST, it is not the case that autonomy-as-alternatives is a response to the environment,
it is the result of the development of the system as a whole. Looking back at the whitefooted mouse, alternative possibilities can be explained as the result of heterogeneous
productions. They are the result of the mutual construction involved in the development
of the organism and the environment. In other words, these alternatives are the result of
the interactants that constitute the system. So, alternatives become a component in the
sustainability of the system, which includes the organism and the environment. The
actions that become available to the organism through these alternatives aid in the
sustainability of the organism, but the sustainability of the organism informs the
environment of which the organism is part. In other words, niche construction plays a
role in the development of these alternatives and these alternatives play a role in not only
the sustainability of the organism, but also the system of which the organism is part.

3.2.1 The Denial of a Primary Determinant for Autonomous Actions

Going back to the claim that it is best to abandon the view that we possess a
primary determinant for autonomous actions, NADST helps to show why this claim is
warranted. Following Oyama’s claim that in a DST “[T]here is no single, centralized
control of the processes of development,” 193 it follows, under NADST, that it is not
necessary to posit reason, inclinations, environmental factors, or any other element as the
primary determinant of autonomous actions. All these elements are best seen as part of a
system in which the relationships among them all play a role in determining our actions
and choices.
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As discussed earlier, the view that there are privileged developmental pathways
and phenotypes is challenged by proponents of DST. This view typically sees particular
pathways or phenotypes as privileged, and when these privileged pathways or phenotypes
fail to emerge, it is claimed that it is due to “interference.” This is eerily similar to the
notion of reason that Waller accuses Wolf of using. Remember, Waller sees Wolf’s
notion of reason as one that closes off alternatives in favor of a single true path. Claiming
that reason is the single true path implies that it is privileged. Wolf sees reason as the
highest faculty there is, and thus, as the faculty that ought be used to motivate action. 194
She sees no basis for acting in opposition to reason. In other words, non-rational motives
are subsidiary to the dominant role played by reason. So, when a faculty other than
reason plays a role in the motivation of an action, this other faculty must be seen as
interfering with reason, and thus interfering with the capacity to follow the single true
path, that is the path that has been deemed privileged. NADST sees the motivation of an
action as the result of a heterogeneous process. It sees action as the result of
development, and development as comprised of the interaction between various factors.
So, for an organism that possesses instinct, inclination, and reason, action is the result of
at least the interaction between instinct, inclination, reason, and environment. Even when
one appears to be following the dictate of reason, it must be noted that reason has been
informed by these other factors, and these other factors informed by reason. To be clear,
what is at issue is the capacity to isolate any of these factors. They are all informed by
each other, and are all the result of this mutual informing. Thus, for NADST, when a
factor other than reason plays a role in motivating action, it is not seen as interference, it
is simply part of the process involved in the development of the action. Again, action is
194
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the result of a heterogeneous process, and no single resource, interactant, or element is
seen as privileged. Thus, to claim that one interferes with another, is to miss the point.
There is no interference, only mutual construction. NADST asks for a more complex
explanation for the motivation of an action. It does not accept that reason is a faculty in
isolation from these other factors, nor that these other factors are in isolation from reason.
In this sense, it collapses the distinction drawn by Wolf and others between reason and
other forms of motivation.
An example may help to make clear what I have in mind. Imagine that Russ is on
a roof, and one available avenue to get down from the roof is to climb down the fire
escape, and the other is to take an elevator. Now, further imagine that Russ is inclined to
avoid elevators for no reason, the fact is, that he simply dislikes them. He may reason that
the elevator is indeed a possible alternative; however, he also realizes that he has the
inclination to avoid elevators, and thus reasons that the torture he will endure from taking
the elevator is more than he desires to accept. Thus, he takes the fire escape. Notice,
when he finally performs the act of descending from the roof via fire escape, it is the case
that his action is the result of a heterogeneous process. At the very least his action was the
result of an interaction between his reason and inclination, and thus his action is best
characterized as the result of a mutual construction. There was no primary determinant.
Now, one might think that his inclination to avoid elevators was the primary determining
factor in him taking the fire escape, but notice that he did not simply avoid the elevator
due to his inclination, he still used reason to deduce the idea that he did not desire to go
through the torture that taking the elevator would produce. His action ultimately is the
result of multiple interactions between reason and inclination. Neither one of them
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motivated the action in isolation. His action was dictated by what best satisfied all these
motivating factors.
Now, this is not to say that there is no difference between reason, and these other
factors, but it is to say, that these differences do not merit drawing the metaphysical
distinction between them that Wolf and others do. In other words, if it is the case that all
these factors are informed by each other, then it makes little sense to claim that one has a
privileged position as the primary determinant of an action while the others simply
operate as background interference.
In short, if there are actually available paths present, then I agree with Wolf that
the capacity to act in accordance with, or in opposition to reason is sufficient for
autonomy, but in contrast to Wolf, I do not see it as necessary. I argue that if there are
actually available paths present, then the capacity to act in opposition to, or in accordance
with any faculty, such as inclination or instinct, is sufficient for autonomy as well. Now,
as argued previously, whether available paths are actually present is contingent on the
system as a whole. So, for Wolf, to have autonomy just means one acts in accordance
with reason even though one is able to act against reason. 195 In contrast, I do not think
that acting on reason even when one has the capacity to abandon reason is enough to
establish autonomy. If there are no alternative paths available, then it matters very little if
one has the capacity to act in accordance with, or in opposition to, reason. Further, sense
NADST sees all contributing factors as informing each other, it denies any justification
for isolating these factors. Thus, to be autonomous for NADST is simply to have
available alternative paths, and the capacity to actually take one of these alternative paths,
regardless of the faculty being used to motivate the taking of one of these paths. It is here
195

Ibid., p.62

86

that I abandon the use of Waller’s terminology—autonomy-as-alternatives—and
introduce the term—autonomy-as-available-alternatives—as it is expresses more
accurately what I mean by autonomy.

3.2.2 NADST Promotes a Non-Essentialist Normativity

Wolf sees reason as explicitly and essentially a normative term that refers to the
highest faculty there is. 196 To act in opposition to reason, then is to act in opposition to
the “highest” faculty available to any organism that possesses reason as a possible
faculty. Thus, if an organism possesses reason, then she sees reason as the faculty that
ought be used to motivate action in all cases. To do otherwise, is to deny the normative
character of reason. Viewing reason in this manner seems to promote an essentialist
account of normativity. Wolf attaches a value to the way that reason motivates action that
she does not attach to other faculties, and to deviate from this is to ignore the essentially
normative character of reason. In this sense, she sees reason as the essential reference
point from which all action ought be motivated.
In contrast, NADST promotes a non-essentialist normativity—one that sees it as
intelligible to act in defiance to reason in some cases. Thus, there is not a set list of
attributes that comprise the normative. The normative is comprised of heterogeneous
elements that change in relation to the particular dynamic in play at the time. Thus, the
faculty or faculties that are promoted to the role of dictator at any given moment will
depend on the status of the local system at that time. In short, there are no essential
attributes that comprise the normative.
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In addition, Wolf argues that if one thinks that it is intelligible to act in opposition
to reason, then this commits one to a radical skepticism, or nihilism, about the objectivity
of values. 197 She writes:
Keeping in mind the essentially normative character of “Reason,” the claim that one might
intelligibly want to act in defiance of it must be understood as a way of denying that there really
is such a thing as Reason in that sense at all. It is a way of expressing a position of radical
skepticism, or nihilism, about the objectivity of values. 198

I think Wolf is mistaken to see radical skepticism, or nihilism, about the objectivity of
values, as the only viable alternatives available for one who thinks it is intelligible to act
in defiance of reason. If as Waller argues, it is beneficial ceteris paribus to explore
alternatives paths even in the face of what reason recommends, then it is reasonable to
think that there is value in this endeavor—the objective value being the increasing
possibility of discovering resources that would be left undiscovered if reason was strictly
followed in all cases. So, even if as Wolf claims, the use of reason will most likely lead to
true beliefs and good values, it is not the case that it will always lead to the best action.
So, there is an objective value to be found in acting in defiance of reason in some cases.
Thus, I think that Waller offers a viable reason to think that acting in defiance to reason
does not necessarily commit one to a radical skepticism or nihilism in regards to the
objectivity of values. It commits one to skepticism about the value of seeing reason as an
overriding normative dictator, but this does not warrant the stronger claim that Wolf
maintains.
Now, I want to make clear that NADST does not discount the value of reason, it
only discounts the use of it as the primary determinant of autonomous actions. In other
words, there is still room in NADST to recognize the benefits of following reason.
197
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However, it also leaves room for recognizing the benefits of not following reason
exclusively. In fact, since NADST sees reason as the product of development, and
development as the process of mutual interaction, it sees reason as being built out of these
interactions. Assuming the organism in question is capable of possessing an inclination or
instinct, then there is no time when an organism is absent the influence of inclinations,
instincts, or environment. So, in-practice, there is no way for any organism to act on
reason alone. Thus, when following reason, one is following a reason that is informed by
other factors, and included in these other factors are the currently available paths, and
faculties.

3.2.3 Responsibility Within NADST

It is often said that the capacity to have done otherwise is needed in order to hold
someone responsible for their actions. If one could not have done otherwise, then one
cannot be held responsible. NADST claims that any organism that has possible
alternatives, or in other words, the capacity to do more than one thing, is autonomous.
Defining autonomy in this manner is one way of saying that one could have done
otherwise. However, I do not believe this to be enough to establish responsibility. As I
argued before, I see autonomy as something that admits to degrees. Thus, some
organisms can be more or less autonomous than other organisms. It is in this difference
that I believe room for responsibility can be made; however, in order to explain exactly
how responsibility is attached within NADST, I need to first explain in more detail the
various ways that organisms can differ in the degree of autonomy they possess.
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To begin, I need to clarify what I mean by possible alternatives. Possible
alternatives result from the relationship between what I call available paths and available
faculties. In other words, an organism’s possible alternatives are the result of an
organism’s available paths and available faculties being situated in a manner that allows
access to available alternatives. The more available alternative paths and available
alternative faculties an organism possesses, the more possible alternatives an organism
has present; however, in order for these possible alternatives to become available, the
organism’s faculties must be in the right kind of relationship with the paths. I now turn to
the task of explaining exactly what I mean by available alternative paths and available
alternative faculties. I will take each in turn.
By available paths, I am here talking about what I call environmentally available
paths. To clarify, if for example an organism is locked in a cage, then its environment is
such that it has no available alternative paths. It has only one path, and that is to stay in
the cage. If on the other hand, the organism is in a room that has a door, then it now has
what I call available alternative paths. It could stay in the room, or go out the door. As
mentioned previously, the more available paths present to an organism, the more possible
alternative actions exist for the organism. So, if an organism is in a room with three
doors, then it now has four possible options, stay put or take one of the three doors. So,
by available alternative paths, I am talking about available external alternatives. That is,
alternatives that are the result of the organism’s local environment. Now, as I formerly
stated, these available alternative paths are just one part of what I call possible
alternatives. The other part is what I call available alternative faculties.
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By faculties, I am talking about the following types of things: sense of smell,
eyesight, the capacity to walk, reflex, instinct, inclination, and reason. 199 All these
faculties have the capacity to motivate particular behaviors, the capacity to open the eyes
of an organism to possible paths and actions that would not be noticed otherwise, and the
capacity to actually allow for the action to be performed. In short, faculties (if
appropriately related to a path) allow an organism to access a path. In other words, there
may be a path present, but it may not be noticed if the organism is lacking the needed
faculty to recognize it or act on it. For example, imagine Honeycutt is trapped in a well,
and there are a bunch of boxes at the bottom of the well. If Honeycutt has all possible
faculties as available options, then he has a greater chance of recognizing that stacking
these boxes up can provide him with just what he needs to escape the well. Further, he
has a greater chance of possessing whatever faculty is needed to actually ascend the
boxes. In contrast, if Honeycutt has only one available faculty, then his chance of
recognizing and actually accessing this path is reduced. In this sense, there is a path;
however, it is one that may not be recognized or able to be accessed without the proper
faculty in play. By having more faculties available to him, he has a higher likelihood of
seeing and accessing the available path. So, the having of alternative available faculties
means that an organism has the capacity to be informed and motivated by more than one
faculty, and this opens up the possibility for the organism to perform actions that it would
or could not perform otherwise. So, if an organism possesses the capacity to be motivated
by instinct and inclination, then when acting it has two alternative faculties that can be
used to motivate and inform action. For example, if an organism is in a room with one
door, and the only faculties it possesses are instinct and inclination, then its possible
199
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alternative paths are to either stay in the room or go out the door, and its possible
informing motivators are instinct and inclination. If this organism possesses the capacity
for reason, instinct, and inclination, then it has one more available informing motivation
for action. Namely, reason. The more available alternative faculties present to an
organism, the more informing motivations for action exist for the organism. So, having
more available alternative paths increase the amount of possible actions, and having more
available alternative faculties increase the amount of possible informing motivators for
taking action, and thus, increases the amount of actions recognized as possibilities, as
well as increasing the amount of actions the organism can actually perform. Having
clarified what I mean by available paths and faculties, we are now prepared to examine in
detail what it means to be more or less autonomous.
Let me begin by stating that there must be at least one available faculty and one
available alternative path present for an organism to be considered autonomous. Further,
the path and faculty must be situated in a manner that allows for the faculty to access the
path. In other words, the minimum requirement to claim autonomy under NADST is the
existence of at least one available alternative path, the possession of at least one faculty,
and a relationship between the faculty and path that allows for the faculty to access the
path. So, an organism that is in a room with one door, and has no faculties, does not
possess autonomy. In this scenario, it is the case that the organism has an available path
to take; however, it lacks the faculty it needs in order to recognize the path, access the
path, and be motivated to take the path. In other words, the organism is really no more
than an inanimate object. We might think of how a brain dead human acts if placed inside
a room with a million doors. Although there are millions of available paths, the brain
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dead human has no motivating faculty to prompt the taking of one of these paths, nor the
capacity to recognize that there is a path, and thus lacks autonomy. Notice, that if
autonomy was attributable in cases where there was an available path, but no available
faculty present, then it would be possible to attribute autonomy to anything that has an
available path. The inclusion of at least one faculty as a requirement appears to rule out
the possibility for attributing autonomy to inanimate objects, but we might wonder where
this leaves things like trees and plants. I want to consider the possibility that trees and
plants do possess a certain amount of autonomy.
To begin, lets make a further distinction between plants and inanimate objects. It
is possible for a tree to take a path if one is present. If we place a tree inside a cage, then
the tree has no available paths, and thus cannot do anything but stay inside the cage;
however, if we cut a hole in the top of the cage, thus providing an available alternative
path, then it is entirely possible that the tree grows out of this hole. In other words, it is
possible to claim that the tree has taken a path, and that the tree might have done
otherwise. In contrast, if we place a stone inside the cage, even if we cut a hole in the
cage, it does not ever leave the cage. It lacks the capacity to do otherwise. In this sense,
we might think that the tree and rock differ in their capacities to possess autonomy-asavailable-alternatives; however, one might argue that the rock too can access the hole in
the cage if it is acted upon by an external influence such as the wind. After all, the tree
will only grow out of the hole if there are external influences such as sunlight and water.
Thus, there seems little difference between the tree growing out the hole, and the rock
being blown out the hole—neither tree nor rock decides on any action, or could do
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otherwise than what is given by the external causal influences—hole/no hole; light and
water; wind blowing. 200
The short response is that unlike the tree, the rock lacks a faculty, and thus fails to
meet the minimum requirement for autonomy-as-available-alternatives. In offering a
more detailed response, I rely on a distinction that Richard Campbell draws between
different types of cohesive systems. 201 To begin, we need to get clear on just what
Campbell means by cohesive system. He states:
A cohesive system is one in which its various internal processes work together to ensure that one
of the forms of stability which it manifests is spatio-temporal integrity. […] What makes
component processes into a strongly cohesive system—into an identifiable entity—are the
internal bonds which constrain the behaviour of its constituent sub-processes in such a way that
the totality behaves dynamically as an integral whole. […] For example, the molecular bonds in
the crystal lattice of a rock cause the rock as a whole to behave as a unified system under a large
range of interactions; if it is kicked with moderate force, it moves relative to the ground. 202

A cohesive system, then, has the effect of at least observably individuating the system
from its environment. The internal bonds of the rock effectively cohere in a manner that
allows for the rock to behave as an integral whole. Contrast this with gas—if gas is not
contained, then it will disperse. 203 So, although the rock is a composite of sub-processes,
these processes integrate into a whole. Campbell then draws a distinction between two
fundamentally different types of persistent cohesive systems. He claims there are
“persistent and cohesive systems that are energy wells, and those that are far-from
equilibrium.” 204 In addition, he adds that “these two types of entity manifest ontologically
different forms of stability.” 205 He maintains that
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‘Energy wells’ are cohesive process systems which persist at or near thermodynamic
equilibrium, and whose organization can be disrupted only by an input, from external sources, of
a critical level of energy. Typically, such a disruption of their organizational structure can only
be brought about by a higher level of energy than they typically encounter in their ambient
environment. 206

For example, if you smash a rock with a hammer, then it its organizational structure may
disrupt. The key point here is that the organization of this type of cohesive system can
only be disrupted by an external source. In contrast, far-from equilibrium systems have
intrinsic processes that interact with its ambient environment. He offers the planet earth
as an example. He claims, “[S]ince far-from equilibrium stability manifestly exists, its
maintenance has to be a function of its being located within an interactive system of some
sort. In the case of the earth, this is primarily a matter of energy flow from the sun to the
earth and heat radiated from the earth into space.” 207 The persistence of a far-from
equilibrium system is dependent on external resources, but the interaction between the
intrinsic processes in the system and these external resources are what enable the system
to maintain.
Campbell then introduces a further distinction. He claims that there are far-from
equilibrium systems that are self-maintenant, and those that are not. A self-maintenant
system is one that contributes to the persistence of the conditions upon which it
depends. 208 Campbell offers the example of a candle flame to make things clear,
a candle flame is a complex of processes that make several active contributions to its own
persistence, including its maintaining a spatio-temporal integrity. Most importantly, a candle
flame maintains its temperature above the combustion threshold; it vaporizes wax into a
continuing supply of fuel; and in usual atmospheric conditions, it induces convection currents,
thus pulling in the oxygen it needs and removing the carbon dioxide produced by its own
combustion. 209
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The point is that the candle flame is involved in maintaining itself. It is true that if it runs
out the necessary external resources, i.e., oxygen or wax, it will no longer persist, but as
long as these external resources are available, then it will continue to play a role in
maintaining itself. 210 In this sense, we can say that it is a far-from equilibrium system that
is self-maintenant. In addition, there are far-from equilibrium systems that are recursively
self-maintenant. In contrast to a self-maintenant system, a recursively self-maintenant
system can not only maintain stability within a certain range of conditions, but can also
maintain stability within certain ranges of changes of conditions. 211 As Campbell states,
“they can switch to deploying different processes depending on conditions they detect in
the environment.” 212 The point of the discussion is this: Rocks are a type of cohesive
system, but they are energy-wells they are not far-from equilibrium systems. In contrast,
trees are not only far-from equilibrium systems, but are a far-from equilibrium systems
that are recursively self-maintenant. The complexity that allows for the tree to be selfmaintenant, is not found in the rock. It is true that both the tree and the rock need external
influences in order to go through the hole in the cage, but the tree being a far-from
equilibrium system that is recursively self-maintenant, has the capacity (faculty) to
deploy different processes depending on the conditions of the environment. In short, the
tree interacts with the environment, the rock does not. The rock lacks any intrinsic
processes that interact with its ambient environment. In other words, the rock lacks the
faculty needed to interact with its environment. In this sense, it seems fair to claim that
the rock lacks the needed faculty to actually access a path. It may be pushed out of the
hole, but it is not due to any intrinsic process of its own—it is only due to an external
210
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cause. In contrast, the tree does have intrinsic processes that interact with the
environment, and these intrinsic processes have something to do with the capacity for the
tree to grow out the hole in the cage. Thus, it is not the case that the tree growing out the
hole is solely an effect of external causes.
So, there is clearly a further distinction to be made between plants and inanimate
objects in regards to autonomy. But, one might wonder if there is much of a difference
between the tree taking an available path, and an organism that possesses only the faculty
of instinct taking an available path. In both cases the action is the result of something that
is not in the control of the life form in question. Both the tree and the organism in this
case are in a passive relationship with the motivating faculty; however, there is a
motivating faculty present, and an available path. So, if the minimum requirement to
claim autonomy under NADST is the existence of at least one available alternative path,
and possession of at least one faculty, and the faculty and path are situated in a manner
that allows for the faculty to access the path, then it seems that both the tree and the
organism in this case have met the criteria. In this case, what is being displayed by the
tree is the least amount of autonomy possible. Now, if a life form, in addition to the
minimum requirement for autonomy, has more than one alternative path, or more than
one available faculty, then that organism has more possible options available, and thus
has the capacity to be more autonomous than one that has only the minimum
requirement. However, more needs to be said about how the role of faculties and paths
operate.
Unlike available paths, which simply add the possibility for one more available
option for each available path, available faculties have the capacity to expand an
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organism’s available options exponentially. To clarify, think about Honeycutt stuck in the
well again. If Honeycutt has available to him the faculty of reason, then he has available
to him all the different options and paths that reason helps him recognize. If there are
three possible available paths, and Honeycutt lacks the faculty needed to recognize and
access these paths, then these paths cease to be available. Think of an infant that is stuck
in the same well as Honeycutt, the infant lacks the faculty needed to recognize that
stacking up boxes will allow for escape. Further, even if the infant had the faculty of
reason, and was able to recognize that stacking the boxes will allow for escape, the infant
may still lack the faculty to climb, and thus the path is still unavailable. So, the
environmentally available path is the stacked boxes, but since the infant lacks the faculty
to recognize this path, and access this path, then this paths ceases to be available to the
infant. So, no matter how many possible available paths are present, it is only through the
use of available faculties that these paths are recognized and accessible, and thus become
actually available for use. Thus, although the possibility for available paths is essential to
autonomy, without the proper faculty present, and without the proper relationship
between the faculty and path, then it is possible that these paths are never recognized or
accessible, and hence never seen as available. So, the organism with the greatest number
of faculties present, has the greatest opportunity to make use of available alternative
paths, if the faculties are situated in a manner that allows for access to these paths.
However, this is not the whole story. The quality of these faculties matters as well. There
is a difference between the amount of available options that can result from the use of
different faculties. It seems likely that some faculties have the capacity to increase
available options in greater number than others. In addition, although some organisms
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might share the same faculty, one organism might possess a superior form of this
particular faculty, and thus might have more available options as a result. I will examine
each of these in order.
First, I maintain that some faculties have the capacity to increase available
alternatives in greater number than others. For example, it seems uncontroversial to claim
that reflex is much more limited than say inclination. There are few if any real alternative
actions that arise from the motive of reflex. If the doctor hammers your knee, your leg
moves. This is the action that the reflex motivates; however, if the doctor hammers your
knee, and inclination is the motivating factor, then you may be motivated to perform
numerous actions. You may be inclined to hit back, sit there and take it, or run out of the
office. So, in this case it seems clear that inclination offers more possible alternatives
than reflex. However, if both reflex and inclination are in play, then the capacity for even
more available alternatives is present—in addition to all the alternatives that inclination
provides, reflex provides the alternative of your leg necessarily moving when the doctor
hammers your knee. If the organism in question only had available the faculty of
inclination, then this alternative would not be available. In other words, if you lacked
reflex, then you would lack the alternative of your leg necessarily moving when the
doctor hammers your knee. So, although reflex is severely limited in the number of
alternatives it provides, it nonetheless does provide an alternative. In other words, an
organism that possesses both reflex and inclination has the capacity for more available
alternatives than one that has only one or the other, but if an organism does only possess
one or the other, than inclination is the one that offers more available alternatives. I think
this is certainly the case for reason, and I see at least two explanations for this.
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First, I take it to be an uncontroversial claim that any organism that has reason as
a faculty also has instincts and inclinations. There is no empirical evidence to suggest that
there exists any organism on this planet that possesses reason alone, and no other
faculties. In contrast, there certainly does seem to be empirical evidence of organisms on
this planet that possess instinct, but do not possess reason, or that possess a variety of
faculties, but do not possess reason. So, it follows that any organism that possesses
reason will also possess many other faculties. As stated previously, the organism with the
greatest amount of faculties present, has the greatest opportunity to make use of available
alternative paths. I argue that empirical evidence suggests that organisms with reason also
possess many other faculties, and thus have the capacity to make use of more available
alternative paths than those that don’t.
Second, reason seems to have the capacity to open up more doors than other
faculties. Reason gives organisms the capacity to break down a situation and analyze the
different possible routes. It has the capacity to exponentially increase the number of
possible options. To clarify, think about Honeycutt in the well again. Not only does
reason help him identify the available path, and thus allow him to escape, but it also has
the capacity to offer him numerous ways in which to accomplish this action. He could
stack the boxes long ways, or short ways, or anyway that will do the job. In short, his
options increase significantly. It is not simply the case that he sees an available path, and
that’s it, but he sees multiple ways in which to access this available path, assuming there
are multiple ways. However, if there are not multiple ways, then reason allows him to see
this as well. Reason offers the opportunity to analyze the consequences of performing an
action in a different manner than other faculties. So, much like inclination motivates and
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recognizes more possible alternative actions than reflex, reason motivates and recognizes
more possible alternative actions than all other faculties. But, this does not mean that if
an organism only possesses reason that it recognizes all possible alternative actions, or
even the most alternative actions. Just like the example of reflex and inclination, the
organism that possesses reason and these other faculties will have a greater amount of
available options, than the organism that only possesses reason. Thus, the greatest
amount of autonomy possible is only available to those organisms which possess reason,
but reason is not sufficient, it is only necessary. Consequently, I maintain that those
organisms with the greatest amount of autonomy have the faculty of reason as an
available option. It is not the sole criteria or primary determinant for autonomy, but it is
requisite for the highest degree of autonomy. In short, the more available paths and the
more available faculties present to an organism, the more autonomous that organism can
be, but in order to reach the highest level of autonomy, all possible faculties must be in
play, and this includes reason. This is probably in-practice impossible, as it seems highly
unlikely that any organism will actually possess all possible faculties. The best we can
hope for is a close approximation to this ideal.
Now, to the claim that some organisms might share the same faculty, but due to
the fact that one organism possesses a superior form of this particular faculty, they have
more available options as a result. Take for example the eagle. It is possible that the eagle
has the faculty of tremendous eyesight, and although most humans also possess eyesight,
our eyesight is not as keen as that of the eagle, and thus the eagle will recognize available
paths that humans do not recognize. So, imagine a case where the only faculty possessed
by the human and the eagle, is eye sight. In this case, although both the eagle and the
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human share this faculty, the fact that the eagle’s faculty is superior allows for it to
recognize more available paths, and thus it has more available options. In this case, the
eagle is more autonomous. However, although this faculty presumably allows the eagle to
recognize numerous paths that would go unrecognized by an organism without the same
degree of this faculty, it still only allows for the recognition of a few environmentally
available paths, it does not allow, in the way that reason does, for the eagle to see nearly
as many different paths. Yes, it is true that the eagle may recognize that it can access the
path from the east or the west, but this is not what I am talking about. If we put the eagle
in the well with Honeycutt, it may be the case that the eagle sees boxes that Honeycutt
does not see, but through the faculty of eyesight alone it is unable to see that stacking the
boxes is the only way to escape. So, although there is an available path out of the well, it
is not available to the eagle, because it lacks the faculty to recognize that path. The same
can be said for Honeycutt. If the boxes he cannot see are required to access the path out
of the well, then the path is not available to him. So what is the difference here? The
difference is that keen eyesight does not allow the eagle to analyze if it should take the
path from the east or the west. For this to happen, the eagle needs more than just the
faculty of keen eyesight, it needs the faculty of reason. Reason would allow the eagle to
determine which path it ought take to best satisfy the goal. Reason brings into the
equation the capacity to determine what the best mode of action is in the given situation.
In addition, it should be noted that the eagle example exposes the idea that
organisms that possess reason, can also be subject to this kind of distinction. If Sara’s
capacity to use reason is superior to Jesse’s capacity to use reason, then it seems
reasonable to think that Sara has the capacity for more available options, and thus the
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capacity to reach a greater level of autonomy. So, even at the highest levels of autonomy,
it still admits to degrees of difference. Consequently, the level of autonomy of any
organism can only be assessed on an individual basis. It might be the case that all
organisms that possess reason are more autonomous than those that do not possess
reason, but it is also the case that within the organisms that possess reason there are
degrees of difference in the amount of autonomy each possesses due to the fact that some
possess a superior form of this particular faculty.
There still may be a question about whether or not an organism with all possible
faculties and an infinite amount of paths will actually act at all. It is possible that
organism X with only the minimum requirement for autonomy does not stay put, while
organism Z with more available options just sits around doing nothing. But, this does not
show that X is more autonomous than Z, it just shows that X’s action was to leave, and
Z’s action was to stay put. In contrast, if it is the case that Z is paralyzed by the having of
too many options, or simply cannot seem to act no matter what options are presented,
then we might think that X is more autonomous than Z. But notice here, that if Z is
paralyzed, or simply unable to act no matter what options appear to be available, then Z
actually has no available options. The availability of options requires that the organism in
question actually has the capacity to act on these actions. These options have lost their
availability for Z. So, we might think in this case that Z actually lacks the needed
faculties to motivate or recognize the available paths, that Z’s faculties are in some
manner defective, or that there really are no available paths present for Z. Now, if Z
recognizes that there are available paths present, but still cannot act on them, then we
might question whether or not Z actually sees these paths as available. If Z does actually
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see these paths as available, and yet still cannot come to act, then I think it right to claim
that Z’s action consists of staying put. After all, one of the available paths in any situation
that meets the minimum requirement for autonomy is to stay put. So, if Z stays put, even
when there are numerous available paths, then staying put just counts as Z’s action. In
short, to be more autonomous for NADST is simply to have more possible options
available, and to have the capacity to act on them, whether or not one actually acts upon
them or not is a separate issue. We are now ready to cash out how it is that moral
responsibility works for NADST.
I begin by stating that moral responsibility can only be attached to those
organisms that have developed reason as an alternative faculty. I am not making the
stronger claim that reason must be the faculty used in the performance of an action to
hold one responsible, but simply that the having of reason as an alternative allows for the
attachment of responsibility. As I argued previously, there are times when it is beneficial
to act on the motivation of some other faculty besides reason; however, this does not
mean that the action escapes moral accountability. If the organism in question has as an
option the use of reason, then it can and should be held responsible for the action,
assuming that it could have done otherwise. 213 So, if there are available paths presents,
and the organism in question has reason as an available faculty, and this faculty is
situated in a manner that allows for it to access a path, then that organism is responsible
for the actions it performs. In short, only those organisms that have the capacity to
213
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possess nearly the highest degree of autonomy are to be held morally responsible for their
actions, and I maintain that those organisms are the ones that possess reason as a faculty.
As noted earlier, reason is the only faculty that allows for an organism to determine what
action it should perform in a given situation, it is also the only faculty that permits what
Richard Campbell calls flexible learning—which allows for an organism to adjust its
behavior through anticipating the likely outcomes of its action. 214 Thus, it is also the only
faculty that allows for an organism to determine what action it should not perform. It is
this capacity that allows for the attachment of responsibility. If an organism lacks the
capacity to determine what should or should not be done, and adjust its behavior in
anticipation of the likely outcomes of an action, then it follows that this organism cannot
be held responsible for doing what it should or should not do. There is no right or wrong
action in the moral sense for this organism.
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4
The Source of Inclination

In the previous chapter I offer a naturalized account of autonomy that gives reason to
think that actions can be the product of something besides reason. Following this, I see it
necessary to examine one of these other sources in more detail, namely inclination. In this
chapter I examine three views on the source of inclination, and investigate the capacity
for these accounts to work within the naturalistic framework I endorse in previous
chapters.

4.1 Introducing the Three Views of Inclination

Typically Kantian ethics is portrayed as antithetical to naturalism; however, the
position that Tamar Schapiro offers in her article “The Nature of Inclination” seems to
offer reason to rethink the notion that the Kantian concept of inclination is incompatible
with a naturalistic framework. Thus, I begin my investigation with a treatment of her
piece.
In her article, Schapiro discusses three views of inclination. In setting the
framework for her position she identifies two extreme positions. She argues that “a theory
of inclination has to navigate between two extremes, one of which assimilates inclination
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to an external happening and the other of which assimilates it to an exercise of will.” 215
The first she calls the extreme anti-rationalist view of inclination, and the second she
calls the extreme rationalist view of inclination. She then offers and defends what she
calls a “middle way.” She argues that inclination “[…] is the exercise of a subpersonal
capacity that is both agential and nonrational.” 216 I now discuss the three positions as she
sees them, offer criticism of the extreme rationalist (hereafter ER), and extreme antirationalist (hereafter EAR), positions, then I show how Schapiro’s account lends itself to
the naturalistic framework I endorse. In doing this, I show why the ER and EAR accounts
fail to work for the naturalized framework that is informed by DST. Further, I examine
the notion of instinct, and examine the possibility that Schapiro’s account of inclination
supports a notion of inclination that sees it and instinct as different in degree rather than
different in kind. Consequently, Schapiro’s account of inclination is a better fit for the
naturalistic account I offer.

4.2 The Extreme Anti-Rationalist View

Schapiro claims that the extreme anti-rationalist view supports the idea that
inclinations arise from “a source external to reason or will.” 217 Further she maintains that
such a view places the motivational source of inclinations outside of our agential
capacities.
Extreme anti-rationalism locates the motivational source of inclination in something wholly
distinct from our agential capacities. […] The claim is that our inclinations are causally

215

Schapiro, Tamar (2009) p.232
Ibid., p.232
217
Ibid., p.233
216

107

determined, whereas we freely author our actions; inclination is the product of natural necessity,
whereas actions are products of reason. 218

So, the idea is that our inclinations are products or effects of a causal process, and thus
can arise in us independently of our volition. 219 In this sense, our inclinations come to us,
we do not go get them. So, we are passive in relation to the motivational source of our
inclinations. According to Schapiro’s explanation of the EAR position, the primary
distinguishing characteristic between inclinations and actions is that actions are products
of reason, whereas inclinations are the product of what she calls natural necessity. I see at
least three items that need to be addressed within her explanation of the extreme antirationalist position. First, I question the use of the phrase product of in her explanation of
the difference between inclinations and actions. Second, I investigate the use of the term
natural necessity in establishing inclinations. Finally, I explore the notion that actions are
solely the product of reason.
Schapiro maintains that the extreme anti-rationalist position asserts that behaviors
that are motivated by inclination are causally determined, whereas actions are something
we can freely author. Thus, there is a distinction drawn between causally determined
behavior, and freely authored behavior. Prima facie this claim seems straightforward, and
unproblematic. However, she then claims that the EAR asserts actions as products of
reason. The use of the phrase product of here appears problematic. The phrase product of
seems to imply some sort of causal relationship between the item that precedes the
phrase, and the item that follows the phrase. If this is not the case, then it seems
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reasonable to wonder if the product of relationship between reason and action is a matter
of logical necessity. I address the former concern first.
If I say that all “X’s” are the product of “Y,” then I am saying that “X” is the
result of “Y,” that if I have an “X,” then I must have a “Y.” Without getting into all the
problems associated with the notions of causality, it still seems quite fair to interpret the
saying product of as implying a causal relationship. Thus, if the extreme anti-rationalist
wishes to draw a distinction between inclinations and actions based on the claim that
inclinations are causally determined, but actions are not, then they may need to abandon
the notion that actions are the product of reason. Schapiro does not address this problem
in her essay, but it seems that the EAR must ascribe to the claim that reason itself is not
causally determined, and thus actions although the product of reason escape the charge of
being causally determined. However, this ascription does not avoid the charge that
actions, if the product of reason, are themselves causally determined; even if reason itself
is not causally determined. Although, such an assumption is not a given, for the time
being, I will assume that reason is not causally determined, and levy my criticisms under
this assumption. The argument goes as follows.
1. Reason itself is not causally determined.
2. Actions are the product of reason.
3. The phrase product of implies that some thing, is the producer of something else.
4. Thus, reason is the producer of actions.
5. A causally determined thing is a thing determined by its cause, call this an effect.
6. By definition, causes produce effects.
7. Thus, all an effect is, is the product of a cause.
8. How a cause comes to be, is not necessarily identical with how the effect of this very cause
comes to be.
10. Thus, it is not necessarily the case that if “X” produces “Y,” that how “Y” came to be is
identical with how “X” came to be.
11. Therefore, if actions are the product of reason, and reason is not causally determined, it does
not follow that actions are not causally determined.
12. If actions are the product of reason, and all an effect is, is the product of a cause, then it
follows that actions are the effect produced by reason.
13. Thus, although reason is not causally determined itself, reason does causally determine
action.
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Now of course if reason is posited as causally determined, then premise one can be
dropped from this argument without producing any real problems.
I now turn to the question of whether the product of relationship between reason
and action is a matter of logical necessity rather than causal necessity. Perhaps the use of
the phrase product of is meant to assume that the relationship between reason and action
is a matter of logical necessity. If this is the case, then there is now a stronger, and I argue
more determined relationship between the items at issue, than a causal relationship. If it is
the case that I must have a “Y” in order to have an “X,” then “Y” is a necessity for “X.”
Now, if the use of the phrase product of, implies such a relationship, then the statement
that “[…] actions are products of reason,” seems to place reason and action into a
necessary relationship. So, it appears that the EAR must accept that the relationship
between reason and action is either one of logical necessity or causal determinacy.
Positing a logical necessity to empirical items such as actions and reason appears
unjustifiable, and if not, then it is at least problematic. Either way, to accept either of
these conclusions is unacceptable for the EAR. Thus, I maintain that the description of
actions as the product of reason is a misnomer at bare minimum.
In addition to the troubles discussed with the use of the phrase product of, the use
of the term natural necessity is also problematic. In contrast to actions, Schapiro
maintains that the EAR asserts inclinations as the result of natural necessity. The meaning
of the term natural necessity is unclear. Presumably claiming that inclinations are the
product of natural necessity means either that there is something about the “nature” of
human beings or perhaps the nature of organisms in general, that necessitates the
possession of inclinations, or the more general claim that there are things that exist out in
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the world called inclinations, and that they are the necessary product of some thing or
things in the past, present, and perhaps future universe.
If we take the first part of the former understanding of what it means for
inclinations to be the result of natural necessity, then inclinations are a necessary part of
being a human being. This points to the idea that there is some sort of “nature” that can
be ascribed to human beings; call it human nature. Such a claim has several difficulties.
Since I maintain a naturalistic framework, I will examine one difficulty that arises for this
claim with the acceptance of evolutionary theory, and one that arises, if in addition to this
acceptance, it is approached from the stance of DST.
In an article titled “On Human Nature,” David Hull discusses the problem with
accounts of human nature under the condition that evolutionary theory is accepted.
Hull argues that "[…] it is simply not true that all organisms that belong to Homo sapiens
as a biological species are essentially the same." 220 Furthermore, he claims that even if
there were characteristics that were limited to one species and universally shared within
that species, it would be temporary at best and extremely rare.
In most cases, any character universally distributed among the organisms belonging to a
particular species is also possessed by organisms belonging to other species, and conversely any
character that happens to be limited to the organisms belonging to a particular species is unlikely
possessed by all of them. […] A character state (or allele) which is rare may become common,
and one that is nearly universal may become entirely eliminated. In short, species evolve, and to
the extent that they evolve through natural selection, both genetic and phenotypic variation are
essential. 221

Hull's account exposes a difficulty that evolutionary theory produces in defining an
account of an organism’s nature. Evolution by natural selection is the primary process by
which organisms change. Thus, what might be seen as human nature in the present, may
not have been part of the species in the past, and might not be a part of the species in the
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future. So, even if we did identify some particular characteristic that we called human
nature it would only be of temporary use to any form of naturalism that assumes
evolutionary theory. If Hull is correct, then one must eliminate the use of an essentialist
definition of an organism’s nature. If by claiming that inclinations are a natural necessity
one means that there is something about the “nature” of human beings or perhaps the
nature of organisms in general that necessitates the possession of inclinations, then the
elimination of an essentialist definition of human or any organism’s nature proves
damaging. Without an essentialist definition of an organism’s nature this claim is not
warranted.
Further, If we analyze the concept of natural necessity under the DST perspective,
then we might find further reason to deny it. In order to expose the problems that DST
produces for accounts that treat the development of an organisms inclinations as the
result of natural necessity, it will help to return to DST’s reconceptualization of the
nature/nurture debate.
The argument over the primary cause of an organism’s development is often
articulated in terms that promote a divide between nature and nurture. This type of
approach places particular importance on how much the development of an organism is
the result of genes, and how much is the result of that organism’s particular environment.
Now, in order to examine the development of an organism in this manner it is necessary
to see environment and organism as separate. In contrast, DST wants to draw focus on
how organism and environment mutually construct each other. As discussed in Chapter
Two, Oyama reconceptualizes the notions of nature and nurture in a manner that allows
genes and environments to be seen as “parts of a developmental system that produces
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phenotypic natures.” 222 Now, if natures are viewed as phenotypic, then it follows that
natures cannot be fixed and unchanging, but instead, as Oyama notes, “[…] natures are
multiple and changing over the life span. […] nature is simply a phenotype—an
organism-in-transition through a life cycle […].” 223 So, an organism’s nature simply
amounts to whatever attributes identify an organism at a particular time, and these
attributes are the result of developmental processes. Thus, the nature of any organism is
contingent on the various statuses of the resources and interactants involved in its
development. In addition, as Oyama notes, according to DST, traits must be constructed
in ontogeny, 224 and thus, the reliability of any trait is contingent on the stability of the
influences present during construction. To use the term natural necessity in regards to the
possession of inclinations implies that there is something about the nature of an organism
that requires as a necessity the possession of inclinations; however, if the reliability of
any phenotypic attribute is contingent on the stability of the influences present during
construction, then in order to maintain the claim that inclinations are the result of a
natural necessity, it requires a commitment to the notion that the influences present
during construction remain stable. If they do not remain stable, then the nature of an
organism may very well obtain or lose certain phenotypic attributes, and it is possible that
inclinations are one of the attributes effected. Since there is no reason to think it
necessary that these influences remain stable, then to claim that inclinations are a natural
necessity is too strong a claim to maintain under the assumption of DST.
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Now, if by claiming that inclinations are a natural necessity one means the more
general claim that there are things that exist out in the world called inclinations, and that
they are the necessary product of some thing or things in the past, present, and perhaps
future universe, then it does seem necessary to posit some sort of causal relationship. If
not, then either the necessity of inclinations is called into question, or one must posit
some other “power” from which this necessity arises. Taking a note from Hume, it seems
likely that we might just define causation as necessary connection, and thus posit a causal
relationship.
Returning to the claim that actions are the product of reason, once again we see
the use of reason as the primary determinant for actions. As noted in chapter three, this
limits the number of possible alternative actions. If all actions are the result of reason,
then no actions are the result of inclination, and thus a large array of possible actions are
lost. Furthermore, if all actions are the result of reason, then the possibility that actions
may arise in opposition to reason is eliminated. But, this does not match up with
empirical findings. People often act in opposition to reason.
If human actions are the result of reason, then what produces actions in animals
that do not possess reason? It seems that the answer must somehow involve either the
notion that all animals possess reason, animals which do not possess reason act on
inclination or instinct, or that animals do not act at all. In reference to the latter option, I
maintain that on the Darwinian naturalism I endorse the difference between action and
mere behavior is a matter of degree, and thus this does not alleviate the problem for the
EAR. If the EAR simply rejects Darwinian naturalism, then this option does become
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available; however, the point of this section is to expose the problems associated with
accepting this form naturalism for the EAR position.
So, if we assume that animals that do not possess reason act on inclination or
instinct, then there is nothing inherently impossible about things other than reason
prompting action. Thus, the EAR must assume that there is a difference in kind between
humans and other species, or attribute reason to all species. However, the latter
suggestion seems unlikely in light of current evidence. Thus, it must be the case that the
EAR is committed to the former belief. The naturalistic framework I endorse does not
accept the claim that there is a difference in kind between the mind of what we might call
the lower animals, and the human animal. Following Darwin, I maintain that it is a
difference in degree. 225 Assuming that the difference between the lower animals and the
human animal is one of degree, and assuming that at least some of the lower animals lack
the possession of reason, then there is no reason to think that actions are the sole product
of reason. Thus, the notion that actions can be prompted by inclination or instinct is not
out of the question.
Now, this does not mean that inclinations are not causally determined, but it does
mean that if inclinations are causally determined, then actions that are motivated by
inclination are not freely chosen. So, the EAR has few options left to support the claim
that our actions are freely chosen. Either, admit that there is a difference in kind between
the lower animals and the human animal, admit that all animals act from reason, or admit
that inclinations and instinct are not causally determined. The latter option seems out of
the question for the EAR, and the second option is unlikely given current evidence. Thus,
the first option seems the only viable option left for the EAR. Such a commitment makes
225
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the EAR’s position incompatible with the naturalistic framework I endorse in earlier
chapters, and thus I reject it.

4.3 The Extreme Rationalist View

In contrast to the EAR, Schapiro claims that the ER emphasizes the “similarity
between the form of motivation involved in inclination and that involved in volition.” 226
The ER denies “that there are distinctly passive and active motivational capacities.” 227
Thus, the difference between the motivational capacities of reason and inclination
appears to be one of degree rather than of kind. She claims that
[E]xtreme rationalism starts from the main rationalist insight, namely, that inclination engages us
as agents. It then takes this insight to imply that inclination engages us as full-fledged rational
agents. […] extreme rationalism denies the Platonic and Aristotelian view that there are agential
parts of the soul in any philosophically deep sense. It denies that there are distinctively passive
and active motivational capacities, each making a different contribution to action. Instead,
extreme rationalism holds that the soul is unitary, in the sense that agency involves the exercise
of one’s rational capacity. 228

So for the ER there is no clearly delineated category of motivational or causal importance
that separates reason from inclination. They both play a role in motivating action;
however, at this point the extent of the role each plays is still unclear. In order to grasp
the role that each plays Schapiro investigates an argument by Thomas Scanlon that she
considers to be a version of what she calls extreme rationalism. 229
In his book, What We Owe to Each Other, Scanlon argues that desire alone does
not motivate action. According to Schapiro, Scanlon’s view posits that “having a desire
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to ‘A’ essentially involves taking certain considerations as reasons to ‘A’.” 230 Further,
she notes that Scanlon intends this account to be the case for all desires. Thus, for
Scanlon “the motivational force behind all action comes from the agent’s takingsomething-as-a-reason-to-act.” 231 So, if an inclination motivates an action, then the
formulation of that inclination involves some sort of reason; it involves the use of reason.
Thus, Scanlon makes no distinction in kind among the possible sources of motivation for
an action. After all, if Scanlon is correct, then the motivation behind every action comes
from having a reason to perform that particular action. Further, Scanlon argues that there
is nothing about the way desires, reason, or inclinations motivate that makes them a
unique source of motivation. He writes:
[…] we should not take “desires” to be a special source of motivation, independent of our seeing
things as reasons . . . when a person does have desire in the directed-attention sense and acts
accordingly, what supplies the motive for this action is the agent’s perception of some
consideration as a reason, not some additional element of “desire.” 232

So, according to Scanlon desire does not have some additional motivating part. The
motivation for acting on desire is found in the agent’s perception that there exists a
reason to perform some action.
At this point Schapiro questions if the ER can account for the EAR’s claim that
the passivity of inclination or desire, and the deliberateness of reason, expose them as
distinct motivational sources. Schapiro points to the appearance of conflict between
distinct motivational sources in cases of akrasia and irrationality. If such a conflict exists,
then it presents a problem for the ER’s claim that the motivational sources behind actions
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are not different in kind. If the ER is to maintain a unitary notion of the soul, then there
needs to be some account of how something like irrational thoughts or akrasia arise.
In addition, there also seems a question about what kind of reason is in play when
one is motivated to act. If when he speaks of rational he is talking about instrumental
rationality, where the rationale behind an action is akin to the easiest or most effective
way to satisfy a particular desire, then it seems that such actions may be seen as irrational
in a non-instrumental sense. In other words, it may be instrumentally rational to kill your
mistress if you wish to make sure that she does not reveal the nature of your relationship
with her to others; however, the action of killing one’s mistress may be seen as irrational
if judged from a non-instrumental notion of rationality. In one sense there is a reason to
perform this action, but in another sense there is a reason to never perform this type of
action. So, it seems important to know what kind of considerations Scanlon is talking
about when he claims that to act, essentially involves taking certain considerations as
reasons to act. Are these considerations instrumental considerations or some other
considerations? Scanlon seems to offer an answer to both of these questions when he
explains that “we have one capacity that can be exercised in two distinct ways.” 233 He
writes:
Being such a creature (rational that is) involves not only the capacity to make certain judgments
and to be consistent about them, but also the ability to see certain considerations as reasons and
to think of and see as reasons those things one has previously judged to be such. […] Even if, for
example, I have convinced myself that I should not be influenced by the approval or disapproval
of a certain group, I may find myself wondering anxiously what they would think of something I
am considering doing. When these thoughts occur, I may dismiss them immediately.
Nonetheless, insofar as they involve (perhaps only momentarily) seeing something as a reason
that I judge not to be one, they are instances of irrationality. 234
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Scanlon draws a distinction between seeing something as a reason to act in a particular
way, and judging that I have reason to act in a particular way. So, when one has judged
that “A” is not a reason to “B,” but nonetheless continues to see “A” as a reason to “B,”
and thus performs “B” on the basis of “A,” then one is acting irrationally. However, in
both cases the action is motivated by a reason. Thus, according to Scanlon, there is no
grounds for positing distinctive motivational capacities in cases of akrasia or irrational
action. There is not a conflict between two distinct motivational capacities, in both
instances the motivation to act arises from a reason. So, the distinction is not drawn
between motivational capacities, but rather, it is drawn between two ways of exercising
the same motivational capacity.
The distinction Scanlon draws between judging something as a reason to act, and
simply seeing something as a reason to act does seem to admit to a degree of difference
in the motivational strength of the reason. Scanlon claims that to act in opposition to
judgment is irrational. Now, by Scanlon’s account, all actions are motivated by some
reason. Thus, it seems that for Scanlon it is impossible to act in opposition to reason.
However, as noted above, there must be a difference in the motivational strength of the
reason used to prompt an action if in one case it is seen as rational, and the other it is seen
as irrational. Presumably, irrational behavior is not as reliably advantageous as rational
behavior. If “X” is more reliably advantageous than “Y,” then it follows that “X” will be
the preferred option of motivation. Now, this does not mean that “Y” will not sometimes
win out, but it does mean that when one reflects back on the decision to follow “Y” rather
than “X,” assuming that advantageous behavior is seen as more desirable, then one will
see the decision to act on “Y” as a mistake. So, it follows that rational behavior would be
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preferred to irrational behavior. If the claim is that to act in opposition to a reason arrived
through judgment, even if guided by another type of reason, is to act irrationally, then it
must be the case that acting on the basis of a reason which has been determined by
judgment is seen as the preferable option. Presumably, if reason “X” is preferred to
reason “Y,” then the motivational strength of “X” will be seen as stronger than the
motivational strength of “Y.” In other words, in most cases “X” will offer a more
powerful reason to follow it, than to follow “Y.”
Turning back to Wolf’s argument discussed in Chapter Three, she claims that one
could never have reason to act in opposition to reason. I take her use of the term reason
to be in line with the meaning Scanlon has for judging something as a reason to act; not
the sense that Scanlon uses when discussing the idea of seeing something as a reason to
act. In other words, by reason, Wolf does not simply mean that there is some sort of
consideration motivating one’s action. In contrast, she sees reason as the “highest faculty,
or set of faculties, there are—that is, to whatever faculties are properly thought to be most
likely to lead to true beliefs and good values.” 235 Thus, to act in opposition to reason, as
Wolf defines it, is to act irrationally. In Scanlon’s account, an act is irrational just in case
the action performed is not motivated on the basis of a reason arrived at through
judgment. Wolf claims that acting irrationally is something one may want the capacity to
do, but one could never want to exercise such a capacity. 236 So, in Scanlon’s terms,
Wolf’s assertion leads to the claim that one could never have reason to act in opposition
to what one judged to be a reason to act. Thus, borrowing from Wolf’s position, it
follows that there is a stronger motivational reason to follow the reason that “judging”
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something as a reason provides, than to follow the reason that “seeing” something as a
reason provides. Scanlon expresses this sentiment in his example of what constitutes an
irrational act. So, for both Wolf and Scanlon, an irrational act stems from acting in
opposition to the thing that is seen as a more reliable source of motivation. For Wolf that
thing is acting in accordance with reason, and for Scanlon that thing is acting in
accordance with the reason that judgment promotes. So for Scanlon, although there is not
a distinct motivational capacity at work, there is a difference in the motivational strength
between “judging” and “seeing.” The more reliable source is judging, and thus it is the
preferred motivational source.
This leads to a further question. What is it about the formulation of “judging”
something to be a reason, and the formulation of “seeing” something as a reason, that
produces this difference? For Scanlon they both motivate action through the use of a
reason, so there must be something about how this reason comes to be that makes one
more reliably advantageous. “Seeing” something as a reason to act is akin to an
inclination or desire, whereas “judging” something as a reason to act seems to be akin to
what Wolf would call reason. In judging if something is a reason to act, the rational
capacity of the agent is put to use in a way that will most likely lead to the best decision.
In this sense, “judging” works in the same manner as reason does for Wolf. Remember,
that for Wolf the use of reason is “[…] most likely to lead to true beliefs and good
values.” 237 In like manner, “judging” for Scanlon performs the same function. Thus, I
argue that “judging” for Scanlon works in the same manner as the use of reason does for
Wolf. But what of desires or inclinations?
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For Scanlon and the ER, the formation of a desire or inclination is not absent the
use of reason. So, there must be a difference in how this reason is used in “judging” and
“seeing.” Schapiro offers insight into this answer when she asserts that “[T]he most
natural and consistent way to fill out the extreme rationalist view is to conceive of desire
as a sort of hasty, unreliable act of judgment.” 238 So, although the formation of a desire
involves a certain amount of judgment in its production, it is hasty and unreliable use of
judgment. This seems to run counter to what Scanlon claims. He makes his distinction
based on the idea that desires and inclinations arise out of “seeing” something as a
reason, not out of “judging” something as a reason. In fact, for Scanlon it is the absence
of the use of judgment that makes something a desire. So, in contrast to Scanlon,
Schapiro’s assertion points to a difference in the degree of judgment used in formulating
a reason to act. So, on Schapiro’s reading of the ER’s position, “seeing” something as a
reason to act is simply a hasty and unreliable form of “judging” something to be a reason.
Later in her essay Schapiro appears to reformulate her claim that a desire is the use of
hasty judgment into a claim about the hasty use of reason. Taking “seeing” something as
reason to act to mean that one has a desire to act in that particular way, and taking
“judging” something as a reason to act means one is using reason to prompt that
particular action allows for us to look at the distinction in a different light, and one that
seems more in line with Scanlon’s position.
In drawing a distinction between desire and reason, Schapiro argues that for the
ER, although the difference between desiring and reasoning is one of degree, there is
some facet about reasoning that places it in a different light. Mainly, that reasoning is a
deliberate act, and also more reliable.
238
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The difference between desire and reason, on this view is a difference in degree. Reasoning and
desiring are the same activity but what we call ‘reasoning’ is a more deliberate and reliable
exercise of this activity than ‘desiring’. 239

So, if the distinction is made between desiring and reasoning, then Schapiro’s reading of
the ER position seems in line with Scanlon’s claim that the difference between desiring
and reasoning is one of degree. In addition, Schapiro’s remark offers insight into what
constitutes this difference in degree. The difference as Schapiro sees it is found in the
hasty reasoning involved in desiring. Schapiro remarks that one strength of this view is
that it helps “explain how desire and reason can interact.” 240 She claims that under this
view desires can be seen as presenting “claims suitable for direct evaluation on the basis
of reason. For, on this view, to reflect on one’s desires is simply to double-check the
hasty reasoning that led to the conclusions implicit in them.” 241 However, she points out
that this version may have problems with attributing responsibility to actions performed
from reason. Schapiro claims that the ER must commit to the notion that “[T]here is no
reason to think we should be less responsible for exercising our reason hastily than we
are for exercising our reason carefully.” 242 So it might be the case that the hasty use of
reason in forming our inclinations and desires gives us reason to double check them
before acting on them; however, if we do act on this hasty use of reason, then the ER
must commit to the notion that we ought be just as responsible for those actions as we are
for those actions we perform after careful scrutiny. After all, the ER claims that “desiring
and reasoning are at the bottom exercises of the same capacity.” 243 Thus, Schapiro thinks
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that for the ER, there is no reason to claim that one escapes responsibility, while the other
does not.
Further, Schapiro maintains that the ER makes a mistake by conflating desire and
volition. She claims that there needs to be a distinction between desires and volition.
Practical reason, insofar as it is the source of action, is the seat of agential authority. Hence,
desires, too, must issue from the seat of agential authority. Extreme rationalism thus assimilates
desire to volition, and in doing so, it overlooks the fact that desires are not attributable to us in
the same way that actions are. 244

So, Schapiro’s remark offers reason to believe that the problem of responsibility for the
ER is rooted in mistaking desire as a volition. People are not generally held responsible
for things they desire unless they act on the desire. So, Schapiro indicates that there is a
difference between actually acting on a desire, and merely possessing a desire. She sees
this as something that is missing in the ER account. In response, it is the case that that the
ER sees desiring and reasoning as exercising the same capacity; however, the ER is not
necessarily committed to the notion that desires are attributable to us in the same way as
actions. It is true that by attributing the use of reason, even if it is careless and hasty use,
to desires, the ER is assimilating desires to volition. However, Schapiro’s assertion
conflates the action that follows volition with the volition itself. Now, there is a
connection between one’s volition and the action that follows, but they are not one and
the same. I take the meaning of volition to be akin to an act of will that precedes an
action, and that this action is the deliberate result of the volition. Lets call the action that
follows one’s volition the “action proper.” Thus, it is the case that an act of volition is
followed by an action, but the act of willing in itself is not the “action proper.” To clarify,
it may be the case that the act of willing is itself a physical act, but it is not something
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that we have empirical access to in the same manner as the “action proper.” Thus, the
“action proper” is seen in a different light than the volition itself. In other words, like
desiring, one can have a volition, but that volition is not itself the “action proper”
anymore than one’s desire is itself identical with the action performed on the basis of that
desire. If volition is an act of will that precedes an action, and the ER assimilates desires
to volition, then the ER is committed to maintaining that desire is an act of the will. In
this sense, a desire to “X” may be best described as a careless and hasty act of the will.
However, the difference between volition and the “action proper,” allows for the ER to
avoid being committed to a notion of desire that makes desire attributable in the same
sense as the “action proper.” Thus, Schapiro is mistaken to claim that the assimilation of
desire to volition causes a problem for the placement of responsibility for the ER.
In sum, the ER position as described by Schapiro assimilates inclination to an act
of the will. Unlike the EAR, the ER has no problem asserting that actions can be the
result of inclination. However, because the ER sees inclinations as involving a certain
amount of reason in their production, there is still a problem implementing the ER
position within the naturalistic framework I endorse. In attributing reason to the
formation of inclinations, the ER must either posit reason to all animals, make a
distinction in kind between the mind of the lower animals and the mind of the human
animal, deny that the lower animals act altogether, or make a distinction between the way
inclinations arise in the lower animals and the way they arise in the human animal.
Again, like the EAR, to posit reason to all animals seems a stretch at the least, and to
make a distinction in kind between the mind of the human animal and the mind of all
other animals is incompatible with the naturalistic framework I argue for in Chapter One.
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In reference to the third option, as stated previously, the Darwinian naturalism I endorse
sees the difference between action and mere behavior as a matter of degree. Thus, under
this framework there is no reason to think that the lower animals simply do not act.
Prima facie the fourth option appears compatible with the naturalistic framework
I endorse; however, it is difficult to see how this claim can be maintained. If inclinations
are the product of reason, then to claim that the inclinations of the lower animals are
produced differently than the inclinations of the human animal is to make a distinction in
kind. Thus, option three results in the implementation of option two. Consequently, in
order to allow for the ER’s position to be implemented into my naturalistic framework,
the ER is left with either attributing reason to all animals, or positing a third motivational
source.
One might argue that instinct is the driving force behind the lower animals
actions, and that instinct is void of reason. Thus, the ER could posit three separate
motivational sources for action; instinct, inclination, and volition. Therefore, there is no
reason why the lower animals cannot be said to act without the use of reason, whilst the
actions motivated by inclination for the human animal do use reason. Now, as long as the
ER is willing to commit to the idea that at least in some instances humans act from
instinct, then positing a third source of motivation to the lower animals relieves most of
the problems that the ER account has within my naturalistic framework. It avoids the
need to posit reason to all animals, and it allows for the distinction between the human
animal and all other animals to be seen as one of degree rather than kind. 245 To clarify,
instinct is the common motivational source between the rest of the animal kingdom and
245
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the human animal. This opens the door for the idea that these shared instincts are the
foundation which through evolution have evolved into other motivational sources. 246
Such a claim lends itself to the notion that the mind of the human animal has emerged out
of a shared foundation with the rest of the animal kingdom. Still, if the ER’s position is to
maintain that the difference between the human animal and all other animals is one of
degree, then in order to avoid positing reason to all animals, the ER may need to commit
to the notion that all animals with the exception of the human animal act on instinct
alone. However, it seems difficult to maintain that the higher primates act on instinct
alone. Now, there is nothing impossible required to maintain the claim that all animals
excepting the human animal act on instinct alone; however, it is well documented by
primatologist that chimpanzees and bonobos display certain behaviors that seem to be
beyond the capacity of instinct alone. In his book Good Natured, Frans de Waal notes
that chimpanzee behavior differs greatly between different chimpanzee communities. De
Waal states
Field primatologists have noticed differences in tool use and communication among populations
of the same species. Thus, in one chimpanzee community all adults may crack nuts with stones,
whereas another community totally lacks this technology. Group specific signals and habits have
been documented in bonobos as well as chimpanzees. Increasingly, primatologists explain these
differences as learned traditions handed down from one generation to the next. 247

So, in this instance we have evidence of behavior that is being directed by learning, and
thus appears to be the result of more than simply instinct. Now, such evidence does not
necessarily point to the use of reason. It may be the case that these chimpanzees are hard
wired to mimic others of the same group, so it might be argued that this behavior is
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instinctive to the chimpanzee. However, the general notion of primatologist is that this
behavior is not simply instinctive. 248 Thus, if the ER is forced to commit to the notion
that all animals excepting the human animal act on instinct alone, then they find
themselves in contradiction with the current empirical evidence offered by primatologist.
So, in order to avoid conflict with current evidence, if the ER’s account is to fit in with
the naturalistic framework I promote, then they must posit reason to all animals, or allow
that some animals outside of the human animal possess reason, and that the rest of the
animal kingdom although deficient in reason, act from instinct. The ER could view
animals like the higher primates in the same light as human beings, and thus posit the
possession of inclinations to these animals, while positing instinct as the sole motivating
factor behind action for the rest of the animal kingdom. However, the ER claims that
reason is needed in order to motivate action. Remember that Scanlon claims “the
motivational force behind all action comes from the agent’s taking-something-as-areason-to-act.” 249 Thus, the ER must commit to both the notion that those animals who
lack reason, also lack the capacity to act and to the notion that human beings cannot act
from instinct. Therefore, in order for the ER account of inclination to maintain
compatibility with my naturalistic framework, they must either commit to the notion that
all animals without the faculty of reason do not act, which is in direct conflict with the
Darwinian naturalism I endorse, or posit reason to all animals, which is in conflict with
the currently accepted empirical evidence. But, this does not expose all the difficulties
248
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with this account. A further problem arises for the ER when we take a look at the
possibility of drawing a distinction between hasty and non-hasty use of reason.
We have established that the extreme rationalist position maintains that
inclinations are not absent the use of reason, but rather are the result of hasty reasoning.
Now, remember that for Scanlon “the motivational force behind all action comes from
the agent’s taking-something-as-a-reason-to-act.” 250 Thus, an action even if the result of
an inclination, is always the result of the use of reason. So, unlike the EAR position, the
distinction the ER draws between an action caused by an inclination, and an action
caused by a volition is one of degree, not kind. However, although one of degree, the ER
does still draw a distinction between volitions and inclinations on the basis of how reason
is used in the production of each. The capacity to distinguish between the cause of an
action for the ER rests on the notion that an inclination makes hasty use of reason,
whereas a volition does not; however, in order for the ER to draw this division, it must
make a distinction between what it means to use reason in a hasty manner, and what it
means to use reason in a non-hasty manner. How this distinction is made by the ER is
crucial if the ER account of inclination is to maintain compatibility under the umbrella of
DST.
The conceptual framework proposed by supporters of DST problematizes the
notion that we have the capacity to isolate the causal impetus of the various
developmental resources involved in the construction of an organism’s nature. DST
supports the notion that “an organism’s nature is just the organism itself, in whatever
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environment it finds itself.” 251 Oyama notes that “[…] no organism can exist or even be
characterized independently from a richly elaborated world on many scales of magnitude,
that causal responsibility for the whole or for a trait cannot be partitioned among the parts
of the system […]” 252 Now, if the conceptual framework offered by DST gives reason to
believe that we lack the capacity to isolate these resources, and thus determine the
particular isolated cause of a developmental outcome, then the ER distinction between
hasty and non-hasty reasoning will need to be made in light of this assumption if it is to
be compatible with DST.
DST stresses the importance of the mutual interaction between organism and
environment. The organism and environment are mutually constructed through this
interaction. Included in this development is the behavior of the organism. So, the
development and behavior of a biological organism is included in the construction of the
organism. Now, if the use of reason is seen as a behavior, and DST maintains that the
behavior of an organism is mutually constructed through the interaction with
environment, then the development of the use of reason is part of this construction, and
thus is itself the result of this mutual interaction. Further, how this reason is used will be
contingent upon this interaction. Thus, whether one uses hasty reasoning or not will be
contingent on the relationship between the organism and its environment. So, there are at
least two issues of concern here. 1) The conditions that result in the production of reason
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in general. 2) The conditions that result in the use of this reason in a hasty or non-hasty
manner.
Addressing the first issue adequately would take us beyond the scope of this
project; however, it will help to broach this topic in at least a cursory manner. The
naturalistic framework that is at the base of this project supports some notion of
evolutionary epistemology. So it follows, that in examining the first issue I am committed
to offering a naturalistic account of reason that draws on Darwinian evolution. Now,
following the most rudimentary notion of Darwinian evolution, we might say that the
capacity to reason has evolved in the same manner as any physical trait. If our brains are
the product of evolution, and brains are necessary for the capacity to reason (at least on
this planet), then the capacity to reason is directly connected to the evolution of the brain.
The evolution of the brain may then be cashed out in terms of the survival value
associated with this evolution. Thus, the capacity to reason under this rudimentary
account, may be best seen as the result of its capacity to aid in survival.
I do support Darwinian evolution; however, I am also committed (at least in this
project) to a treatment of this position under the umbrella of DST. Thus, I do not argue
that the capacity to reason should be seen solely as the result of its survival value to the
organism. Further, I do not argue that the capacity to reason evolved in order to aid in
survival, this would seem to imply a teleological explanation for the evolution of reason,
and I, as well as Darwin, do not wish to promote a teleological account of evolution.
What I do promote, following Oyama, is a notion of evolution that sees it as change in
the developmental system. 253 So, the development of reason under this account would be
the result of changes in the system. Now, if as Oyama notes, the “[…] causal
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responsibility for […] a trait cannot be partitioned among the parts of the system, and
everything that organism does and is rises out of this interactive complex, even as it
affects that very complex,” 254 then reason should be seen as the result of this interaction.
The development of reason may be best characterized under this account as having been
constructed through evolution, and since evolution is seen as a “[…] result of organismenvironment systems changing over time,” 255 the change in the brain that leads to the
development of reason should be seen as the result of the change in the organismenvironment system. It is not the case that reason was developed in order to aid in the
survival of the organism, but rather that it was developed out of the mutual relationship
between organism and environment as a result of an interactive complex in which both
organism and environment mutually construct each other. In this sense, it seems that the
development of reason is as much of an aid to the survival of the environment inhabited
by organisms that possess reason, as it is to the organisms themselves. To clarify, the
environment of which an organism is part, is the kind of environment that results from
the interaction between organism and environment, thus, the emergence and
sustainability of an environment that is inhabited by organisms that possess reason will
be affected by the fact that these organisms possess reason. So, in order for this
environment to emerge, and sustain, it must be the case that the development of reason in
the organisms which inhabit this environment plays a role in the development of this
environment. In other words, the environment that results from the interaction with
reason possessing organisms is contingent on the fact that these organisms in fact do
possess reason. If these organisms did not possess reason, then the environment would
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likely be much different. under DST, the development of reason should be seen as the
result of a dialectical relationship between organism and the environment of which the
organism is part. It should be furthered noted, that this explanation has implications for
the discussion of NADST in Chapter Three.
In the discussion of NADST in Chapter Three, it was argued that autonomy
admits to degrees, and that the capacity to be more or less autonomous rests on the
number of possible alternatives available to an organism. Further I argue that the more
possible alternatives available to an organism the greater the chance of sustainability for
that organism, and the environment of which that organism is part. Accordingly, for
NADST the evolution of reason would offer another alternative, and thus be seen as
aiding in sustainability.
Addressing the second issue, on what conditions result in the use of reason in a
hasty or non-hasty manner, it must be noted that there are times when an agent has no
choice but to come to a decision in short time. If I have five minutes to come to a
decision on what action I will perform, then I necessarily must make the decision within
this five minutes or not act at all. If I have all the time in the world to think about my
action, then I will not be subject to the same constraint; however, to use all of this time is
not a realistic option. Presumably, my life will end before all the time in the world is
spent, and if not, it will certainly end when all the time in the world has been spent. So, in
order to actually perform an action, one must cut off the reasoning process at some point,
and act, or be left in the position of Buridan’s ass. But, it is still in question as to when to
cut off this process, and not be guilty of using hasty reasoning. If I have all the time in the
world, then I may be guilty of using hasty reasoning if I do not take all this time to
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decide. However, as explained previously, I will never act if I do not cut off the reasoning
process at some point. Thus, if it is even possible to act on reason in a non-hasty manner,
then there must be some point at which I can cut off this reasoning processes and not be
guilty of using hasty reasoning. If not, then the only type of reasoning available is hasty
reasoning. But, if this is the case, then the ER loses the notion of volition altogether. In
other words, if the only reasoning available is hasty, then the motivational source behind
and action for the ER can never be a volition. Also, it is worth noting that one could take
the counter position that all reason is non-hasty; however, if the only reason available is
non-hasty, then the motivational source behind and action for the ER can never be an
inclination. So, this does not help the ER. Thus, if the ER is to avoid the loss of volitions
or inclinations as possible motivational sources behind action altogether, they must
commit at least to the idea that there is such a thing as hasty and non-hasty reasoning, and
that there is in-principle a distinction between the two. Furthermore, in order for the
distinction to actually be made by the ER, they must commit to the notion that there is inpractice a method for distinguishing between hasty and non-hasty reasoning. So, there are
two questions at stake here. 1) What does the notion of an in-principle distinction
between hasty and non-hasty reasoning entail? 2) What does an in-practice method for
distinguishing between hasty and non-hasty reasoning entail? It seems the ER will need
to have an answer for both of these questions if they wish to maintain this distinction.
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4.4 Schapiro’s Middle Way

Schapiro argues that the way to avoid the extremes found in extreme rationalism
and extreme anti-rationalism while maintaining their respective insights is to “distinguish
between two agential capacities that jointly characterize us as human agents.” 256
One is a capacity to demand and offer justifications to ourselves and so to take considerations as
reasons. The other is a more primitive capacity to see objects as calling for certain responses,
independent of any justification. It is the latter capacity, I claim, that accounts for the
motivational force of inclination. 257

So Schapiro, unlike Scanlon, sees the motivational source of inclinations as failing to
provide a reason for action. For Schapiro it is not simply a case of hasty reasoning that
leads to an inclination, it is the absence of reasoning altogether. Schapiro does see
inclination as part of our agential capacities. So, actions motivated by inclination are not
examples of non-agential actions. They are; like actions motivated by reason, actions that
are the result of our agential capacity. She sees inclinations as being part of one of the
two agential capacities that constitute a human being. In contrast to Scanlon, she argues
that inclination lacks a level of reflection. She claims that “Scanlon’s account
intellectualizes inclination, freighting it with a layer of reflection that it does not have,
simply qua inclination.” 258 She ultimately claims that the motivational source behind
inclination manifests itself as an imperative.
Suppose I am terribly thirsty. I have been hiking […] on a hot summer day, and I have run out
water. My throat is painfully dry, and I am aching for a drink. […] Scanlon would claim that, in
this situation, I am insistently seeing the dryness in my throat as reason to drink water and this is
what is motivating me. But I contend that a more primitively normative thought could suffice to
account for the content and motivational force of inclination. It is not that I am seeing dryness in
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my throat as a reason to drink water but rather that I am seeing water as to-be-drunk. […] My
thirst involves my seeing water in an imperatival mode, seeing it as “calling for” drinking
. […] the salient normative thought is not that of reason. It is more like a thought of obligation,
law, or practical necessity. 259

So, for Schapiro the thought that goes through one’s mind in such a scenario is simply,
“Drink!” There is no reasoning involved in the imperative to drink. Schapiro sees the
inclination to “A” as lacking rational justification. Thus, in this example there is no
rational justification involved in the motivation to take the drink of water. To be clear,
she does not claim that actions which have been prompted by inclination are irrational,
they do not act in opposition to reason, but rather act without regard to reason at all.
Thus, Schapiro defends a view “according to which our capacity for inclination is both
agential and nonrational.” 260 So, for Schapiro agency does not necessitate the use of
rationality. If inclinations motivate actions without justification, and actions motivated by
inclination are agential acts, then it follows that for Schapiro the use of rationality has
little to do with the agential character of an action. However, she does seem to think that
the use of rationality has something to do with the type of agential capacity at work.
In drawing her distinction of agential capacities further, Schapiro introduces what
she calls “object-based” agency and “principle-based” agency. She defines object based
agency as one in which there are no justificatory capacities at work. She states
[…] there is conceptual room for a distinct kind of agency that does not presuppose justificatory
capacities and that this kind of agency plausibly characterizes human inclination as seen from
the perspective of one who experiences it. I am going to call this kind of agency “object-based”
in contrast to “principle-based” agency. 261

She sees the capacity to demand and offer justifications to ourselves, and thus take
considerations as reasons to act, as principle-based agency. In contrast “inclination has
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the structure of object-based agency.” 262 Further, she argues that “having an inclination
involves having and being motivationally responsive to an imperatival conception of an
object and that this does not involve further thought of a justification for responding as
the imperative directs.” 263 Unlike Scanlon, who claims that inclination involves taking
into account certain considerations as a reason to act, Schapiro sees inclination as void of
any considerations. So her account amounts to the notion that the human animal is
constructed out of two different agential capacities, one of which uses reason, and the
other which does not.
By asserting that human agents are comprised of two agential capacities, 264
Schapiro avoids some of the problems that are associated with implementing the EAR
and the ER positions within the naturalistic framework I endorse. If, unlike the account
the ER posits, it is the case that inclinations are nonrational, then Schapiro’s account
avoids the need to posit reason to all animals in order to account for the production of
inclinations in the lower animals. Thus, her account allows for both the lower animals
and the human animal to act from inclination without having to posit a difference in kind
between the human animal and the rest of the animal kingdom.
In addition, she suggests that the felt need to ”X,” guides the inclining part of the
agent in the way that instinct guides an animal. 265 In this sense, it seems that Schapiro has
collapsed the distinction between the motivational capacity of instinct in the lower
animals, with the motivational capacity of inclination in the human animal. Thus, she
must be committed to the idea that the lower animals are motivated by something akin to
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object-based agency. This points to a difference in degree rather than a difference in kind
between the lower animals and the human animal. She adds strength to this assumption
later when she claims:
[…] when I am inclined, I necessarily see a certain action as to-be-done in virtue of features that
make doing it look good to me. Some version of the “guise of the good” thesis does characterize
object-based agency. But, again, this does not mean that I see the goodness of those features as
justifying my doing the action. What it means is that looking-good-to-me functions as the basic
criteria any action must fill in order for it to appear to me as to-be-done. In other words, each of
my inclinations manifests my inclining self’s responsiveness to a basic imperative to seek my
apparent good and to shun my apparent bad. This is consistent with the analogy to animal action,
because creatures of instinct characteristically act in light of what they sense of their weal and
woe. 266

She sees seeking good and avoiding bad as a basic imperative inherent in the production
of any inclination. So object-based agency is not entirely arbitrary. The fact that the
inclination to perform the action is at base rooted in the perception that either something
bad is avoided or good attained shows that there is at least some necessary criterion
involved in the object-based agential capacity. She is quick to point out that this should
not be seen as a reason to perform the action, but seen simply as the necessary criteria for
any inclination. In addition, she maintains that this basic imperative is seen in the
motivation of the lower animals as well. So, the fact that she draws a connection between
the basic criteria involved in the activity of inclining for the human animal, and the basic
criteria involved in the instinctive behavior of the lower animals shows that her position
is compatible with the notion that the difference between the lower animals and the
human animal is one of degree. This lends further reason to believe that her account can
work within the naturalistic framework I promote.
The claim that object-based agency is akin to the instinctive acts of the lower
animal exposes a crucial similarity between instinct and inclination. Assuming an
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evolutionary explanation, the instinctive actions of the lower animals are the result of a
gradual evolutionary process that results in the maintaining of traits that maximize
fitness, and the loss of those traits that are most detrimental to fitness. 267 If as Schapiro
argues, inclination is at the foundation motivated by the seeking of one’s apparent good
and the shunning of one’s apparent bad, then inclination appears to function in the same
manner as instinct. Both motivational sources are at their base imperatival motivators that
promote the apparent good of the organism; but, they do so without the need for the
organism to reflect on why they ought to perform the action being prompted. In this
sense, as the EAR maintains, inclination and instinct are in a passive relationship with the
organism. So, according to Schapiro’s account, the actions prompted by inclination are
similar to actions prompted by instinct; they are not based on the use of reason.
Furthermore, if as Schapiro claims, to be inclined manifests itself as an imperative act,
and that act is one which employs no reason or justification, but rather simply is the felt
need to perform the act, then there seems little difference between an inclination and
instinct for Schapiro. Before proceeding any further it would be good to flush out exactly
what is meant by the term instinct. Once this is completed, I return to Schapiro’s account
of inclination and make the case that for Schapiro, inclination and instinct share such a
similar makeup, that under her account the two can be seen as different in degree rather
than kind.
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4.5 Defining Instinct

What one means by the expression instinctual behavior can be quite unclear. The
term instinct is used in a variety of manners, and some of these uses appear in direct
conflict with other uses. Andrew Cherry states that “words like instinct have been loosely
associated with behaviors that are not related to learning or reasoning.” 268 Although it
appears that human beings have some inborn and non-learned dispositions, identifying
these dispositions is problematic. Typically a distinction is made between attributes that
appear to be products of environmental influence and attributes that are called instinctual;
however, environmental influences play such a large role in shaping organisms that it
seems impossible in most instances to isolate attributes in a manner that allows for the
distinction to be made and avoid being arbitrary. Over the history of the term there has
been disagreement over exactly how to avoid this problem. There appear to be two main
camps, one which posits instincts as solely phylogenetic in origin, and the other which
allows for ontogenic influence in their production. 269 Lets turn to a discussion of these
positions.
Cherry claims that “[A]t first, instinct was considered to be a feature of a person’s
soul or characteristics conferred on someone by a god.” 270 Such an account admits to
supernatural explanations, and thus is of the sort offered prior to the Copernican and
scientific revolutions. Since then the use of the supernatural to understand most things
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has gone out of fashion, and the concept of instinct is no exception. However, there still
seems to be a similarity in this use of the term, and the use that has become commonly
accepted by the scientifically-influenced modern layman. In both cases talk is about
attributes present in an agent, and whose presence or absence is beyond the control of the
organism or any other individual without supernatural abilities. One might be able to
avoid acting on an instinct, but this is not the eradication of an instinct, it is simply the
suppression of the instinctual urge. Even though it is possible to curb the strength of
instincts, it is beyond the control of the organism as to whether it has such instincts to
begin with. One might argue that this points to the innateness of instincts. This similarity
seems to have persisted in some fashion from the earliest use of the term to the present.
In Taking the Stink Out of Instinct, Patrick Bateson offers a list of some of the
various meanings which the term instinct has denoted:
The Various Meanings of Instinct
1. Present at birth (or at a particular stage of development)
2. Not learned
3. Develops before it can be used
4. Unchanged once developed
5. Shared by all members of the species (of the same sex and age)
6. Organized into a distinct behavioral system (such as foraging)
7. Served by a distinct neural module
8. Adapted during evolution
9. Differences between individuals due to genetic differences 271

Each item in the list that Bateson offers appears to articulate a concept of instinct which
escapes environmental influence. 272 Assuming evolution, the idea seems to be that
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instincts are primarily phylogenetic in origin (hereafter PIO). In other words, they are the
result of evolutionary history rather than the result of individual development, learning,
or conditioning. Recognized for his influence in the early development of the field of
social psychology, and as one of the first individuals to develop a theory of instinctual
behavior, William McDougall offers a nice concise account of instinct that promotes just
this point.
In his book, An Introduction to Social Psychology, McDougall defines instinct as
[…] an inherited or innate psychophysical disposition which determines its possessor to
perceive, and to pay attention to, objects of a certain class, to experience an emotional
excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act in regard to it in a
particular manner, or at least, to experience an impulse to such action. 273

McDougall suggests that there is a “disposition” to perceive particular qualities. We
might say that there is a disposition to attend to certain things in a certain way. Perception
is directed by this disposition, and as such certain behaviors are incited that would not be
incited under a different perception. Lauren Wispé, in her book The Psychology of
Sympathy, remarks that McDougall’s definition of instinct is comprised of three parts: a
perceptual, or seeing aspect; a conative, or striving aspect; and an emotional core.
His theory rests on the assumption that emotions are bodily adaptations to instinctual strivings
which are instigated more or less naturally by the perception of certain objects. An instinct,
therefore, is a way of perceiving, feeling, and doing 274

Accordingly under McDougall’s position one perceives certain objects due to disposition,
and as a result of this perception a particular feeling arises, and this feeling incites the
impulse to act in a certain manner. He stops short of saying that one will actually perform
the action incited, but one will at least “experience an impulse to such action.” Thus, any
action performed as a result of this impulse may be cashed out as an instinctual action.
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Further, the impulse that McDougall speaks of appears to fall under the criteria of
innateness offered by Nikolass Tinbergen; it is distinct from those things which are
learned or developed. 275 In addition, McDougall suggests that an instinct “determines its
possessor to perceive, and to pay attention to, objects of a certain class.” 276 By using the
term ‘determines,’ McDougall imports the notion that instincts interfere with one’s
freedom. Under a broadly compatibilist account of freedom, freedom is the result of
one’s own will being causally responsible for action. Thus, if instincts determine an
individual’s attention, then they are a constraint on the freedom of the individual’s will.
Moreover, if one’s instincts determine one’s impulse to act in a certain manner, then the
capacity for such impulses to emerge in the course of individual development seems
diminished. In other words, if the instinctual impulse is determined, then it is not the
product of ontogeny; it is not the result of individual development, but rather the result of
phylogenetic history. Thus, the use of the term ‘determines’ to denote the power of an
instinct displays McDougall’s commitment to the idea that these impulses are not
individually developed; but are rather, at least in the sense that Tinbergen offers, innate.
If instinctual impulses are innate, then any action that is the result of an instinctual
impulse may also be characterized as innate. Therefore, instinctual actions are those
actions that are the result of innate factors, and innate factors, in Tinbergen’s sense, are
not ontogenetic in origin (hereafter OIO). In order to further aid in establishing the
connection between the innate and the instinctual, it will be beneficial to look at another
valuable notion of what constitutes instinct found in the early writings of Konrad Lorenz.
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In describing Konrad Lorenz’s early account of instinctive behavior Ingo Brigandt
suggests that for the early Lorenz “only […] innate components qualify as instinctive
behavior.” 277 Further, Brigandt suggests that Lorenz draws a distinction between the
innate and the learned or developed. Such a dichotomous approach suggests that “there
are neither ontogenetic nor phylogenetic transitions between innate and learned
components of behavior.[…] Instinctive behavior patterns are rigid and do not get
modified or become more flexible due to experience in the course of ontogeny.” 278 Thus
it seems that Lorenz views the notions of phylogeny and ontogeny as a dichotomy.
Further, since he argues that instinctive behavior is rigid, and thus resists modification
through ontogeny, then actions from instinct cannot be the result of ontogeny.
Consequently, under this account, instincts must be PIO. Furthermore, it seems clear for
both Lorenz 279 and McDougall’s accounts that the impulse to act must be innate in order
for an action to be the result of an instinct. It still seems unclear whether innateness is a
sufficient condition for something to be an instinct; however, since it is necessary, and
because the innate, as defined by these writers, is necessarily not the result of ontogeny,
but is rather PIO, we have further reason to believe that for Lorenz and McDougall
instincts must be PIO. In addition, according to Tinbergen, actions that are instinctual
must be innate. Since innate behavior as described by Tinbergen, has “[…] not been
changed by learning processes,” 280 and in view of the fact that change by learning
processes implies ontogenetic influence, it must also be the case that instinctual behavior
is devoid of ontogenetic influence for Tinbergen. In sum, for Lorenz, McDougall, and
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Tinbergen instinct is PIO. This view is not accepted by all, and thus it is necessary to
look at accounts that argue against this claim. One place to look is in an argument offered
by Daniel Lehrman.
Lehrman begins his critique of Lorenz by drawing attention to Tinbergen and
Lorenz’s use of the term innate. He claims that Lorenz and Tinbergen use the term innate
as if it “surely referred to a definable, definite, and delimited category of behavior.” 281
However, Lehrman maintains that the term is not without ambiguity. Further, due to the
heuristic value which Lorenz and Tinbergen place on the concepts of innate and notinnate, if we wish to flush out the instinct problem, then it is necessary to “consider
carefully just what it means to say that a mode of behavior is innate.” 282 Lehrman notes
that it is
[…] apparent that Lorenz and Tinbergen, by “innate” behavior, mean behavior which is
hereditarily determined, which is part of the original constitution of the animal, which arises
quite independently of the animal’s experience and environment, and which is distinct from
acquired or learned behavior. 283

Further, he maintains that either explicitly or implicitly, Lorenz and Tinbergen regard the
major criteria of innateness as entailing:
(1) the behavior be stereotyped and constant in form.
(2) it be characteristic of the species.
(3) it appear in animals which have been raised in isolation from others.
(4) it develop fully formed in animals which have been prevented from practicing it. 284

Lehrman claims that unquestionably there are behavior patterns which meet these
criteria; however, Lorenz’s attributing of these patterns as innate, does not necessarily
offer any real assistance to the scientific understanding of their origins. 285 He cites
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several cases of empirical evidence showing that the soundness of the criteria for
innateness offered by Lorenz and Tinbergen can be brought into question. I will focus on
one.

Lehrman argues that items present at birth do not necessarily escape

environmental influence. In order to support this claim he references an analysis of the
domestic chicks characteristic pecking.
Domestic chicks characteristically begin to peck at objects […] soon after hatching. The pecking
behavior consists of at least three highly stereotyped components: head lunging, bill opening and
closing, and swallowing. […] This pecking is stereotyped, characteristic of the species, appears
in isolated chicks, is present at the time of hatching, and shows some improvement in the
absence of specific practice. Obviously, it qualifies as an “innate” behavior, in the sense used by
Lorenz and Tinbergen. 286

The pecking behavior of chicks meets all the criteria for innateness offered by Tinbergen
and Lorenz; however, Lehrman argues that some of the claims made by Tinbergen and
Lorenz in reference to the innateness of such behavior overreach what can be expected to
be soundly warranted. Having offered an example of behavior that appears to fit all the
criteria of innateness given by Lorenz and Tinbergen, Lehrman then cites a study on
domestic chicks done by Z.Y. Kuo in 1932 which Lehrman believes exposes the
unsoundness in Lorenz and Tinbergen’s account. In the study it was noted that
As early as three days of embryonic age, the neck is passively bent when the heartbeat causes the
head to rise and fall. The head is stimulated tactually by the yolk sac, which is moved
mechanically by amnion contractions synchronized with the heartbeats which cause head
movement. Beginning about one day later, the head first bends actively in response to tactual
stimulation. At about this time, too, the bill begins to open and close when the bird nods—
according to Kuo, apparently through nervous excitation furnished by the head movements
through irradiation in the still-incomplete nervous system. Bill-opening and closing become
independent of head-activity only somewhat later. After about 8 or 9 days, fluid forced into the
throat by the bill and head movements causes swallowing. On the twelfth day, bill-opening
always follows head-movement. 287

Lehrman maintains that “Kuo’s observations strongly suggest several interpretations of
the development of pecking. […] the head-lunge arises from the passive head-bending
which occurs contiguously with tactual stimulation of the head while the nervous control
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of muscles is being established. By the time of hatching, head-lunging in response to
tactual stimulation is very well established.” 288 The data collected from Kuo’s
observations show that behaviors present at birth are not necessarily unlearned or absent
environmental influence. If as Lehrman asserts, Lorenz and Tinbergen’s meaning of
innate behavior entails that the behavior arises “independently of the animal’s experience
and environment, and […] is distinct from acquired or learned behavior,” then Kuo’s
evidence exposes a problem with the notion of innateness that Tinbergen and Lorenz
defend. The basic idea is that there is nothing preventing learning, conditioning, or
environmental influence while in the embryonic stage. Thus, if part of the meaning of
innate behavior is that it arises independent of external influences, then to make claims
about the innateness of a behavior on the basis that it is stereotyped, characteristic of the
species, appears in isolation, is present at the time of hatching or birth, and shows some
improvement in the absence of specific practice, can lead to faulty assumptions. Kuo’s
work proves problematic for their account since Tinbergen and Lorenz maintain that
innate behavior is absent external influence.
A major obstacle for Lorenz and Tinbergen is that in order to know that anything
actually meets the demands of their criteria for innateness, we need to be able to isolate it
from the possibility of external influence. However, a basic criterion for any such attempt
is the existence of the object in question. Any attempt to isolate an object requires that it
be in-the-world. If something is in-the-world, then it is impossible to isolate it from any
external influence. Lehrman asserts, that “[I]t must be realized an animal raised in
isolation from fellow-members of his species is not necessarily isolated from the effect of
processes and events which contribute to the development of any particular behavior
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pattern.” 289 He then notes that the important question is not if the organism is isolated,
but what is it the organism is isolated from. 290 All this points to a difficulty in our ability
to know the extent the effect of these processes have on any particular behavior pattern.
In this sense, it seems that it is just not within our capacity to identify the exact extent of
influence any one factor has on another. Lehrman indicates a further reason to see this as
a problem when he claims that “[…] the systematic stability of a characteristic does not
indicate anything about its mode of development.” 291 So, the fact that certain behavior
patterns are characteristic of a particular species tells us very little about the development
of these patterns. In sum, at this point in time, we simply do not have epistemological
access to the items that meet all the criteria for innateness offered by Lorenz and
Tinbergen. Thus, if innateness is a necessary criteria for something to be considered
instinctive, then Lorenz and Tinbergen’s account of innateness makes the capacity to
deliver empirical evidence of instinctual behaviors extremely difficult, if not impossible.
At the very least, Lehrman’s critique offers reason to believe that instincts are not
necessarily PIO.
Although, in contrast to Lorenz, Tinbergen, and McDougall, Lehrman indicates
that instinct is a candidate for development through ontogeny, it is still apparent that
instinct is in a passive relationship with the organism in both accounts. Thus, the two
camps at least share the similarity of positing instinct as distinct from an active
motivational capacity such as reason.
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4.6 Returning to Schapiro

Looking back at Schapiro’s account of inclination, she claims that inclination is
motivated by a felt need. In addition she claims that inclination is a form of object-based
agency. Returning to Lorenz, McDougall, and Tinbergen’s account of instinct we see a
similar notion being used by McDougall in his description of instinct. He asserts that
instincts prompt one “to experience an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon
perceiving […] an object, and to act in regard to it in a particular manner, or at least, to
experience an impulse to such action.” 292 McDougall’s notion of instinct, just like
Schapiro’s notion of inclination, is object based. In addition, Schapiro’s claim that
inclination is motivated by a felt need to act in a particular way in response to the object
is similar to McDougall’s claim that instinct ignites an emotional excitement in the
organism on perceiving the object, and that this emotional excitement leads to an act in
response to the object, or to at least have an impulse to act. I argue that the emotional
excitement McDougall speaks of can be thought of in the same manner as Schapiro’s
claim about the felt need to act. McDougall’s view basically iterates the idea that instinct
incites a felt need to act in response to an object. Schapiro’s notion of inclination, rests on
some of the same assumptions as McDougall’s notion of instinct. Mainly, they are both
object based, and they both excite the felt need to act in a particular manner. Further,
Wispé claims that for McDougall, “instinct is as a way of perceiving, feeling, and
doing.” 293 Schapiro’s notion of inclination is also a way of perceiving, feeling, and doing.
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So, following McDougall’s notion of instinct, Schapiro’s notion of inclination, if
different from McDougall’s notion of instinct, seems to only be a difference in degree.
Turning to Lehrman’s position, we see a notion of instinct that positions it in the
O-camp; however, as noted previously, both the O-camp and the P-camp still see instinct
as a passive motivational source. Schapiro sees inclination acting on us in the same
passive manner as instinct does for the O-camp and P-camp. So the manner in which
instinct motivates, even for the O-camp, shares an important similarity with the manner
in which inclination motivates for Schapiro. In addition, there is nothing inherent in
Schapiro’s account of inclination that denies it the capacity to be OIO or PIO. Schapiro
makes no remarks on whether or not the development of our inclinations is PIO or OIO.
So it seems that Schapiro’s account is not burdened with the problems associated in
approaching the problem from the position of an either/or binary involving whether or
not the development of inclinations is PIO or OIO. Whether the felt need to act in
response to a particular object is one that has been passed on through phylogeny, as in the
case of Tinbergen and Lorenz’s account of instinct, or whether it is the result of ontogeny
as in Lehrman’s account, is of no matter in deciding if the item in question is an
inclination for Schapiro. What matters for her, is whether the motivational source
produces an imperative to act, comes to the organism passively, and produces the felt
need to act in response to an object in a particular manner. All three criteria can be
achieved whether instincts are PIO or OIO. Further, all three criteria seem to be in line
with the way in which instinct manifests itself whether instinct is seen as OIO or PIO.
Thus, when analyzing the similarities between her notion of inclination and the notions of
instinct discussed previously, it seems of little consequence which camp she promotes.
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Adding further support to the notion that inclination and instinct differ in degree,
Schapiro remarks
Just as the cat lacks the capacity to call its instincts into question, so the inclining part of me
lacks the capacity to call its motivating principles into question. My contention, then, is that to
“have an inclination” is to be aware of a part of me going for something in the way that a
nonhuman animal goes for something. My inclination is the movement of my inner animal, a
movement that would count as my action were I wholly a creature of instinct. 294

Again she draws a connection between the instinctual acts of the non-human animal, and
the inclining of the human animal. The fact that she sees us as lacking the capacity to call
into question our inclinations in the same way a non-human animal lacks the capacity to
call into question its instincts, shows a further commitment to the notion that these two
capacities function in a similar way. They both come to the organism in a passive
manner. Thus, there is a lack of control over both items. In this sense, both inclinations
and instincts are one part of the organism’s source of motivation; however, it is a part of
the organism’s source of motivation that the organism does not have the deliberative
power to produce. In sum, both instincts and inclinations come to the organism whether
the organism wants them to or not. In other words, they manifest themselves as an
imperative. Thus, using Schapiro’s words, each of these capacities produce the felt need
to act in response to a situation in a particular way, regardless of the organism’s reasoned
notions of how they should act in response to such a situation. In this way, instinct and
inclination appear to be part of the same capacity for Schapiro. Thus, I maintain that her
account allows for the difference between the two to be seen as one of degree.
Furthermore, unlike the EAR who asserts that inclinations are the result of
something that is non-agential, Schapiro does not force one to make a distinction between
non-agential and agential capacity on the basis of the use of reason or inclination. She
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does make a distinction in degree between the two agential capacities, but this does not
amount to a distinction in the kind of capacity. Both inclination and reason are agential
capacities. Thus, there is no reason why we should view the motivational use of
inclination as a different kind of capacity then the motivational use of reason. Further,
since her notion of inclination allows for it be seen as different in degree from instinct, it
follows that there is some sort of gradation amongst instinct, inclination, and reason. So
for Schapiro, it seems warranted to claim that the difference among instinct, inclination,
and reason is one of degree not kind
It is unclear whether or not Schapiro places instinct outside the agential
capacities, but it seems likely that she would. However, if she does, then it may be
problematic for her notion of inclination. The fact that her notion of inclination shares
such a close similarity with the notion of instinct offered by both the P-camp and the Ocamp, makes it difficult to then claim that instinct is an entirely different kind of
motivation than inclination. Thus, in order for her to claim that instinct is not part of the
agential capacities, but nonetheless still only different in degree from inclination, she will
need to make a further distinction. She sheds some light on this problem in her discussion
of the difference between what she calls reflex and inclination, where she appears to
assimilate reflex to instinct. She writes:
When I squint in bright sunlight, I do not do so in response to an imperatival conception of
anything. I do not see the sun as to-be-squinted-at. […] I do not have an inclination to squint and
then act on that inclination. Rather, I squint by reflex. So, on my theory, my inclination to turn
on radios is not assimilable to a reflex. 295

So, in the case of inclining, there is first an inclination to X in response to some
imperatival conception, then there is the separate act of doing X. In contrast, she sees the
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reflex to X as missing the felt intermediacy of an impulse preceding the action of Xing.
In other words, there are not two separate events involved in reflex, there is not an
impulse to X, and then the actual act of doing X, but rather, the reflex to X comes to me
without the impulse-to-X. Ultimately, she attributes reflex to a causal process that she
does not attribute to inclination. To get at this claim, she asks us to consider the way nonhuman animals are motivated to act when not acting on reflex. In doing so, she discusses
how the world might look to a cat.
The cat sees this scurrying mouse as to-be-chased, this food in the dish as to-be-eaten, and that
big angry dog as to-be-avoided. When she is moved in light of her teleological consciousness,
she is not simply subject to a causal disposition. The object does not force her to act in the way
that pollen in the air might force her to sneeze. Rather, she sees the object as calling upon her to
initiate movement in response to it. 296

Again we see her make a distinction based on the notion that there is some thing which
the inclining act is in response to. She draws the distinction further by implying that
reflexes are the result of a causal disposition, whereas inclinations are not. So acts from
reflex are forced, and acts from inclinations are not. This points to a difference in the
degree of freedom involved in the performance of each of these acts. In the case of
reflexes, if the action connected with the reflex is performed, then it is a forced act. This
entails the notion that the motivational force of an inclination, although imperatival in
nature, does not exact the same kind of power over the organism that we see from a
reflex. So, for Schapiro, there is a definitive difference between the power of a reflex to
produce an action and the power of an inclination to produce an action. Perhaps, it is in
this difference that Schapiro can make a case for why instinct does not reside in the
agential capacities like inclination.
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In making the claim that an “inclination is the movement of my inner animal, a
movement that would count as my action were I wholly a creature of instinct,” 297 it
appears that she sees some difference between inclinations and instincts. After all, if she
did not distinguish between instincts and inclinations, then there would be no need for her
to speak of the two separately as she does in the above quotation. It seems that she wants
to draw a similar distinction between instinct and inclination as she does between reflex
and inclination. In this quote, she pushes the notion that to have an inclination, is not
enough to ensure that the action being inclined actually gets performed. Notice that the
movement of one’s inner animal in this example is not the same as the movement of the
creature that is wholly instinctive. Her claim maintains that if I was wholly a creature of
instinct, then my inclination would count as my action. This claim implies, that if I am
not wholly a creature of instinct, then my inclination does not count as my action. So, if
the organism in question is not wholly a creature of instinct, then to have an inclination,
is not to perform an action. Looking back to her claims regarding reflex, when one has a
reflex, the action itself is the reflex. Remember, that in contrast to her account of
inclination, she does not draw a distinction between the reflex and the action motivated
by the reflex. The action is itself the reflex. It seems that she may make the same move
with inclination and instinct. If the inclination to perform an action, is counted as the
action itself for animals that are wholly instinctive, and presumably by “wholly
instinctive” she means that all the actions of such a creature are the result of instincts,
then the wholly instinctive creature does not have the capacity to have an inclination to
act, and then the further capacity to act or not act on the basis of this inclination. The
wholly instinctive creature simply acts, and it is the action itself that she calls instinctive.
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To clarify, the motivational power of an “inclination” to act for wholly instinctive
creatures is much stronger than the motivational power for those creatures that are not
wholly instinctive. Inclination for the former, manifests itself as an action, whereas for
the latter, inclination manifests itself as the impulse to an action, not the action itself.
Thus, for the wholly instinctive creature, the notion of inclination is not the same notion
she uses in respect to those creatures that are not wholly instinctive. It seems that the
difference, then, is not between instincts and inclinations necessarily, but rather between
the type of organisms involved. If an animal is not wholly instinctive, then the capacity to
possess inclinations is present, but if the animal is wholly instinctive, then the capacity to
possess inclinations is not present. In this sense, she does appear to draw a distinction in
kind between human and non-human animals. But, there is a problem with such a claim.
Since the above example is of a cat, unless she posits inclinations to cats, then she draws
the same distinction between instinct and reflex, that she does for inclination and reflex.
Her claim that, “the cat sees the object as calling upon her to initiate movement in
response to it,” shares a similarity to the notion of inclining actions for the human animal.
In both cases, she sees reflex as having more force over the action of the organism in
question. Assuming that she sees cats as wholly instinctive creatures, then her description
of the motivation involved in the cats actions, shows that instinct does not have the same
force as reflex. Again she says,
[…] the cat sees this scurrying mouse as to-be-chased, this food in the dish as to-be-eaten, and
that big angry dog as to-be-avoided. When she is moved in light of her teleological
consciousness, she is not simply subject to a causal disposition. The object does not force her to
act in the way that pollen in the air might force her to sneeze. 298
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So, for the cat, these “as-to-be” impulses, appear to be the same type of impulse Schapiro
describes as an inclination for the human animal. So, perhaps she allows for creatures,
such as cats, to possess inclinations. However, she follows this quote by saying, “[S]till,
when the cat is motivated in this way, she does not see the demand to chase the mouse as
something requiring justification. Indeed, she does not have the capacity to call her
instincts into question.” 299 So, clearly in her description of the cat, she sees these “as-tobe” impulses, as instinctive. But, her description of these instinctive impulses mirrors her
description of the inclining impulses she attributes to the human animal. Thus, again it
appears that instinct and inclination function in nearly the same manner for Schapiro. The
only apparent difference seems to be the type of animal involved in these “as-to-be”
impulses. The “as-to-be” impulses of the human animal can either be the result of instinct
or inclination, but for the wholly instinctive creature, these “as-to-be” impulses can only
be the result of instinct. She does not discuss her method for deciding which creatures are
wholly instinctive, and which are not. But, no matter the method for making this
distinction, the process by which actions are motivated through both inclination and
instinct seem nearly identical under her account.
It seems the only real difference to be drawn between the two is to claim that
inclination is an agential capacity, and instinct is not. But, if the two capacities are
identical with the exception that one is agential and one not, then the term agential seems
to add very little if anything at all to inclination. Think about the difference between
pitching a baseball, and throwing a ball off a hill at a person with a bat attempting to hit
the ball. The only real difference here is that the pitcher is part of something, mainly a
baseball league, that uses certain terms to describe the situation at hand. We only think
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that the pitcher is doing something wholly distinct from the fellow who is on the hill
throwing the ball to his pal in virtue of the context. One is “pitching” in an organized
game of baseball, the other is “throwing a ball off a hill at a person with a bat attempting
to hit the ball in the backyard.” But in essence, they are both doing the same thing. In this
sense, the two acts are not different in kind, but are different in degree. It seems that
unless Schapiro maintains that the difference between inclination and instinct is similar to
the difference between reflex and inclination, then her notion of inclination and instinct
are in the same relationship as the “pitcher” and the “thrower.” Either way, I think her
account allows for this difference to be seen as one of degree.
A welcome feature of Schapiro’s notion of inclination is that it fits well within the
account of autonomy offered in chapter three. NADST promotes the concept that the
more possible alternatives available to the organism in question, the more autonomous
that organism can be. Schapiro’s allowance for nonrational activity to coincide with
agency opens the possibility for more alternatives. If we lock down agency with the
notion that it must be connected with only the rational, then we close off possible
alternatives. Schapiro’s account of inclination does not limit these alternatives in the
same manner that the EAR or ER accounts do. If there is no concern that non-rational
activity disturbs one’s agency, then there is no need to connect agency with rational
activity. Thus, her account opens the door to more available alternative actions than
either the ER or EAR.
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5
Ethical Naturalism Reconsidered

In the previous chapter I examined the concept of inclination because it seemed helpful to
distinguish the notion of inclination within a naturalistic framework that assumes DST
from notions of inclination that posit it as distinct in kind from other motivational
sources. Having exposed the problem that DST creates for this type of thinking, we are
now prepared to reconsider ethical naturalism in light of a DST perspective. In Chapter
One we took a cursory look at the general notion of ethical naturalism, and some of its
critics. I now discuss two contemporary versions of naturalized ethics in order to expose
how the concept of nature used in these versions differs from the notion of nature found
in naturalistic frameworks that assume DST. I end with an examination of the effect this
difference produces for a naturalized ethics.

5.1 Contemporary Ethical Naturalism

There are far too many contemporary versions of naturalized ethics to discuss
them all in a project of this size, so I will limit my discussion to two of the leading
movements in contemporary ethics that defend versions of naturalism. I examine what
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some have termed Duke Naturalism and Pittsburgh Naturalism. 300 In discussing Duke
Naturalism I focus on the claims of Owen Flanagan, and in discussing Pittsburgh
Naturalism I focus on the claims of John McDowell. I offer an exposition of their
respective positions, and then analyze these positions under a naturalistic framework that
assumes DST in an attempt to expose the differences between their accounts and
accounts that posit DST.
I want to make clear at the outset that I recognize Flanagan’s and McDowell’s
views differ considerably; however, the goal of this section is not to explain the
differences between the two, but rather the goal is to expose how each is different from
the view expounded throughout this project—the view that emerges when we look at
ethics as understood from the theoretical/empirical perspective of DST.

5.2 Duke Naturalism: Flanagan

Owen Flanagan offers a version of naturalism that attempts to reconcile what
Wilfrid Sellars calls the manifest image and the scientific image. In glossing Sellars,
Flanagan claims that the manifest image is “the composite set of all folk theories of
ordinary people.” 301 He claims that the manifest image has two components, the
humanistic image and the world image. 302 The world image is composed of beliefs about
the external world, and the humanistic image is composed of beliefs about human nature.
He is primarily concerned with reconciling the humanistic part of the manifest image
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with the scientific image. According to Flanagan, “the humanistic image is the part of the
manifest image that concerns the nature of persons.” 303 He notes that “[T]he humanistic
image says that we are spiritual beings endowed with free will—a capacity that no
ordinary animal possesses and that permits us to circumvent ordinary laws of cause and
effect.” 304 In contrast, he asserts that “[T]he scientific image says that we are animals that
evolved according to the principles of natural selection. Although we are extraordinary
animals we possess no capacity that permits us to circumvent the laws of cause and
effect.” 305 To be clear, he does maintain that the humanistic image “can and often does
display a sophistication due to absorption of theological, philosophical, and some
scientific ideas.” 306 The beliefs about human nature, then, are influenced by the
acceptance or non-acceptance of ideas found in these fields. However, according to
Flanagan, there is still a disconnect between the scientific image and the humanistic
image that needs to be reconciled. He notes that many think the scientific image threatens
to remove meaning from our lives. However, he claims that this need not be the case. He
argues that we have good reason to buy into the scientific image, and that to do so does
not necessarily result in the loss of meaning or morals.
Flanagan argues that we have good reasons to abandon supernatural notions of the
self and libertarian free will. We are physical organisms that do not need to circumvent
the ordinary laws of cause and effect in order to be held morally responsible. 307 He
claims that “[T]he mind is the brain—mental life is realized in our brains—and it is
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subject to natural laws.” 308 The mental life is not an exception it does not escape causal
laws. It is here that the worry about losing moral responsibility comes into play. If we are
physical organisms top to bottom, and all physical organisms are constrained by causal
law, then it seems we lose the ability to do otherwise, we lose our freedom. In order to
support the claim that we have moral responsibility even though we do not possess
libertarian free will, Flanagan defends what he calls neo-compatibilism. Neocompatibilism, he claims, preserves the ideas that, even though I do not possess
libertarian free will, “I am morally accountable for what I do and that in some plausible
sense I can do other than I do.” 309 In order to get clear on how the neo-compatibilist
supports this claim it will be helpful to discuss what Flanagan calls “moral network
theory.” 310 Once this is completed, I return focus to the neo-compatibilist account.
Flanagan defends what he calls moral network theory. He claims that according to
moral network theory, “acquiring knowledge […] is primarily a process of learning how:
how to recognize a wide variety of complex situations and how to respond to them
appropriately.” 311 He adds, that “through exposure to situations […] moral perception,
cognition, and response develop and are refined.” 312 The primary idea is that people
acquire the capacity to recognize how best to respond to particular situations through
their experiences. Flanagan draws on an analogy to help clarify how moral network
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theory explains “the way a human acquires moral sensitivities and sensibilities.” 313 He
maintains that it works in much the same way as sonar does in learning to distinguish
rocks from mines. He writes:
One way to teach the mine-rock device would be simply to state the rule specifying the
necessary and sufficient characteristics of rocks and mines. The trouble is that these are not
known (indeed it is part of the mine producers’ job to make them as physically nondistinct as
possible). Despite these efforts at disguise, there are bound to be subtle features that distinguish
mines from rocks, so it would be good if the device could be trained in a situation where it starts
by guessing mine or rock and then, by being clued into the accuracy of its guesses, develops a
profile for recognizing rocks from mines. Indeed this can be done with connectionist networks.
Eventually the mine-rock detector (which of course, never becomes perfect at its job) comes to
be able to make judgments of kind very quickly, based on a small number of features, and it
responds accordingly. […] According to moral-network theory, the fundamental process is the
same in the case of moral learning. 314

Flanagan explains that humans learn to recognize a variety of “prototypical kinds of
social situations, and they learn to produce or avoid the behaviors prototypically required
or prohibited in each.” 315 He maintains that humans learn to recognize the ways that
embedding society generally reacts in prototypical social/moral situations, and the ways
that the embedding society generally expects people to react in these situations. 316 Just
like the sonar gets better at distinguishing mines from rocks as it gains experience,
humans get better at recognizing what society expects as we gain experience. In short, we
learn from experience what we are expected to do or not do in certain situations.
Further, in displaying the complexity involved in moral learning, Flanagan asks
us to consider what is involved in learning to tell the truth. He claims that we do not want
to teach a child that he or she “has a categorical obligation to tell the truth.” 317 There are
clearly many instances that we prefer the child not tell the truth. For example, when a
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stranger asks the child for his or her address. 318 He asks us to “consider just four kinds of
situations and what they require in terms of discrimination and response:”
1. Situations that call for straightforward truth telling: “The cookies were for dessert. Did you
eat them all, Ben?”
2. Situations that call for tact: “So, Ben, you are enjoying school, aren’t you?” (said by teacher
to child in front of parents).
3. Situations that call for kind falsehoods/white lie: “Kate, I got my hair cut a new way for the
party tonight. How do you like it?” (one preteen to another). “Kate, don’t you think I’m getting
better at soccer?” (said by one teammate to another—and supposing Kate does not think Emily
has improved one bit over the season).
4. Situations that call for lying/misinformation, depending on who is asking: “Little boy, what is
your address?” (asked by the stranger). 319

These examples expose a fraction of the possible situations one may encounter that call
for discriminating between telling the truth, omitting information, or outright lying.
Learning when to tell the truth is a complex matter. In practice it seems impossible to
have a specific rule for truth-telling for each and every possible situation; however,
Flanagan argues that just like the mine-rock device gets better at distinguishing the
difference between rocks and mines, humans get better at recognizing what situations call
for what responses. Once we learn the expected response in prototypical situations, we
are better prepared to make a discriminatory judgment in particular situations, especially
those situations that share similarities with the prototypical situations we have
encountered in past experiences. Similarity between a particular situation, and one of the
prototypes we have experienced can offer information about how to react in a particular
situation. He writes:
How exactly a child or an adult responds to a novel moral situation ‘will be a function of which
of her many prototypes that situation activates, and this will be a matter of the relative similarity
of the new situation to the various prototypes on which she was trained.’ 320
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However, Flanagan is quick to note that some situations will be ambiguous, and thus
there will be times when there is disagreement over what is occurring. 321 He argues that
these instances “lead to reflection, discussion, and argument, which in turn lead to
prototype adjustment.” 322
Explaining that how one reacts in a particular situation is the result of prototype
identification, and explaining that when disagreement over prototype identification arises
that prototypes are subject to adjustment, exposes a crucial point for the moral network
theorist. Moral responsiveness need not entail the use of a set of “special-purpose rules or
algorithms that are individually applied to all, and only, the problems for which they are
designed specifically.” 323 Nor, as Flanagan notes, does moral responsiveness need to
“involve the deployment of a single general-purpose rule […], such as the principle of
utility or the categorical imperative, designed to deal with each and every moral
problem.” 324 He then adds:
Moral issues are heterogeneous in kind, and the moral community wisely trains us to possess a
vast array of moral competencies suited—often in complex combinations and configurations—to
multifarious domains, competencies that in fact and in theory resist unification under either a set
of special-purpose rules or under a single general-purpose rule or principle. 325

So, assuming moral network theory, there is no reason to think that moral responsiveness
is or can be the product of a set of special-purpose rules or a general-purpose principle.
Flanagan then argues that moral network theory leaves no room for traditional
notions of reason. Networks are in the business of pattern recognition, not reasoning, at
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least in any traditional sense of the word. He claims that really all such systems can do is
recognize and respond to patterns. 326 Further, he claims that
The total network comprises more than the neural nets that contain the moral knowledge a
particular individual possesses. Whatever neural net instantiates (or is disposed to express) some
segment of moral knowledge, it does so only because it is ‘trained’ by a community. The
community itself is a network providing constant feedback to the human agent. 327

The total network is a system that includes a social aspect as well as neural nets. The
neural nets are educated by feedback from this social aspect (the community). As
Flanagan indicates:
The neural network that underpins moral perception, thought, and action is created, maintained,
and modified in relation to a particular natural and social environment. The moral network
includes but is not exhausted by the dispositional states laid down in the neural nets of particular
individuals. 328

Both the social and what Flanagan calls the natural play major roles in the formation of
the neural network. However, as previously noted, the social feedback itself can change if
there is disagreement over what prototype is occurring and the disagreement leads to a
prototype adjustment. This adjustment can lead to a change in the feedback that
individuals receive from the embedding society, and thus, lead to modification in the
neural network. This modification can then lead to changes in what actions an individual
sees as appropriate in particular situations.
According to Flanagan, the main point is that “moral knowledge is the result of
complex socialization processes.” 329 He is quick to point out that it is not simply “mere”
socialization. He notes, “‘mere’ socialization is socialization toward which no critical
attitude is taken, for which there are no rational mechanisms that drive adjustment,
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modification, and refinement.” 330 In contrast, moral socialization has constraints that play
a role in the assessment and adjustment of moral learning. 331 He writes:
We are trying to learn ‘how best to organize and administer [our] collective and individual
affairs.’ Social experience provides feedback about how we are doing, and reliable cognitive
mechanisms come into play in evaluating and assessing this feedback. So there are aims,
activities to achieve these aims, feedback about success in achieving the aims, and reliable
cognitive mechanisms designed to assess the meaning of the feedback and to make
modifications to the activities. 332

Flanagan claims that cognitive mechanisms include individual reflection, collective
reflection, and conversation; however, reflective practices “do not involve the
deployment of some rarefied culture-free faculty of reason.” 333 Rather, to be critically
rational is a development of natural capacities, and is something we learn. It is, as
Flanagan notes, “a perfectly natural capacity displayed by Homo sapiens socialized in
certain ways.” 334 In short, Flanagan argues that moral network theory offers an
explanation of how moral learning works. He claims that moral learning can be explained
by “complex prototype activation and […] rational practices that are socially acquired
and communally circumscribed in structure and content.” 335
All this seems to suggest that Flanagan supports a form of relativism, and he
does. He supports what he calls pluralistic relativism; however, with relativism comes
worries about what exactly keeps actions in check. After all, if what is “good” is relative
to what group/environment one is part, then what is to stop one from thinking, for
example, that the killing of Jewish people by the Nazis ought be seen as good since the
embedding community of Nazis think it is good? Flanagan argues that the worry of
falling into an extreme relativism that allows for this type of thinking is remedied by one
330
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simple answer: “The ends of creatures constrain what is good for them.” 336 He explains
that
The relativist is attuned to relations that matter, to relations that have relevance to the matter at
hand. Not all kinds of food, clothing, and shelter suit us animals, us members of the species
Homo sapiens. Nor do all interpersonal and intrapersonal practices suit us. 337

Accordingly, he argues that there are “substantial constraints on what might count as an
adequate morality stemming from intrapersonal and interpersonal factors.” 338 He
maintains that we are social animals, but we have certain innate capacities and interests,
and although many specifics of these capacities and interests are due to local
socialization, the fact that we have them, “seems to be part […] of human nature.” 339 He
argues that the normative aspect of naturalistic ethics ought explain “[…] why some
norms (including norms governing choosing norms), values, and virtues are good or
better than others.” 340 He writes:
One common rationale for favoring a norm or set of norms is that it is suited to modify,
suppress, transform, or amplify some characteristic or capacity belonging to our nature—either
our animal nature or our nature as socially situated beings. 341

The idea is that there are certain characteristics that human beings see as desirable, and if
there are certain norms that aid in the promotion of these particular characteristics, then
these norms will be favored over norms that either do not enhance these traits or promote
undesirable traits. Flanagan argues that there is a core set of moral beliefs to be found
across different cultures, and although certain particular beliefs may vary from culture to
culture—like beliefs about when it is acceptable to kill something or the need for
cooperation—these beliefs are similar in that “they all serve to regulate and promote
336
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human social life.” 342 He adds that even before the effects of culture have taken root, we
(human beings) have different preferences when it comes to things like shelter, play,
communication, and friendship than other animals. Morality, then, serves to inculcate
those behaviors that are seen as desirable. He argues that “[M]orality cannot seek to
instantiate behavior that no human beings have a propensity to seek,” 343 and this he
maintains at least limits the capacity to fall into extreme relativism.
Further, Flanagan claims that this appears to “reduce morality to a system of
hypothetical imperatives that hinge on our wanting to secure certain aims: If you want to
secure social cooperation, then you ought to__.’” 344 The antecedents of these
hypothetical imperatives consist of those aims that Homo sapiens have a tendency to
seek. In addition, he maintains that what aims we want to secure are limited by our
nature, and this constrains the sorts of things Homo sapiens strive to achieve. So,
according to Flanagan, the hypothetical imperatives consist of those things that human
beings tend to seek, but the types of things we tend to seek are constrained by our nature.
He writes:
[…]while the aims of naturalistic ethics are internal to the motivational systems of the species
Homo sapiens, they are external to any particular individual member of that species. This
follows from the view that there are a limited number of goods that human beings seek given
their nature and potentialities, and these goods (or aims) limit what can be placed as antecedents
to the hypothetical conditionals. 345

Ultimately Flanagan argues that the risk of falling into extreme relativism is remedied by
the fact that those things which can be placed as antecedents to the hypothetical
imperatives are limited by our nature and potentialities. In other words, it is not the case
that anything goes.
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Now that we have an idea of how moral network theory works for Flanagan, let’s
turn back to the discussion of neo-compatibilism, and the claim that neo-compatibilism
preserves the idea that even though we do not possess libertarian free will we are still
morally accountable for what we do, and that in some plausible sense we can do other
than we do. 346 First, I address the notion that we can do other than we do, then I examine
the notion of responsibility under his account.
In discussing the neo-compatibilist position, Flanagan writes:
What the neo-compatibilist means when she says that an individual could have done other than
she in fact did is that if that person had seen the situation more clearly, had been sensitive to
reasons she was not in fact sensitive to, she could have done otherwise. 347

In order to get at Flanagan’s point here, it helps to remember how moral learning works
according to moral network theory. Remember, that according to Flanagan’s description
of moral network theory
[…] acquiring knowledge […] is primarily a process of learning how: how to recognize a wide
variety of complex situations and how to respond to them appropriately. […] We are trying to
learn “how best to organize and administer [our] collective and individual affairs.” Social
experience provides feedback about how we are doing, and reliable cognitive mechanisms come
into play in evaluating and assessing this feedback. 348

The assessment of this feedback can then lead to behavioral modification. If the
individual in question fails to recognize or assess this feedback, then the feedback cannot
play a role in directing action. If for example, Michelle had been sensitive to reasons she
was not in fact sensitive to, or in other words, had she recognized and assessed a bit of
feedback that she did not recognize or assess, then she could have done otherwise.
Now, Flanagan points out, this does not mean that she could have acted other than
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she did, “[I]f she acted from deterministic rational causes, whatever they were, then these
necessitated her act.” 349 However, he claims the fact remains that
[…] agents can in fact normally do any number of things. When I consider a number of
options—going to the movies, having a friend over for a visit, staying home and reading a
book—I normally do so only when all the options are open to me, when all are possible and, to
some extent, attractive. When I deliberate and choose any one of them, nothing would prevent
me from carrying through on that choice. Insofar as the worry is about what I can do, the neocompatibilist can make clear sense of the concept of live options. Furthermore, she can make
sense of “could have done otherwise” in the following sense. Even after I choose, say, to go to
the movies, it is still true that I could have stayed home and read had I chosen to do so. 350

So, according to Flanagan, the neo-compatibilist can retain the notion that one “could
have done otherwise” as long as live options are present. In other words, as long as there
are live options present, it is within the realm of possibility that one could have chosen to
perform any of these live options. So, even if the agent chose to do X, it does not change
the fact that it is still true that the agent could have chosen to do Y, as long as Y was a
live option. I now turn to the second part of this discussion, moral responsibility.
With respect to moral responsibility, Flanagan argues that by “responsible for an
act,” the neo-compatibilist means three things:
1. The act was routed through the conscious deliberation/habit module
2. The module is adjustable from the inside, by the agent, and from the outside, by way of
feedback from the moral community.
3. By virtue of being routed through a modifiable cognitive module, the person can learn to
respond differently next time. 351

So, the agent is responsible in the sense that he or she has the capacities needed to
respond differently in the future. 352 In other words, we are able to modify our actions in
response to our own and the community’s responses to our past actions. 353 Flanagan
argues that “there are universal human emotions which are part of the original equipment
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with which we enter the world, just like eyes, ears, noses, and hearts,” 354 and these “basic
emotions express how we feel and convey information to others about how we would like
them to behave.” 355 This is part of the feedback received that allows for us to recognize
which behaviors are in need of modification. Remember, this is how moral learning
works for the moral network theorist. Just as the mine-rock detector learns how to modify
how it distinguishes between rocks and mines as it gets feedback from past experiences,
we learn to modify our actions from the feedback we get from past actions. By
responsible, Flanagan means that since we are “able to modify our future actions in light
of our own and the community’s responses to our past actions,” 356 we have the capacities
required to be able to respond differently in the future. 357 Thus, he claims that “we might
say that a neo-compatibilist agent is responsable (with an “a”, not responsible, with an
“i”).” 358 Flanagan admits that the neo-compatibilist depiction may dissolve the rationale
found in accounts that attach responsibility in only those cases “where the agent could
have done other than she in fact did given her exact state of mind at the time.” 359
However, he does not see this as a real problem in regards to our actual practices. He
claims that “[P]erhaps the situation is akin to Christmas without Santa Claus: Presents are
nonetheless exchanged. The practices stay in place because the fiction that seemed to
motivate them, or be required to make sense of them, turns out to have been
inessential.” 360 In other words, the neo-compatibilist removes the need for agents to
possess libertarian free will in order to be held morally accountable for what they do. In
354
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this sense, libertarian free will is shown to be inessential for continuing the practice of
holding agents accountable. Since the scientific image is incompatible with notions of
free will that require it to be unconstrained by law, it follows that in order to retain moral
accountability and keep it compatible with the scientific image, moral accountability
must be freed from this requirement. This is exactly what Flanagan argues neocompatibilism accomplishes. Thus, according to Flanagan, the neo-compatibilist avoids
the need to require capacities that are incompatible with the scientific image in order to
retain moral accountability. So, for Flanagan, buying into the scientific image still leaves
room for ethics. But what according to Flanagan does ethics entail?
He asserts that ethics is concerned with the question: “How shall I (we) live?” 361
He ultimately defends what he calls “ethics as human ecology.” He claims that
Ecology is a normative science: It studies how different life-forms flourish in their
environments. Certain environments are objectively better for the flourishing of wetlands,
beavers, orchids, and pine forests. Ethics is the normative science that studies the objective
conditions that lead to flourishing of persons. 362

According to Flanagan, broadly speaking, ethics can be conceived as a “systematic
reflection or inquiry into the conditions required for living a good life.” 363 Ecology, as he
describes it, is the “science that studies how living systems relate to each other and to
their environment,” 364 and what it takes for them to flourish. Ethics as human ecology is
a systematic inquiry into what conditions best allow for human beings to flourish. To be
clear, Flanagan does not ignore the question of whether humans have responsibilities to
nature or non-human sentient beings. He claims “[…] if we understand our natures and
that of the rest of natures bounty deeply enough, we will be moved to be morally
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attentive to the well being of much more than our fellow humans. We will have moral
impulses to care for nature as such.” 365 In addition, he argues that this impulse is not
strictly instrumental—it is not motivated by “enlightened self interest”—but rather from a
“[…] recognition that the well-being of nature is an intrinsic good.” 366 Flanagan does not
argue that human well-being is all there is to ethical inquiry. In closing, he maintains that
there is no reason to think that ethics as human ecology is any less objective than ecology
in general. So, if ecology is accepted as offering objective information, then ethics as
human ecology should be accepted as doing the same.

5.2.1 Analysis of Flanagan’s Naturalism in Reference to DST & Autonomy-as-Available-Alternatives

In this section I do two things. First, I display some of the differences between
Flanagan’s account and accounts that assume DST. Second, I draw attention to some of
the similarities and differences found between the account of autonomy-as-availablealternatives offered in Chapter Three, and Flanagan’s argument that in some plausible
sense we can do other than we do, and that we are still morally accountable for what we
do, even though we do not possess libertarian free will.
The first thing to note is that Flanagan appears to place phylogeny in a privileged
position in regards to ontogeny. This much is evidenced in the solution he offers in
response to the worry that his account leaves open the door to extreme relativism. In
offering a response to this worry, he relies on the notion that we have certain innate
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capacities and interests, and these innate capacities and interests constrain the sorts of
things we tend to seek. Accordingly, the types of actions that we desire to perform,
although influenced by culture and environment in general, are restricted by our innate
capacities and interests. Thus, social and cultural influences operate merely as
interference or as background stuff, whereas these innate capacities assume the role of
primary determinant in relation to what sorts of actions we tend to seek. He does not
explain in detail what he means by innate; however, he seems to imply that the innate is
phylogenetic in origin. Further, if he thinks that these innate capacities and interests have
the ability to constrain the sorts of behaviors we are inclined to perform, even in the face
of other developmental influences, and he sees these innate capacities and interests as
being at least somewhat unchanged by ontogeny, then in this sense, he relies on a notion
of phylogeny that sees it as overriding ontogeny in regards to the sorts of behaviors that
we tend to seek.
Further, his explanation shares a similarity with those who offer preformationist
accounts of biology. Remember that preformationists posit that “the information that
programs development is preformed in the genes,” 367 and all other factors are simply
supporting or interfering aspects of development. Under this account, traits or
representations of traits are transmitted to offspring rather than being reconstructed in
development. The gene is portrayed as the steady force, and other factors are seen as
influencing the possible phenotypic outcomes of the gene. However, these possible
phenotypic outcomes are limited by the genes. In other words, the information that
programs development in the genes dictates the range of possible outcomes, and all
causal factors outside the gene simply aid in directing development towards one of these
367
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preprogrammed outcomes. Flanagan implies that we have innate capacities that act in just
this way, they limit or constrain the sorts of actions we tend to seek. Thus, much like the
preformationist places the genes in a privileged position, Flanagan places these innate
capacities in a privileged position.
In contrast, proponents of DST reject both the notion that phylogeny overrides
ontogeny, and the view that there are privileged developmental factors. 368 Thus, it
follows that according to DST, there is no reason to think that the actions we tend to seek
must be constrained by these innate interests and capacities. Further, there is no reason to
think that factors outside what Flanagan calls innate, do not constrain the actions we seek.
In short, there is no reason to place any of these factors in the role of primary
determinant. Flanagan’s response to the worry that his account leaves open the door to
extreme relativism advances a thesis that implies both that phylogeny overrides ontogeny,
and that there are privileged developmental factors. Consequently, in regards to this
response Flanagan’s account is incompatible with DST.
In addition, Flanagan seemingly draws a dichotomy between culture and biology.
In explaining the normative component of naturalistic ethics Flanagan claims that “[O]ne
common rationale for favoring a norm or set of norms is that it is suited to modify,
suppress, transform, or amplify some characteristic or capacity belonging to our nature—
either our animal nature or our nature as socially situated beings.” 369 In this instances it is
clear that Flanagan maintains a distinction between the characteristics that are the result
of our biological nature, and the characteristics that are the result of us being culturally
influenced organisms. In addition, later he claims that “[E]ven prior to the powerful

368
369

See Chapter Two for a detailed account of this rejection.
Flanagan, Sarkissian, and Wong (2008) p.16

175

(natural) effects of culture,” we prefer different things than other animals. 370 Again, we
see him alluding to the idea that there is a clean distinction to be made between culture
and biology. This is something that proponents of DST reject, and thus, this is another
reason why Flanagan’s account fails to align with DST.
Further, Flanagan’s comments point to a hard distinction between humans and the
rest of the animal kingdom. By referring to “our animal nature” as the other half of our
“total nature” he makes clear that organisms outside the species Homo sapiens lack this
other half. While this may be true, it is also true that humans lack many of the
characteristics of other organisms. It is unclear exactly why these other characteristics
should be cashed out as simply the result of “animal nature,” and the characteristics that
result from us being socially situated beings should be seen as the result of something
outside of animal nature. Taking a note from Darwin, we might just think it is part of our
animal nature that we are social beings, and thus the characteristics that obtain because
we are socially situated can be cashed out as part of our animal nature. As I argued
earlier, assuming an evolutionary explanation for development, there is good evidence
that our natures are not static, and thus there is only so much we can draw from these
claims. However, it seems safe to say that DST does not draw a distinction between
animal nature and “natures” that arise due to our being social situated beings. In contrast,
if we take a DST approach, then we are forced to accept that the biology/culture divide is
not warranted. Our biological natures include culture, learning, habituating, etc.
In addition, in contrast to DST, Flanagan maintains a divide between nature and
nurture. In regards to human interests, Flanagan claims that the interests
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[…]we seek to develop are a complex outcome of nature and nurture, as well as what our social
environment favors. For many persons, realizing their complex talents and interests is not in the
cards. Some are prevented by their environment from ever discovering what talents and interests
they have. 371

Here, Flanagan not only draws a distinction between nature and nurture, but he adds a
third distinction, social environment. Furthermore, he uses this distinction to support the
notion that people have certain talents and interests that sometimes do not surface due to
interference from factors outside of nature. 372 One problem with this claim is that there is
no possibility that “nature” exists in isolation from these other factors. It is reasonable to
think that these capacities and interests might be different than they in fact are if there
were changes in these other factors; however, even if these factors were different, they
would still play a role in what capacities and interests do surface. In other words, there
seems to be no way to avoid these other factors playing a role in the development of
one’s interests and talents.
Further, Flanagan’s claim seems to imply that there are “true,” “right,” “normal,”
“best,” etc. talents and interests to be had, and that these are the talents and interests that
would surface if factors outside of “nature” played no role in their development. This is
not to say that Flanagan thinks that due to environmental factors no one ever realizes
these potentialities, just that when one does not realize one’s potential it is due to
environmental factors. Seeing as how there will always be environmental factors,
Flanagan must think that there is some kind of norm for the environment, and when this
norm is interfered with, then it has the possibility of interfering with the capacity for
people to realize their “true” talents and interests. One problem with this position is that
there seems no empirically sound manner that will allow for us to know when one has
371
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realized the talents or interests they are supposed to realize ceteris paribus, and when
they have not. It is highly likely that there are any number of talents and interests that can
or will surface depending on all factors involved in the development of an individual.
Thus, no matter what talents or interests do surface, we will always be left asking what
other talents and interests we might have had if things had been different. Imagine, for
example, that Bruce was born in 1108. Since he was born in 1108, his environment would
be one that lacked as an available alternative the possibility to play electric guitar, thus
we might think that his environment interfered with his talent to play electric guitar. Had
his environment not interfered, then he would have been the first Jimi Hendrix. So, if he
had been born at a different time, say 1936, in a different environment, he might have
realized a talent for playing electric guitar. But notice, this just shows that there will
always be some talent or interest that may not be realized. There seems little worth in
claiming that environment interferes with the capacity to realize talents and interests; it is
more appropriate to speak of the environment as providing opportunities to realize talents
and interests. Depending on one’s environment, the sorts of talents and interests available
will be different. Whether the talents and interests that do arise are “true,” “right,” “best,”
or “normal,” is something that cannot be determined.
There are parts of Flanagan’s account that seem compatible with DST. At least
the following part of ethics as ecology that he offers seems a nice fit with DST. Flanagan
writes:
Ecology teaches that the health of each ecosystem depends on that of every other ecosystem. It is
an empirical mistake to think that a certain ecosystem is in good condition if neighboring ones
are not. Even if an ecosystem is in good shape now, its health is unstable so long as the
neighboring ecosystems are unhealthy. 373
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This is exactly the kind of thing we might expect to hear from a proponent of DST. We
need to be concerned with the stability of the local system, its relations, and interactions,
but not just within itself. It is important that we concern ourselves with the stability of
neighboring local systems, and recognize that the relationship and interactions between
local systems plays a role in the stability of each. In this instance, I think the proponent of
DST will claim that Flanagan has got it right.
Now, I want to draw attention to some of the similarities and differences found
between the account of autonomy-as-available-alternatives offered in Chapter Three, and
Flanagan’s argument that in some plausible sense we can do other than we do, and that
we are still morally accountable for what we do, even though we do not possess
libertarian free will.
Remember, according to Flanagan, the neo-compatibilist can retain the notion that
one “could have done otherwise” as long as live options are present. This is similar to the
notion of autonomy offered in Chapter Three. According to autonomy-as-availablealternatives, as long as there are available alternatives, (which remember means there is
at least one available path, one available faculty present, and the faculty and path are in
the right relationship to allow for action), then the organism in question has at least the
minimum requirements for autonomy. The concept of live options that Flanagan offers
claims that as long as there are live options present, it is within the realm of possibility
that one could have chosen to perform any of these live options. So, even if the agent
chose to do “X,” it does not change the fact that it is still true that the agent could have
chosen to do “Y,” as long as “Y” was a live option. In this sense, live options share a
crucial feature with the notion of available alternatives articulated in my notion of
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autonomy-as-available-alternatives. Mainly, that as long as there are options to be had,
and this means that the organism in question not only has an available path, but the
needed capacity to actually take the available path, then it is reasonable to claim that no
matter what path the organism actually takes, it is still the case that the organism in
question had the capacity to do otherwise. For example, looking back to the example I
offered in Chapter Three, If we place a tree inside a cage, then the tree has no available
paths, and thus cannot do anything but stay inside the cage; however, if we cut a hole in
the top of the cage, thus providing an available alternative path, then it is entirely possible
that the tree grows out of this hole. In other words, it is possible to claim that the tree has
taken a path, and that the tree might have done otherwise. In this instance even if the tree
grows out of the hole, it is still true that it could have not grown out of the hole, and in
this sense, we can retain the notion that it could have done otherwise. One might think the
analogy breaks down due to the fact that Flanagan’s explanation involves an agent that
has the capacity to choose, and that trees (and many other organisms as well) lack this
capacity. I argue that this is not problematic; however, in order to make this clear I need
to say something about what I think the difference between making a choice, and simply
acting is, under my account.
As discussed in Chapter Three, under Richard Campbell’s process-based model
trees may be seen as far-from equilibrium systems that are recursively self-maintenant. In
addition, Campbell claims that “any recursively self-maintenant system is, in at least a
minimal sense, goal-directed.” 374 He adds
Of course, to describe it as ‘goal-directed’ requires an observer. A bacterium does not know, in
any sense other than a fanciful projected metaphor, that it is seeking some nourishing chemical.
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Nevertheless, its characteristic way of switching between swimming and tumbling manifests a
directedness, a ‘towardness’, that can reasonably be described as goal-directedness. 375

Now, he makes clear that at this juncture “speaking of goal-directedness carries no
implication of consciousness.” 376 Campbell then draws a distinction between those
recursively self-maintenant systems that are able to detect that some action they have
performed has been in error, and those that do not. 377 Further, he claims that some
recursively self-maintenant systems which can detect that some action they have
performed has been in error are able to learn from the outcome of their actions, and some
are not. 378 He states, “[H]igher organisms are recursively self-maintenant systems that
cannot only detect error, but can also learn from their mistakes and adjust their behaviour
through anticipating the likely outcomes of the potential interactions indicated to them by
their environmental differentiations. They are ‘flexible learners.’” 379 It is here that I think
the difference between making a choice and merely acting can be demarcated.
In the case of the tree, it is goal-directed in the sense that it manifests a
directedness; however, it does not have the capacity to error detect or learn from its
mistakes in order to adjust its behavior in anticipation of the likely outcomes of its
behavior. In contrast, the agent that Flanagan speaks of does have this capacity. So, by
choice, what we might mean is the internal cause 380 that produces the effect of
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performing an act for an organism that has as an available alternative the capacity to error
detect and learn from its mistakes in order to adjust its behavior in anticipation of the
likely outcomes of its behavior. For example, if organism X, being the type of organism
that has the capacity to error detect and learn from its mistakes in order to adjust its
behavior in anticipation of the likely outcomes of its behavior, has two available
alternatives (or in Flanagan’s terms has two live options) A and B, and the organism
performs A rather than B, then whatever internal mechanism that caused the organism to
perform A rather than B, can be called a choice. In other words, it is the internal causal
mechanism that precedes the doing of A or B. Once A rather than B is done—where only
one of these alternatives can be done at that time, place, etc.—then we can say that X
chose to do A; however, all this means is that “making a choice” is one and the same as
the internal causal mechanism that produced the effect of organism X doing A. In the
case of the tree, it seems right to think that the tree does not possess the same degree of
this internal causal mechanism as a human. So, unlike making a choice between A and B,
the tree, although goal-directed, acts on A or B without anticipating the likely outcomes
of its behavior. However, in both instances the act of doing A rather than B is the result
of a causal mechanism. The only difference in these cases is that certain organisms have
the capacity to error detect and learn from their mistakes in order to adjust their behavior
in anticipation of the likely outcomes of their behavior, and some do not. If this is all that
a choice is, then there seems no reason to think that autonomy-as-available-alternatives
does not share the same capacity as Flanagan’s live options to allow for us to retain the
notion that one could have done otherwise. In other words, in regards to the capacity of
an organism to-have-done-otherwise, it makes little difference if the cause of the action is
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the result of a goal-directedness that lacks the capacity to error detect and learn from its
mistakes, or the action is the result of a goal-directedness that has the capacity to error
detect and learn from its mistakes. In both instances it is still a causal mechanism that
produces the action, and thus, the doing of the action is still bound by law—it is not the
result of some sort of freely authored decision-making that escapes natural law.
In regards to moral responsibility Flanagan claims that as long as “the act is
routed through the conscious deliberation/habit module, the module is adjustable from the
inside, by the agent, and from the outside, by way of feedback from the moral
community, and by virtue of being routed through a modifiable cognitive module, the
person can learn to respond differently next time,” then the agent has the capacities
needed to respond differently in the future, and thus, the agent can be held responsible. 381
In other words, an agent is responsible as long as she is able to modify her actions in
response to her own and the community’s responses to her past actions. 382 It seems that
the deliberation/habit module and the way this module functions for Flanagan are similar
to the notion of reason used for NADST and autonomy-as-available-alternatives. Reason
is one of the faculties that can allow an organism to see an available path, and thus allow
for the identification of an available alternative. 383 However, as articulated previously,
autonomy-as-available-alternatives maintains that the faculty of reason is only possessed
by those organisms with high degrees of autonomy, and these are the only organisms that
can be held responsible for their actions. The main reason given for this, is that the
faculty of reason allows for the organism to ask what should be done. So, it is not simply
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a question of whether or not the organism “could have done otherwise,” but a question of
whether or not the organism can ask itself if it “should do otherwise.” In accessing the
feedback that the organism receives from itself and the community, the organism that
possesses reason as an available faculty has the capacity to ask what it should do in
response to this feedback, and thus modify its action on the basis of this feedback.
According to NADST and autonomy-as-available-alternatives, in order for Flanagan’s
agent to have the capacity to modify her actions on the basis of her own and the
community’s responses to her past actions, reason is the necessary faculty required.

5.3 Pittsburgh Naturalism: McDowell

John McDowell offers a version of naturalism that purports to reconcile what he
calls “bald naturalism,” which sees the natural as those things that are law governed, with
a Kantian notion of rationality, that sees the space of reasons as operating in its own
sphere. The problem consists in the idea that if nature is necessarily linked to the realm of
natural law, and the space of reasons is seen as operating freely in its own sphere, then
the space of reasons may be seen as residing outside nature. 384 McDowell claims that
“[W]e need to recapture the Aristotelian idea that a normal mature human being is a
rational animal, but without losing the Kantian idea that rationality operates freely in its
own sphere.” 385 In doing this, McDowell seemingly makes room for the notion that being
natural is not necessarily coextensive with being law governed.
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In order to allow for the Kantian idea of rationality to be seen as natural,
McDowell introduces a distinction between what he calls first and second nature. He
describes first nature as law governed. This is the only type of nature that he ascribes to
what he calls “mere animals.” Mere animals are subject to a life that is constrained by
biological imperatives. 386 They do not “weigh reasons and decide what to do,” 387 they are
compelled to act on their natural impulses, their “sentience is in the service of a mode of
life that is structured exclusively by immediate biological imperatives.” 388 In essence,
first nature for McDowell is what all of nature is for the bald naturalist. Now, he does not
claim that only mere animals possess a first nature. Human beings too have a first nature;
however, in contrast to mere animals, human beings also have what he calls a second
nature.
Second nature is something that is acquired in addition to first nature, and requires
as a potentiality the possession of rationality. McDowell argues that human beings are
born mere animals, 389 or in other words, we are born into our first nature. 390 We are then,
as McDowell puts it, “transformed into thinkers and intentional agents in the course of
coming to maturity.” 391 So, we are not born with this faculty already intact, but are born
with the potential to acquire this faculty. It should be noted that this is in contrast to mere
animals who lack this potentiality altogether. Second nature is exclusively found in the
domain of human beings; it is described as a natural ability grounded in human nature,
and thus not something that comes naturally to other animals. It is this potential for a
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second nature that McDowell sees as distinguishing the newborn human from mere
animals. 392 So, if infants are born as mere animals, and all that mere animals possess is a
first nature, then this potential must be the result of our first nature. It is important to
remember that McDowell’s account of rationality mirrors the Kantian notion of
rationality that sees it as operating freely in its own spehere, so in order for McDowell to
make the case that second nature is “natural,” he needs a way to show that there is a
natural connection between first nature and second nature. The idea that the potential for
second nature is found in our first nature, is one way that McDowell does this. If the
potential for a second nature relies on an organism’s first nature, then the potential for a
second nature is not free from the realm of law, and thus this potential for a second nature
fits in the domain of “bald naturalism.”
Further, he sees first nature as shaping and placing limits on our second nature.
He claims that “[…] first nature matters […] because the innate endowment of human
beings must put limits on the shapings of second nature that are possible for them.” 393 In
essence, McDowell sees second nature as the actualization of first nature potentialities. 394
He claims that “[S]econd nature could not float free of potentialities that belong to a
normal human organism.” 395 So, if an organism’s potential is shaped and limited by its
first nature, and second nature is a potential for organisms like us, then in this sense the
potential for second nature is bound by first nature. So, human beings are distinguished
from mere animals in the fact that our lives and experiences can be shaped by this
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rationality. 396 This is something that mere animals cannot do; however, the having of this
potential is the result of the law governed first nature that we do share with mere animals.
McDowell believes that this “gives human reason enough of a foothold in the realm of
law to satisfy any proper respect for modern natural science.” 397
In addition, McDowell claims that first nature’s shaping of second nature does not
just involve “a molding of prior motivational tendencies, but also involves the imparting
of practical reason; and reason is inherently open to reflective questions about the rational
credentials of the way it sees things.” 398 He notes that one consequence of this imparting
of practical reason is that it opens the door to reflective questioning that may call into
question the rational cogency of the outlook from which this reflection takes place. If this
outlook is the result of second nature, then it leaves the possibility that one may come to
think, rightly or wrongly, that the outlook associated with second nature fails to be
rationally cogent. In response to this worry he argues that:
if something is to be an intelligible candidate for being the way second nature should be, it must
at least be intelligible that the associated outlook could seem to survive this reflective scrutiny.
And there are limits on the courses reflection can intelligibly take, which come out in limits on
what can be intelligible in the way of statements that purport to express part of such reflection. 399

He believes we can easily expose the limitations of this reflection by looking at the
capacity to convey one’s thoughts to others. If we are unable to intelligibly convey our
thoughts, then he thinks that it brings into doubt “whether what one has engaged in was
really thought at all.” 400 So, he claims that there are limits to what reflection can
intelligibly do, and he argues that “one source of these limits on intelligibility is first
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nature.” 401 In short, first nature shapes the space in which reflection can take place, and
thus places limits on the courses reflection can intelligibly take.
Further, McDowell claims that first nature not only aids in shaping and limiting
the space in which reflection takes place, but “first natural facts can also be part of what
reflection takes into account.” 402 He claims that this is where “we can register the
relevance of what human beings need in order to do well, in a sense of ‘doing well’ that
is not just Aristotle’s ‘acting in accordance with virtues.’ ” 403 So, in reflecting on what
action to take, first natural facts play a role in what action second nature recommends. He
claims that the “basic picture is that putative reasons need to be grounded in facts of
disenchanted nature. And those facts can include such things as what animals of a
particular species need in order to do well in the sort of life they naturally live.” 404 So, in
acquiring a second nature first natural facts are some of the things that second nature
must take into account. Second nature is “a formed state of practical reason.” 405 Thus,
second nature does not free an organism from taking the demand of first natural facts into
account, but, as McDowell notes, it does allow the organism “to step back from any
motivational impulse one finds oneself subject to, and question its rational credentials.”
406

Second nature “[…] effects a kind of distancing of the agent from the practical

tendencies that are part of what we might call his first nature.” 407 McDowell writes:
Reason does not just open our eyes to our nature, as members of the animal species we belong
to; it also enables and even obliges us to step back from it, in a way that puts its bearing on our
practical problems into question. 408
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In this sense, second nature takes on an authoritative role in regards to these practical
tendencies. It calls into question whether or not these tendencies, which are part of our
first nature, should be acted on. So, even though second nature takes first natural facts
into consideration, there are many times when the practical reason of the agent in
question will not necessarily accept first natural facts as good reasons for action. In fact,
McDowell notes that “what the members of a species need is not guaranteed to appeal to
practical reason.” 409 Thus, even though first natural facts are part of what second nature
takes into account when recommending action, second nature is not bound to these facts.
At least according to McDowell’s explanation, it follows that once second nature
becomes actualized, it then operates freely in its own sphere. Thus, first nature is law
governed, the potentiality for second nature is law governed, but the exercising of second
nature is not governed by natural law. The most difficult problem for McDowell to
overcome is how it is that second nature operates freely, but is still natural.
To this end, he asserts that it is “not naturalistic in the sense of purporting to
found intellectual credentials of practical reason on facts of the sort that the natural
sciences discover.” 410 So, second nature is not natural in the sense that it can be explained
by the law governed facts purported to be discovered by the natural sciences, but it is
nonetheless natural. He argues that the natural is not confined to only those things
discovered through the methodology of the natural sciences. He writes:
[…] second nature acts in a world in which it finds more than what is open to view from the
dehumanized stance that the natural sciences, rightly for their purposes, adopt. And there is
nothing against bringing this richer reality under the rubric of nature too. The natural sciences do
not have exclusive rights in that notion; and the added richness comes into view, not through the
operations of some mysteriously extra-natural power, but because human beings come to possess
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a second nature. […]Nature, on this richer conception, is to some extent autonomous with
respect to nature on the natural-scientific conception” 411

McDowell expands his notion of the natural to include more than what the natural
sciences offer. In this sense, second nature is seen as independent from the notion of
nature found in the natural sciences, but nonetheless natural. He argues that we obtain our
second nature through a proper or improper upbringing. He claims that it is an “element
in the normal coming to maturity of the kind of animals we are.” 412 McDowell explains
that “[…] the dictates of reason are there anyway, whether or not one’s eyes are opened
to them; that is what happens in a proper upbringing.” 413 Further, he asserts that “any
actual second nature is a cultural product.” 414 So, he sees second nature as the result of
habituation and socialization, and habituation and socialization as part of the normal
contributing factors in the lives of the human animal. He adds, “Human life, our natural
way of being, is already shaped by meaning. We need not connect this natural history to
nature as the realm of law any more tightly than by simply affirming our right to the
notion of second nature.” 415 He adds
We are looking for a conception of our nature that includes a capacity to resonate to the structure
of the space of reasons. Since we are setting our faces against bald naturalism, we have to
expand nature beyond what is countenanced in a naturalism of the realm of law. But the
expansion is limited by the first nature, so to speak, of human animals, and by plain facts about
what happens to human animals in their upbringing. 416

The main idea is that in order to retain room for “the space of reasons” in a naturalistic
conception, we need to expand our conception of the natural to include more than the
realm of law; however, in order to avoid positing an account that relies on a notion of the
natural that is independent of the realm of law, he argues that first nature limits this
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expansion, and thus second nature is not completely removed from the realm of law. In
other words, second nature still has a foothold in the realm of law. 417
At this point I want to turn to McDowell’s discussion on the connection between
doing well and virtue. He states:
It is important that when the connections between virtue and doing well—in a sense that is not
Aristotle’s ‘acting in accordance with virtues,’ a sense that is not itself shaped by ethical
concerns—do figure in a reflective reassurance about an ethical outlook, they operate at one
remove from the subject’s rational will. What directly influences the will is the valuations of
actions that have come to be second nature. 418

As noted previously, the acquiring of our second nature is the result of what McDowell
calls a proper upbringing. This upbringing helps to ingrain the value of certain modes of
behavior into the subject—modes of behavior that are seen by the community as
acceptable, mandatory, encouraged, as well as modes of behavior that are seen as
unacceptable. 419 It is in this ingraining that the modes of behavior that are seen as
virtuous are learned, habituated, and imitated. Anne-Marie Christensen’s explains that
“virtue as a form of second nature is developed by imitation, training, and a general
initiation into a culture.” 420 McDowell argues that this helps to cope “with the fact that
virtue sometimes requires self-sacrifice.” 421 To illustrate his point, he examines the
connection of courage with doing well.
He claims that “[T]he connection of courage and doing well, in the relevant sense,
is that human beings need courage if they are to stick to their worthwhile projects, in the
face of the motivational obstacle posed by danger.” 422 He claims that it is something like
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this that lies in the reflective background of a second nature that values courage;
however, he wants to make clear that this reflection does not directly engage with the will
of a courageous person, as stated earlier, the reflective reassurance about an ethical
outlook operates at one remove from the subject’s rational will. The problem with seeing
this reflection as engaging directly with the will of the courageous person, is that if we
do, then, as McDowell states, we “risk losing our hold on how it can be rational to face
danger, even in the interest of something one values deeply, if one’s death is a possible
upshot” 423 Now, he notes that all this may be undermined by the thought that in acting
courageously there is a probability that it may lead to death, and thus there will be no
projects to stick to. In response, he claims that being courageous “is primarily a matter of
being a certain kind of person.” 424
One cannot be that kind of person but stand ready to rethink the rational credentials of the
motivations characteristic of being that kind of person, on occasions when acting on those
motivations is in some way unattractive; part of what it is to be that kind of person is not to
regard those credentials as open to question on particular occasions. 425

He argues that this response is right, but only insofar as the “general human need for
courage stands at one remove from the rational will of a person engaged in courageous
behavior.” 426 Otherwise, he maintains that this response appears to be a
“recommendation to abandon reason,” 427 which he claims, “surely does examine the
rational credentials of actions one by one—in favor of blind adherence to a policy.” 428 He
argues that as long as this need for courage is at one remove from the rational will, then
the damage that acts of virtue produce is unproblematic. He adds:
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[…] the point of a particular courageous action lies not in the fact that human beings in general
need courage, focused, as it were, on the circumstances at hand, but in the fact that this action
counts as worth-while in its own right, by the lights of a conceptual scheme that is second nature
to a courageous person. 429

In short, the second nature of a courageous person displays courage to this person as
something that one ought to pursue for its own sake. As McDowell notes, “second nature
will seem to its possessor to open his eyes to reasons for acting.” 430 These reasons—
operating at a remove from the rational will—then become the motivation for performing
one act rather than another. Thus in circumstances that require courageous behavior, the
second nature of the courageous person—acting at one remove from the rational will—is
not clouded by the possibility that the courageous act at hand may lead to one’s demise.
If the rational will was engaged directly by this notion, then the courageous person would
have to either accept that they must abandon reason in this instance, or abandon the
courageous act itself. In regards to the virtuous person, McDowell ultimately claims that
“[…] we can say that reason reveals the dictates of virtue to them as genuine
requirements on a rational will, and the reason that effects this revelation is their acquired
second nature.” 431 If one is a virtuous person, then their second nature will effect the need
to act virtuously, and the performance of virtuous actions will then seem to this person as
a requirement of a rational will.

5.3.1 Analysis of McDowell’s Naturalism in Reference to DST

The goal of this section is to expose some of the incompatibilities between
McDowell’s account, and accounts that assume DST. The first thing to note is McDowell
429
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appears to draw a dichotomy between biology and culture. Remember, in contrast to first
nature, he claims that “any actual second nature is a cultural product.” 432 In drawing a
distinction between first and second nature, he seemingly must draw a distinction
between biology and culture. On the one hand, we have first nature which is bound by
law, and something that the human animal shares with the rest of nature. On the other
hand we have second nature which is not completely law bound, and something that the
human animal does not share with the rest of nature. In his terms, first nature is the
“innate endowment of human beings […] that put limits on the shaping’s of second
nature that are possible for them.” 433 Following these few claims, it is safe to say that
McDowell sees first nature as innate, and second nature as acquired through culture. In
this sense, McDowell draws a distinction between inherited and acquired components of
an organism. In contrast, according to Oyama and proponents of DST, since all features
of a phenotype must develop, “they are all acquired in ontogeny.” 434 Due to the fact that
there are certain conditions required for the development of any phenotype, and these
conditions are part of the formation of the organism from the beginning, “they are all
‘environmental.’” 435 Thus, according to Oyama, “If one seriously accepts the origin of
phenotypes in causal interaction, […] no distinction between inherited and acquired
components of the organism is defensible.” 436 In explaining the difference between first
and second nature, McDowell seems to draw a distinction between acquired and inherited
components, and this is something that proponents of DST must reject.
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Further, McDowell claims that “second nature is the actualization of first nature
potentialities.” 437 This characterization of how first and second nature interact, shares a
similarity with the genecentric view rejected by proponents of DST. He adds, “Of course
first nature matters. It matters, for one thing, because the innate endowment of human
beings must put limits on the shaping’s of second nature that are possible for them.” 438 It
is clear that he sees first nature as placing limits on second nature. In much the same light
as those that accept the genecentric view of development, where genes are seen as
placing limitations on the extent of the developmental influence of other factors, first
nature places limitations on the amount of influence that second nature contributes. It
seems that McDowell views second nature as a kind of background interference, and first
nature as the leading mechanism in the development of an organism’s tendencies. Second
nature does a play a role, but whatever role it does play is constrained by the dominating
effects of first nature. Thus, in the eyes of those that accept DST, McDowell is guilty of
endorsing a primary determinant. First nature is the primary and limiting determinant of
the tendencies that organisms possess, and second nature operates as a secondary
determinant for how these innate tendencies ultimately manifest.
According to DST, nature is the result of nurture, and thus, to use McDowell’s
terminology, second nature is best seen as part of the human animal’s first nature. Now,
McDowell does attempt to include “nurture” in his concept of second nature, but his
insistence on seeing first nature as a limiting force in the actualization of second nature
seems to place McDowell in the same position as those that argue for genes as the
limiting resource involved in phenotypic outcomes. So, McDowell may be read as
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promoting first nature to a privileged position in the development of an organism’s
character.
Moreover, if second nature is the actualization of first nature potentialities, then
second nature is at least partially law bound, and although McDowell has made it clear
that this is exactly what he needs in order to maintain that second nature has a foothold in
the realm of law—which he gets from the fact that second nature is limited by first nature
potentialities—he still wants to maintain that second nature is not constrained completely
by the realm of law. He argues that this allows room for the space of reasons to be seen as
spontaneous. In response, it is difficult to see how McDowell can make room for a
Kantian notion of rationality, and maintain that it is still natural, simply because second
nature is partially law bound. Apparently he thinks that the foothold in the realm of law
that second nature has, as a consequence of being limited by first nature, is enough to get
this; however, it seems that rather than “naturalizing” second nature, which by all
standards discussed in Chapter One involves bringing it under the realm of law, he
instead removes this component as a necessary part of what it means to be natural.
In regards to this move, Gubeljic, Link, Müller, and Osburg note, “[S]ince the
naturalness of all other things derives from their conformity to laws, we might think of
human beings as being discontinuous with the rest of nature.” 439 McDowell seemingly
draws a distinction of kind between humans and other animals, which seems to indicate
that he does see the human animal as distinct from the remainder of nature. 440 McDowell
argues that mere animals lack the freedom we do. He writes, “[I]n mere animals,
sentience is in the service of a mode of life that is structured exclusively by immediate
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biological imperatives.” 441 However, as evidenced by his notion of second nature in the
human animal, and his discussion of the virtuous person, he does not view the human
animal as suffering from the same kind of constraint. Now, the problem does not arise
from the notion that, in contrast to the human animal, “mere animals” lack the capacity to
circumvent what he calls “immediate biological imperatives,” the problem arises in the
notion that second nature is not law bound. If, as Gubeljic, Link, Müller, and Osburg
claim, “the naturalness of all other things derives from their conformity to laws,” and
McDowell insists on explaining second nature as a nature that does not necessarily
conform to these laws, then the human animal must be discontinuous with the rest of
nature. However, if this is the case, then it seems McDowell has lost the foothold within
the realm of law that he needs in order to maintain that second nature is continuous with
the rest of nature. This seems a problem for McDowell if he wishes to maintain that his
view of the human animal is naturalistic. I see no reasonable manner that will allow for
him to maintain this divide between first and second nature, and allow room for the
Kantian notion of rationality within second nature without invoking something that
appears in all light to be unnatural.
In addition, McDowell asserts that “[…] practical reason distances an agent from
his natural motivational impulses.” 442 Taking the DST perspective, there is no reason not
to assume that if one of the faculties an organism possesses is practical reason, then
practical reason is just part of one’s natural motivational impulses. Remember, for
Oyama, an organism’s nature simply amounts to whatever attributes identify an organism
at a particular time, and these attributes are the result of developmental processes. If
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McDowell is to maintain that second nature is natural, then it follows that second nature
too is part of one’s natural motivational impulses. His insistence on separating second
nature from first nature is something that DST has no reason to divide as long as second
nature is simply seen as ontogenetic in origin, which McDowell implies is the case. Now,
McDowell’s insistence that the space of reasons operates at a distance from the realm of
law is something that DST cannot accommodate, but all this means is that McDowell’s
second nature loses its spookiness when brought under the heading of naturalism. In
short, rather than positing a quality to second nature that detaches it from the realm of
law, the move to make is to offer a complex law guided explanation for how reason
functions. This may not be something that we are capable of doing currently, but it is
what is required in order to justify second nature as natural.
I want to note that both Flanagan and McDowell’s versions of naturalism assume
at least some form of an essentialist notion of nature or at least maintain a dichotomy that
is not warranted if DST is the guiding principle. This is something that I want to separate
from, and I think the injection of DST into the conversation aids in doing just this. Thus,
in the following section I discuss the reconceptualization of nature found in the DST
literature, and evaluate the result that this reconceptualization has on a naturalized ethics.

5.4 The Consequences of Reconceptualizing the Natural for a Naturalized Ethics

In respect to the project of naturalizing ethics, Oyama’s notion of nature allows
for the inclusion of resources that may be seen by some as non-natural. She claims that
“[H]uman biology is […] not a matter of individuals with fixed internal natures, but of
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changing natures that are a function of reciprocal relations with environments that always
have a social aspect.” 443 This view allows for a more complex and dynamic notion of
what it means to be natural, and thus allows for more factors to be taken into
consideration when attempting to naturalize ethics. What I propose is a developmental
moral system.
Discussing DST, William Rottschaefer writes:
[…] a DST approach would argue that equal emphasis on the non-genetic factors involved in the
production of moral agency is both required theoretically and supported empirically. In
particular, the current attempts to connect genes and human nature and human nature with
morality are unfounded, though not because morality is a purely cultural phenomenon rather
than a biological one. They are unfounded because moral agency, […] is better understood as a
biological/cultural unit, a developmental system. 444

Assuming DST, it must be the case that moral agency is at least the result of a
biological/cultural unit. Since DST sees culture, environment, and other non-genetic
factors as comprising biology, I think it right to think that moral agency according to
DST is best articulated as a developmental moral system. Proponents of DST 445 claim
that there is empirical evidence that displays the capacity for stable non-genetic factors to
determine phenotypes. Recall these examples from Chapter Two:
Different developmental influences can be stable within any lineage. These influences “may
follow a lineage equally closely through evolution, even though one is genetic and the other
‘environmental’” 446 It may be the case that the extracellular resources are as stable as the
intracellular resources in some instances. Resources such as the types of food available may in
some cases maintain stability through a lineage, and thus must also be seen as having the
capacity to determine phenotypes. 447

Oyama cites phenocopying as a further example.
Phenocopying […] occurs when genetic mutations, as well as changes in the outside world, can
bring about similar alterations in the organism. There are bithorax mutants in Drosophila, but
443
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the bithorax phenotype can also be induced by ether. Genes and ether shocks turn out to be
developmentally equivalent in this respect. 448

Instances such as these offer empirical evidence in support of the notion that stable nongenetic factors do indeed have the capacity to determine phenotypes. Compare this to the
claims made in Chapter Three in regards to autonomy-as-available-alternatives. In that
discussion I argued that autonomy, or the capacity to do otherwise, is found in the
relationship between available faculties and environmentally available paths. Non-genetic
factors are clearly part of the resources that play a role in forming these faculties, and
creating these paths. Again, as I have argued previously, special attention should be
placed on the relationship between faculties and paths. Having a path and a faculty does
little good if they are not in the type of relationship needed in order for the faculty to
access the path, and thus make available to the organism in question alternative actions.
The point is that in order to reach a level of autonomy that justifies attributing moral
responsibility to an organism, the relationship between genetic and non-genetic factors
must be such that it allows for the recognition of the right kind of available alternatives. It
is not simply a case of an organism having available to them the faculty of reason due to
its genes, or having a door in the room as a result of the local environment, it is a case of
having just the right combination of these things in order to allow for the recognition of
the right kind of available alternatives. In short, it is the result of the interaction between
genetic and non-genetic factors that enables an organism to not only do otherwise, but
also to reach a level of autonomy that justifies attributing responsibility to that organism.
As mentioned in Chapter Three, by the right kind of available alternatives I mean those
alternatives that allow for one to ask: “what should I do.” The answer to this question
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seems to involve many factors outside of those that are genetic; 449 however, I want to
urge that the question itself, the motivation to find this answer, also includes many factors
outside of those that are genetic.
I maintain that autonomy-as-available-alternatives maps onto the concept of
nature offered by DST, and in doing so offers a reasonable empirical argument for the
admittance of autonomy as a non-absolute, and thus as something that admits to
differences in degrees. Further, I claim that it offers a reasonable explanation for when it
is justifiable to attribute moral responsibility to certain organisms. The answer in short is
found in the notion of viewing moral agency as the result of a developmental moral
system that evolves not simply culturally, but biologically.
Before closing, I think its worthwhile to take a brief look back at a remark
Flanagan makes. He comments on how certain traditions identify problems with living
our lives solely according to our biological natures. 450 These traditions attempt to
promote a morality that stems from our capacity to circumvent our biological natures in
favor of some other component that is deemed a more appropriate method of motivation
when deciding what to do or not do when a moral or immoral act is what is at stake. In
short, these traditions think we should not simply follow the recommendations of our
biological natures. DST’s allowance of social, cultural, and environmental resources to be
included in our biological natures aids in removing the stigma that these traditions place
on following our biological natures. If our biological natures include these other factors,
then the use of them to avoid acting on our biological natures is no longer applicable,
they are just part of our biological natures. This conception of biology, then, sees our
449
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biological nature as supplying just what we need in order to motivate actions that we
deem appropriate. In Flanagan’s terms, the feedback we get from our community which
informs us as to what modifications we ought make to our actions, can be encompassed
within what we call our biological nature. Cultural and social influences are no longer
seen as in competition with our biological nature—they are simply part of our biological
nature.
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Conclusion

Throughout this project I have been committed to the idea that ethical normativity
is compatible with scientific explanation. I have been at pains to formulate and explore a
naturalistic approach to ethics setting out from the examination of naturalism with which
I began. I argued that of the two main varieties of naturalism—metaphysical and
methodological—methodological naturalism is the most viable position to hold. I then
discussed ethical naturalism and examined some of the problems associated with attempts
to naturalize ethics. After considering various objections and responses to naturalized
ethics I concluded that the debate is still open, and that further work in this area is
warranted. I drew attention to the idea that the versions of ethical naturalism discussed all
appear to presuppose at least some form of an essentialist concept of nature. At that
junction I turned to developmental systems theory. The reconceptualization of nature
found in the writings of Oyama and other proponents of DST contrasts sharply with such
essentialist notions. The inclusion of culture and non-genetic factors within the natural
may change how we see ethics. The intent of this project has been to outline some of the
changes in how we see ethics when understood from the theoretical/empirical perspective
of DST. So, I am not solely concerned with approaching ethics from a naturalistic
position, but from the viewpoint of DST specifically.
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I then turned to an examination of autonomy, and offered a naturalized account of
autonomy under the umbrella of DST (NADST). I argued that autonomy if naturalized,
and guided by DST, must be seen as admitting to differences of degrees. This argument
turns on the idea that autonomy can be seen as the capacity to access available
alternatives. I called this capacity “autonomy-as-available-alternatives.” In short,
different individual organisms have different faculties, different paths, and different
faculty/path relationships. It is in these differences that autonomy is shown to admit of
degrees. On this basis we can establish what it means to be more or less autonomous. The
most autonomous creatures are those with all possible faculties, all possible paths, and all
paths and faculties in the kind of relationship that allows for access to and recognition of
the paths. As mentioned in earlier chapters, this is simply an ideal, and no creature on this
planet appears to possess this degree of autonomy; however, it seems clear that some do
possess a higher degree of autonomy than others. I argued that it is in this difference that
we can find room to hold certain individual organisms responsible for their actions.
Organisms that possess the faculty of reason, a path, and the proper relationship between
the faculty of reason and the path can be held responsible for their actions because they
have the capacity to ask what action should be performed. Their autonomy is of a degree
that allows for alternative actions to be available, and allows for the capacity to judge if
these available alternative actions are to be acted on or not. This lead to the following
questions: 1) What sorts of faculty/path relationships motivate an action rather than just a
mere behavior? 2) Is the possession of reason as a faculty necessary for a behavior to
count as an action? 3) If the faculty of reason is not necessary for a behavior to count as
an action, then what is?
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I argued that although reason can play a role in autonomy, it does not necessarily
play the primary role in determining whether an organism is autonomous. Reason is just
one of many possible interactants involved in the development of autonomy. Reason is
not the sole necessary motivating source of an action. One other possible motivating
source of action is inclination. This lead to two further questions about inclination: 1)
What is the source of inclination? 2) How is it that inclination can be seen as agential? In
light of these questions, I investigated the notion of inclination, and how it might look if
approached from the standpoint of DST. I examined an argument by Tamar Schapiro, and
noted that her allowance of nonrational activity as consistent with agency opens the
possibility for more alternatives. I then concluded that this makes Schapiro’s notion of
inclination a better fit for NADST than either the extreme anti-rationalist or extreme
rationalist accounts of inclination.
My project has been shaped by the general naturalistic commitment that ethical
normativity is compatible with scientific explanation. In the final chapter, investigated
two prominent and contemporary versions of ethical naturalism offered by John
McDowell and Owen Flanagan in order to compare them to the DST-informed view I
developed in the first four chapters. I argued that the concept of nature used in these
versions differs from the notion of nature found in naturalistic frameworks that assume
DST. Both Flanagan’s and McDowell’s versions of naturalism either assume some form
of essentialist notion of nature, or at least maintain a dichotomy that is not needed if DST
is the guiding principle.
In closing I suggested that the project of naturalizing ethics, if informed by DST,
should view moral agency as an outcome of a developmental moral system. This system
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is one that evolves not merely developmentally, biologically, or culturally, but along a
trajectory defined by the intersection of all three. Further, ontogeny and phylogeny, and
genes and environment, no longer stand in dichotomous relationships. In contrast, these
factors are seen as involved in an interactive relationship that mutually constructs
phenotypes. This view sees genetic and non-genetic factors as a working whole, all under
the umbrella of “the natural.” The interaction between genetic and non-genetic factors
constitutes a system that either allows an organism to be autonomous, to a degree, or
prevents an organism from being autonomous, to a degree. This approach places
autonomy squarely in the realm of the natural.
In addition, I have urged that the inseparability of genetic and non-genetic factors
is crucial with regard to attributing responsibility to organisms. NADST proposes that
autonomy admits of differences in degree, and that it is in these differences that room can
be made for responsibility. Describing autonomy as the capacity to access available
alternatives helps to articulate how these differences in degree come about. If available
alternatives are the result of having an available faculty and path in the kind of
relationship that allows access to the path, and different faculties allow for different paths
to be recognized and accessed, and different paths offer different alternatives to be
recognized and accessed by these faculties, then assuming that organisms do not all share
the exact same faculties, paths, and faculty-path relationships, it follows that individual
organisms will differ in the quality and quantity of autonomy they possess at a given
time. If responsibility is attributed to only those organisms that have a certain degree of
autonomy, as autonomy-as-alternatives suggests, then the faculties, paths, and facultypath relationships that are included in an organism’s system play a significant role in
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determining whether or not an organism’s degree of autonomy meets the minimum
criteria for attributing responsibility to that organism.
Further, the faculties, paths, and faculty-path relationships that are present to an
organism are always the product of interaction between genetic and non-genetic factors.
Thus, the relationship between genetic and non-genetic factors present in an organism’s
system play a significant role in determining the degree of autonomy possessed by an
organism, and thus play a significant role in determining if an organism’s degree of
autonomy warrants attributing responsibility to that organism. Autonomy-as-availablealternatives maintains that the relationship between genetic and non-genetic factors must
allow for the recognition of the right kind of available alternatives in order to attribute
responsibility to an organism. I have argued that the right kind of available alternatives
only present themselves when the organism in question has available the faculty of
reason, and it is situated in a manner that allows the organism to access an available path.
Further, the organism in question must have the capacity to ask if it should act on the
available path which is a capacity that is also only available to those organisms that have
reason as an available faculty. So, simply satisfying the minimal criteria for autonomy is
not coextensive with having moral responsibility. In short, it is the interaction between
genetic and non-genetic factors that enables an organism to not only do otherwise, but
also to reach a level of autonomy that allows for the organism to not only access available
paths, but also question which path[s] it should access, and thus justify attributing
responsibility to that organism.
It will be helpful to reiterate what goals this project does and does not pursue.
This project is not applied ethics. It does not directly engage in moral theory. I do not
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address any specific moral problems, nor attempt to offer solutions to any pressing ethical
matters. I have not attempted to show how one would go about addressing a moral
problem by application of some guiding principle or rule. Rather, my project may be best
seen as having a meta-ethical character. I argue that ethics needs to be compatible with
and understood from a scientific perspective. DST seems a beneficial avenue of
explanation within science, and thus, it is worthwhile to examine the implications of
naturalizing ethics under the guise of DST. The goal of the project was to sketch out
some of the changes in how we see ethics when viewed in this way.
More needs to be said about how differences in degrees of autonomy arise. I have
made a point of explaining how it is that an organism can have more or less autonomy
based on the available faculties, paths, and the faculty/path relationship; but it is
important to consider not only the different degrees, but also the different qualities of
autonomy. In addition, further questions remain regarding the faculty/path relationship.
When assessing the relationship between faculties and paths it is important to recognize
the sorts of possible relationships available to the organism in question. One avenue of
investigation that may help lead the way in accomplishing this task is found in Richard
Campbell’s process-based model for ontology. The success of a DST approach to
naturalized ethics thus may depend upon a further exploration of the success of process
ontology.
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